The Evening Post WELLINGTION, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1945.

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 56, 4 September 1945, Page 6

The Evening Post WELLINGTION, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1945.

ALWAYS AN ENGLAND

Economically as well as politically "there will always be an England." That is the assumption which, we think, underlies the American attitude and the world's attitude to Britain; it is an assumption that is not placed in doubt by metaphorical allusions to Britain's "economic Dunkirk." What is in doubt is not Britain's position as a Great Power, economic and political, but the immediate. means to the end. The ultimate goal is clear; the transitional methods are full- of difficulty. The question is not whether Britain as a debtor is regarded in America.as being worthy of creditor help; *the question is: "What form of creditor help?" As "The Economist" observes, "the danger is not that further American assistance will not be forthcoming, but that it will be forthcoming only on terms that postpone indefinitely, the prospect of achieving independence of further assistance." For instance, a greater reliance by Britain on American financial assistance and long-term loans would mean a longer period of leaning on the United States; a lesser reliance would mean a speedier return by Britain to financial-economic independence, but a greater strain upon the war-worn British population and industries, which would have to finance the national life by greater industrial output and greater exports in a shorter time. If Britain does not buy> her external requirements (imports, etc.) by an extended use of American credit, she must buy them by means of greater production and greater sales oversea. Exports of goods, to balance imports, are preferred in Britain to imports of credit. But . can British exports be rebuilt rapidly without some sacrifice in Britain's standard of living?

No such question troubled the Germans who directed Germany's borrowing policy after World War I. The Germans were prepared to invoke financial chaos at home and the chaos of war abroad. Defeated Germany dug a pit for lenders into which foreign lenders fell. But to' plan destructively is far easier than to plan constructively; and that truth applies with peculiar emphasis to a debtor country who inherits the sterling tradition and has no desire to jump on the dollar band wagon. Britain desires to retain not only financial independence, but a tolerable standard of living, and to make these two ends meet is not easy. In the last 25 years there have been periods when the people of Russia, in order to buy abroad the -things required for national reconstruction, had to deprive themselves and to go hungry; in order to survive nationally within the Soviet national framework, the Russian people frequently had to send their best to other peoples. New Zeala'nders would form some idea^pf what happened in Russia if every pound of our butter were exported and if we all lived on margarine. The same idea is now sounded in England in such sentences as the following cabled by our special correspondent, who touches the tender point in his last 20 words: "Facing what has been described as an- economic Dunkirk, the British people find that the first fruits of peace are the prospect of continuing wartime restrictions for an indefinite period and the necessity for a tremendous burst of energy for the export trade to supply other nations with goods- which Britain cannot yet afford for herself, in order that she may pay for her victory." To what degree can a people deprive itself (that is, accept a lower standard of living) in order to buy essential imports with exports? The Russian five-year plans were dictated from above,' for building up the nation; the German guns-before-butter programme was very definitely dictated from above, for the unbuilding of other nations; but a self-denying British policy of manufacturing for export cannot be dictated from above, and can rest only on government by consent of the governed. So the new Labour Government of Britain confronts the task of solving- the problem of popular self-sacrifice in terms of democratic freedom; and a peacetime victory on this front would be comparable 'with the immense wartime sacrifices with which the people of Britain and the people of Russia backed their respective Governments for victory. In fact, from various points of view a peacetime sacrifice of living standards, made voluntarily by a free people already suffering from war- strain, would fulfil the greatest test of national solidarity that modern civilisation can prescribe. If, in such a situation, the British Government must give consideration to its trade relations with foreign members of the sterling group as well as to its relations with the Dominions, in that case Dominion Governments must be understanding, for the Motherland's pinch is greater than ours. It is quite possible that all the democratic countries, alert with ideas of political experiment, are facing a difficult period when economic needs will override experimental ardour. It is sometimes contended that State capitalism, and socialisation, are plants that grow slowly in the soil of prosperity, and rapidly in chaos (as in revolutionary Russia). What confronts Britain and the British Empire is neither prosperity nor chaos, but the careful rebuilding of the former. And this is a path that can be followed only with a maximum of hard work and a minimum of experimentation. For the British Empire, by far the most important question at the ■ moment is the degree to which the British Labour Government accepts the policy'of work and sacrifice, and • the degree to which the Government ;is confirmed in that policy by the Labour movement as a whole.