PETAIN AND FRANCE—194O

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 56, 4 September 1945, Page 5

PETAIN AND FRANCE—I94O

ARCHITECT OF DISASTER

Marshal Petain, of Vichy, has been tried, condemned, and sentenced for his part in the Government of France under German occupation; how far he was responsible for the disaster that befel France in May and^June, 1940, is another question discussed at length, with much asperity by M. Reynaud, Premier of France in those fateful days of 1940, in the course of his memoirs published in "The Post." These strictures of Reynaud's, written before the trial of Petain, would amount now to something- like "flogging1 a dead horse.'' They are accordingly abbreviated in what follows.

A FAITH THAT FAILED

FROM VERDUN TO VICHY

(By Paul Reynaud.) ["World serial copyright reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part forbidden."] There is a great disparity between the picture of Petain which existed in the minds of Frenchmen at that period and the reality they discovered after the armistice. He is a man of restricted intelligence, lacking, by his own confession, the faculties of memory 'and imagination. Such is the originator of that military policy which brought about our downfall. I freely admit that I was not aware of the dominant part which he had taken in the neglect of French preparations for war, because I had never been a member of any committee of national defence.

This is the record of his neglect. After the first World War Marshal Joffre, victor of the Marne, wanted to create a series of fortified areas between Switzerland and the sea. Petain, hero of Verdun, opposed the scheme. His influence was such that Joffre was compelled to resign. Petain proposed that the finest defence was a "continuous front" which should run from Thionville down to Bale. Our northern frontier, he declared, must be defended in Belgium. Under. Petain's direction a Commission was set up under General Guillaumat. Like Joffre, this body believed in fortified areas. But it took no heed to our northern frontier. In 1927 Petain accepted its conclusions. Between Joffre's resignation and the acceptance of the Guillaumat report five years had been lost. In consequence of the Commission's recommendations, the two main sections of the Maginot Line were completed. This famous defence zone consisted of defending a 500-miles front with two sections of 50 miles each; one section of 12 miles; one of 10 miles; and one—incomplete—of three miles. There was nothing to defend the northern frontier via which all invasions of France (save 1870) had come.

MISTAKEN THEORIES

On June 15, 1940, the enemy was to sweep between the two main sections. The forts which Petain gave us were in Gamelin's words, "blind giants." They were sunk four storeys deep underground; on the surface were their "eyes"—turrets which the enemy found it easy to destroy. In 1931 Petain gave up his position as Commander-in-Chief, but that did not stop him (with his immense prestige) from still taking a leading part in all French military discussions. There is no retiring age for Marshals of France. On March 7, 1934—when Hitler had been in power for 13 months—certain senators from the north displayed a justified concern lest we should be invaded acros sour undefended frontier between Montmedy and the sea. Petain reassured them. I take from the official record of his words the single relevant phrase: "This sector is not dangerous." Petain placed his reliance on the Ardennes Forest, which he styled "impenetrable." In 1934, with -Petain at the War Ministry and Weygand at the head of the army, the mili-

tary estimates were cut down. Petain in that year went on record that "the French arhiy has no need of new ideas." boon Petain yielded the War Ministry to Maurin—who publicly stated tat the JRiom trial) tnat all he did was to carry out his predecessor's orders. Even after Petain had lei't the Ministry of War, the whole military organisation of France was impregnated with his ideas. His principal care was to compel young generals who on the battlefields of World War I had shgjvn gifts of leadership to mark time, veterans who had commanded a division or even an army corps were demoted to brigadiers. After the victory of 1918 Petain laid it down as a principle that "no majorgeneral should be appointed who was not at least 53 years old." Although in the last war a tank force had been created, Petain suppressed it. It was at about the time of Petain's greatest influence that Badoglio repeated to Gamelin Mussolini's phrase to him: "France is 'dished.' " JOINS GOVERNMENT. On May 18, 1940, Marshal Petain joined my Government as Minister of State and Vice-Premier. When the Marshal joined my Government he was.fully aware of the extreme gravity of the position. Yet he never raised any question about my war policy. The agreement into which 1 had entered in London on March 28—by which the Allies bound themselves to abstain from negotiating a separate armistice—had been puolished in the Press. There had been certain rumours in the Chamber that Laval's defeatist gang was planning to ma^e vise of Petain. I assumed that, by joining my Government Petain had openly chosen my side and was dissociating himself from these others. On the afternoon of May 18 we went together to see Georges at his headquarters at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre — equally remote from Paris and from the front. Several times he broke ofr to turn upon us the melancholy gaze of his dark eyes, exclaiming: "It is a very difficult position." On May 19, when I took over from Daladier the Ministry of War, General Weygand arrived by air. I offered him General Gamelin's post. Weygand well knew the extreme gravity of the situation. He was aware of the mutual! agreement concluded between the Al-; lies not to make a separate peace. He1 was familiar with the attitude which I adopted in regard to the conduct of the war. As in the case of Petain, Weygand did not make the remotest allusion to such a contingency. We met again the same evening, at the ministry, and there he formally accepted my offer. I felt extremely grateful to Petain and Weygand for their readiness, in such desperate circumstances, to assume, in one case the responsibility of a post in the Government and in the other that of the Supreme Command. I can still recall a visit paid to me at that time by President _ Edouard Hei'riot. during which he said to me: "But for you, it would by now have been all over." Here I must lay to my own charge the profound blunder which I did make and which led on to all that followed. It was that, like all other Frenchmen, I had faith in the patriotism of Marshal Petain and General Weygand.