The Evening Post WELLINGTON, MONDAY, AUGUST 27, 1945.

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 49, 27 August 1945, Page 4

The Evening Post WELLINGTON, MONDAY, AUGUST 27, 1945.

RUSSIA BACK IN PORT ARTHUR

Half a century ago Port Arthur was an all-important key to power-politics in Eastern Asia. It possessed ice-free conditions that were not to be found in the more northerly port of Vladivostok, and therefore had superior advantages, naval and maritime. From China —then in the "partition" stagePort Arthur passed into the de facto possession of Russia, until Japan, forty years ago, challenged the Tsar's forces, and landed a besieging army. The Russian fleet, therefore, on its arrival from Europe, had no port to aim at save Vladivostok; and in trying to break through or elude Admiral Togo's ships the Russian fleet suffered complete defeat, in the series of engagements called the Battle of Tsushima. In no long time Russia found herself defeated both at sea and on land, being unable to offset the advantages Japan enjoyed of being much nearer to the battlefields, both military and naval. This happened about a decade before the outbreak of World War I. The Tsar's advisers considered that they came out of their difficulties lightly, because in the ensuing peace, although Russia lost Port Arthur, she retained Vladivostok and half the island of Sakhalin (then called Saghalien), and she paid no indemnity. But Japan gained immensely in prestige. The powerful possessor of Port Arthur, her military position in East Asia seemed to have become unchallengeable. Distances had been decisive, both by land and sea. As-the wielder of power on the spot, Japan had pushed back the army of great Russia, and had destroyed Russia's fleet. Nobody then guessed that, within forty years, another distant navy would succeed where Russia's had failed, and, with air power, would strike Japan to the heart. So greatly have circumstances changed since the Japan-Russia war, that Port Arthur now figures only in the act of surrender. The great RussoJapanese land campaign in Manchuria, of forty years ago, could not be repeated because on this occasion Japan was already defeated before Russia entered the war. With small effort, Russia has penetrated Manchuria and will once again enter Port Arthur, this time on terms apparently much more agreeable to the Chinese landlord, for "the Manchurian town of Port. Arthur is to be used jointly by China and Russia as a naval base; it will revert to China in thirty years." These words are quoted from a radioed summary of the thirty years' "treaty of friendship and alliance" which Soviet Russia, by swift diplomatic process, has concluded with China. Manchuria, seized by Japan in 1931-32, reverts to China. Russia has secured from China a recognition that Outer Mongolia—so long under Russian influence —is independent of China, but Russia affirms that she wall not interfere in the internal affairs of Sinkiang, China's extreme western province bordering on Tibet. Any expectation that this treaty would reflect heavy Russian territorial demands in Asia seems to be negatived, if the terms are as radioed. An immense and heavilypopulated area of Old China is liberated. Prompt withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Manchuria is promised. Those Manchurian railways which were the subject of a Japanese squeeze on Russia at the time of the Manchurian aggressions of Japan, who forced Russia to sell her railwaycontrol rights, wall revert to joint operation by Russia and China. The puppet State of Manchukuo (originally Manchuria) is liquidated. "The Manchurian port Dairen is to be a free p or t"—another advance in Russia's quest for the use of ice-free ports— and "the treaty provides for mutual aid in the event of Japanese attack." There is no indication that Russia has in any way yielded ( to the temptation of utilising the presence of Russian •■ armies in Manchuria and Korea as a lever for territorial gain. Nor is there any indication that Russia is seeking to use the Chinese Communist armies for similar leverage purposes. According to radio advices, "the treaty, which Avas signed in Moscow a fortnight ago, is something of a repulse to the Chinese Communist regime. Russia has to give moral support to the Chinese Central Government as well as material help in the form of military and other supplies. The Chinese Communist leader has agreed to go to Chungking for talks with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek." The keynote of the treaty seems to be a Russian strategy that will keep Japan quiet, and a Russian attitude of give-and-take which should be consistent with co-operation with China. Where military strategy stands in relation to the atomic bomb is a matter still to be probed. But, whatever the probe may reveal, Japan is now so encompassed by land and sea that she cannot Avithin a period of years be a factor of aggression, unless she profits by some displacement of the present concentration of power in the Big Three —a displacement which could not be based on any of the earthhunger pangs exhibited or plausibly simulated by the late enemy States. In the absence of any discordant influence that could counterbalance the great advantages of peace, it is to be hoped and believed that the victors will continue to stand against aggression, and that hope finds no discouragement in the prompt settlement of Russo-Chinese relations.