THE FINAL BLOWS

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 39, 15 August 1945, Page 12 (Supplement)

THE FINAL BLOWS

HEAD OF THE OCTOPUS

The American victories in the Marianas in the middle of 1944, giving them Saipan and Guam, provided one of the turning points of the war. It enabled Japan to be subjected to heavy air attack, to which the dense population of the islands made them especially sensitive. Reports of large-scale, actions by aircraft "'based on the Marianas" became frequent. The strategy of the Pacific war was clear;, it was to strike at Japan proper, the head of the octopus, on the assumption that when the head was smashed the tentacles spread' over thousands ot miles of sea would relax their grip and fall away. From the Marianas the head could at last be reached with effective blows. The attack was pressed with the utmost vigour. It was already clear that the principal weapon to be used was air power, at least until it failed—if it were to fail—in crushing the enemy. Even from so far away as the Mananas, the great American Super-Fort-resses were able to deal terrible blows, j With a weight-carrying capacity close to that of the British heavy bombers that had hammered Germany, and with a great range of action .and powerful means of self-defence, these huge planes flew in increasing numbers, running up to over 500 at a time in June. . . j ' But Saipan, in the Marianas, is 1500 miles ' from Tokio—too tar, if nearer bases could be captured. There had been sreat hopes of establishing large air bases in China, but these were defeated by the Japanese success in driving southward, and those that had "JAPANS DOORSTEP." been set up had to be abandoned. In February this year, United States marines landed on Iwo Jima, 750 miles from Tokio, and this small island was cleared of the enemy after a month of arduous fighting. At the beginning of April Okinawa was attacked by U.S. marines and troops. This island, in the Riukiu chain, which stretches between Japan and Formosa, is only about 400 miles from the southern end of Japan j proper. The Japanese acknowledged this invasion as a test case, a crucial j affair on which the fate of the war might rest, and the struggle for the prize was fierce indeed. The campaign lasted 82 days and ended with the extirpation of the defenders. With Iwo Jima and Okinawa in their hands, the American air force had two bases reasonably described as "on Japan's doorstep," and this was quickly reflected in the- increasing weight of the air assault. The number of Suoer-Fortresses used in an attack rose *by considerable jumps from 400 in May to 800 in August, and- the total bomb-loads to 6000 tons. j These heavy attacks were supple- i mented by a series of very heavy assaults by planes from aircraft-carriers■ —as many as 1500 at a time—and' by direct, naval bombardment. The naval forces engaged were by any standard enormous, for the United States could draw oil a great fleet comprising battleships armed with 16in guns and a total of about' 100 aircraft carriers; and this force was supplemented by a powerful, though not numerically strong, force of. British ships, including the latest battleships and carriers. DEFENCELESS AND INFLAMMABLE These naval operations were possible because the Japanese navy had been wiped out and aerial defence was either completely absent or trifling. The Japanese professed that their aircraft were being conserved for a final emergency; their absence was not taken by the Allies at its face value; there remained a suspicion that there were still reserves, and it has not yet been cleared up. However, the enemy's failure in the air permitted operations of a unique character, for the attacking fleets steamed along the coast' of the Japanese mainland, hurling their great projectiles at every worth-while target. The only serious threat to their safety came from the "suicide bgmbers," which now and then scored hits and in some cases did serious damage. The Japane.se cities and towns, however "modex'n," consisted in the main of closely-packed highly inflammable buildings and houses and huts, and a vast quantity of incendiary bombs was used to set them on fire. A systematic programme was followed. First the great cities, beginning with Tokio, vyere knocked out as effective production centres; and equal attention was given ■to other industrial nuclei. Smaller towns, housing "backyard" industries, were given their turn afterwards. In the later stages, the Japanese 'were given lists of the towns which were next to be bombarded—a device calculated to serve the double purpose of inspiring their [^populations with alarm and reducing

the actual death-roll resulting from Whatever was the feeling among the Japanese population, the official spokesmen continued to "save face": they still boasted that Japan would never be beaten. They were warned repeatedly that unless Japan surrendered, it would be, in the military sense, destroyed utterly. Even the example of what had happened to Germany, however, seemed to be disregarded. Yet the aerial bombardment had not reached its possible magnitude; it had, indeed, only begun, and there is no doubt that in time it would have beaten the Japanese to their knees. THE FATAL SHOCK. An attempt to bring the ugly facts home to Japan was the issue from the Potsdam Conference of an ultimatum demanding prompt surrender on pain of destruction. But this demand, issued on July 26, was rejected next day by the declaration that Japan would fight on to the bitter end. It was not long coming. An event which has shaken the world as much, though in a different way, as it did Japan—the use, without warning, of that totally unexpected weapon, the j atomic bomb. Only two fell, one on ; Hiroshima, one on Nagasaki. Between them, Russia declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. Probably the Russian action alone would have led to early peace moves; but the atomic bombs were undoubtedly decisive, and the combination had immediate effect.