The Evening Post WELLINGTON, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1945.

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 149, 21 December 1945, Page 6

The Evening Post WELLINGTON, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1945.

JAVA:.,AMERICA SPEAKS

Owing to the suddenness of Japan's collapse, the .Netherlands East Indies, French Indo-China. y and Manchuria ! presented grave problems of readjustment. The Japanese authority came to an end by the surrender; and as neither the Allied armies, nor the i Allied Governments who were the prewar owners of the territory, were physically in a position to be • present to accept the surrender, disarm all the Japanese, rescue internees, and keep order, there was a real danger that all authority would temporarily lapse. The time-lag between the surrender, and the reoccupation of the' East Indies, Indo-China, and Manchuria by the Allies, played into the hands of first-comers, whether the first-comers be groups of native inhabitants as in Java, or racing Communist and Nationalist armies as in Manchuria. The time-lag created a kind of lawless vacuum which also gave the Japanese forces, still armed, a singular chance to play opportunist tricks. The Japanese could aid irresponsible firstcomers by giving them arms, although there was no title, under the surrender, for the Japanese to yield arms to irresponsibles or for the irresponsibles to accept. Not only could the armed Japanese seek to hinder the Allied armies in that way; the Japanese could also take armed action, defensive or offensive, against irresponsible and disorderly factions, and if. the factions happened to be Javanese, the Japanese could thus give the Leftists of Australia and . other countries a propagandist opportunity to j distort the facts, by alleging that the j Allied forces were using Japanese troops to slaughter the Javanese. This opportunity to distort the story of events in Java will continue until all the antecedent facts of JapaneseJavanese clashes, and JapaneseJavanese conspiracies, are known.

In Manchuria it was difficult for the Americans (1) "to accept the surrender of Japanese forces, (2) •to remove them, (3) to liberate prisoners of war, and (4) to assure the safety of civilians interned by the Japanese," but these four duties were still more difficult in Java, where the burden fell on Empire foixes. How can such duties be begun from the outside, and carried out progressively through many miles of rough country, against armed resistance of all sorts, without incurring the ■allegation that the British, in the execution of the four, duties and in preserving order, are helping the Dutch to resume their former legal and constitutional position in Java? On the face of things, it ; would seem that any kind of penetration of Java.or of Indo-China, for whatever lawful purpose,1 ' ;must -automatically ; help the Dutch and the French to return to their former { status —which status would still be compatible with peaceable negotiations for autonomy between the restored constitutional Administrations and the native population. To ask the British to execute the surrender in Java, without indirectly helping the Dutch to return, seems to resemble a desire to make" omelettes without breaking eggs. In its first policy statement on Java and Indonesia —a statement of far-reaching importance —the U.S. Department .of State "has no thought of extending the Allied mandate beyond the specific responsibilities" stated at the beginning of this paragraph, but the Department adds: "It has been necessary, however.' for British troops to assure such order as is necessary for the execution of the Allied objectives." It is obvious that the degree of order necessary to execute the Allied objectives is also a degree of order that the Javanese groups seeking to jump the Dutch Government's seat feel they must resist,' and ihey have resisted. This is the situation that Leftist propaganda distorts.,, ; ';

The statement of the State Department is important because, following on the Bretton Woods agreement, the United Nations Charter, and various decisions of the President and U.S. Congress, it is one more proof that America is not shrinking from the detailed responsibilities that American participation in world affairs involves. The original decision that placed Japan and Manchuria in the American zone, and which placed the Dutch East Indies in the British zone, was strategic, not political. War strategydictated America's concentration on the northern attack,'and Britain's war responsibility in South-east: Asia. When political 'considerations became predominant and urgent after' 'Japan's sudden surrender, America seemed to be likely to meet with the same ambiguous situation in Manchuria as Britain met with in Java. But, owing possibly to' luck as wel) as to good management, the Manchuria difficulties seem to be smoothing themselves out; and the U.S. Department of State has done the right thing in speaking out, at last, concerning Java, and in acknowledging Britain's difficulties in the necessary restoration of order. The Department acknowledges that America "shared responsibility for the decision to send British troops to Indonesia" for the objectives stated above." That is to say, if all that Britain has done is necessary for [realising those objectives, and even if incidentally clashes with Javanese have arisen, America stands behind Britain. As to the future, the Department of State declares: "Extremist or irresponsible action or failure to present or consider specific proposals can only lead to a disastrous situation. Primary responsibility rests on the Dutch and Indonesian leaders, but the United States cannot fail to be deeply interested. Our sole desire is to see a peaceful settlement which .will best aid world stability and prosperity and happiness of the people. It is hoped that a settlement. will be'reached in harmony with the principle and ideals of the United Nations declaration and charter."