EVENING POST JAP CRIME AND ITS PUNISHMENT WELLINGTON, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1945.

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 39, 15 August 1945, Page 6

EVENING POST

JAP CRIME AND ITS PUNISHMENT

WELLINGTON, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1945.

As the curtain falls on the last act , of the Japanese tragedy, the mind goes . back to Scene 1, Act I, the great crime of Sunday, December 7, 1941. That was the day of the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour, when the Japanese perpetrated what has been called the greatest miscalculation in history. It ' was, of course, no sudden aberration. For years Japan, like Italy, had been waiting for democracy's weakest , moment. As soon as Hitler started the looting expedition in Europe, it was, , for Italy and Japan, no longer a question of the will to war, but of the ■ timing of opportunity. Hitler's invasion of France determined the date of Italy's stabbing of that nation, and his invasion of Russia served a similar ■ purpose—but "oriented" differently— : for Japan. It is characteristic of the ' opportunists of Germany and Japan that they deliberately chose the highest ■ I form of their great gamble. Not con- , | tent with fighting Britain, Hitler ; invaded Russia. Not content with jsingling out Britain and Holland for enemies, Japan antagonised, first and ■ foremost, the all-powerful United States, initiating a Pacific war at Pearl : Harbour. Never before had the world ' witnessed the tremendous audacity of . the aggressors of 1941; and the audacity of 1941 it matched by the crash of ■ 1945. For weeks prior to the Pearl ; Harbour treachery, Premier Tojo re- . peatedly declared: "Japan has come to the crossroads of her fate." This '. indeed had happened; and Japan, like '■ Germany, took the wrong turning. But in no sense did Japan in 1941 yield to sudden temptation. She had yielded ; to temptation at least a decade before, in.Manchuria. What Nemesis had in ■ store for the Japanese aggressor was a [ tremendous miscalculation that would , lead to the disgorging of all ill-gotten gains; and it is the story of this drama of transgression and retribution that reaches its climax today in the Allies', acceptance of Japan's surrender, implemented by the Japanese Emperor. A useful thought today is that retribution follows transgression, but that the gamble might have turned out otherwise. It did not seem to Japan, in December, 1941, that Russia, invaded five months earlier by Germany, would ever be able to declare war against Japan in Asia. Nor did it appear likely, to the Japanese militarists, that their insular ramparts in the Pacific could be penetrated by the American by-passing strategy and ; rendered useless. They could not have been blind to the technological superiority of their enemies, and to the possibility that even the Pearl Harbour sinkings might not prevent the Japanese navy and air force from being ultimately placed in a position of relative inferiority; but, assuming the best that the Americans could do in rebuilding their navy and in expanding the United States air forces, the Japanese militarists must still have assumed that, in the last resort, their immense army resources would prevail. It is in this respect that their calculations have erred most greatly. The strategy and tactics of the Allies have practically disarmed one of the greatest aggregations of soldiers and soldier-material that the world has ever seen. With, millions of soldiers, many of whom have. never felt the shock of war, the Emperor must still haul down Japan's flag! This is one of the greatest military wastes in history —unless, of course, the view is taken that all these soldiers of a nation that has lost the sea-war and air-war can be profitably saved to fight again another day. The Allies have destroyed much in Japan, but have not seriously touched either the Japanese army or the Japanese birth-rate,, with the latter's significant future- implications. As for the Japanese army and its immediate meaning, much depends on implementation of the disarmament, and the only light now available on this is Foreign Minister Togo's message. The first impression formed from Togo's message as Foreign Minister is that Japan envisages the.surrender and disarmament as being implemented through the Emperor's office and also through the present Emperor. /Togo speaks partly in the past tense, partly in the future. Already, it seems, the Emperor has issued an Imperial Rescript accepting the provisions (of the Potsdam declaration, which was ( silent on the subject of the Emperor's office. Such an Imperial Rescript perpetuates the old forms and implies the old processes .of Japanese government. Togo then proceeds to , outline what the Emperor of Japan is prepared to do. He is prepared to "authorise and ensure" the signatures of his Government and of Imperial General Headquarters to the directions necessary to ] comply with the Potsdam declaration. The Emperor also is prepared to issue commands to the authorities in Japan (military, naval, air) and to the forces under their control, "wherever located," to cease operations and , surrender arms. Also—the final : capitulation!—the Emperor is prepared to issue such orders as may be required by the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces,for the execution of the above-mentioned terms. In short, • the Emperor has promised to obey I Allied commands inherent in military f surrender. The question remains whether the Emperor's commands, to the extent that they are the Allies' commands, will be obeyed. This is the immediate military issue. How the sacred office of the Emperor will emerge in Japanese t eyes, from such a severe test, is anl other question. But it' is sufficient s unto the day—this day of victory—to 1 say that at long, last the cloud ■ has broken; the sky, if not completely clear, is bright enough to invite rejoicing; and once more, by the grace - of God, the peaceful peoples of the world will be free to turn from the ! toils of war, and devote themselves to I the not inconsiderable task of Recon- \ struction, with'its special problems, in i which the help of Providence, and the r staying power of peoples, will be as much needed as in the recent past. It is in this spirit, looking ahead as well ,i as behind, that the long-hoped-for end ' of World War II should be welcomed, acclaimed, ana celebrated.