BERLIN AND ITS SUNDRY TUTORS

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 7, 9 July 1945, Page 4

BERLIN AND ITS SUNDRY TUTORS

When Britain, the United States, and Russia decided to occupy Berlin in zones —a British, an American, and a Russian zone —the idea may have been that the zones would be complementary one of another. In the nature of things, however, the three nations, in the three zones of occupation, were bound to be to a certain extent competitive. Britain, the United States, and Russia therefore are competing for the prize of being regarded as the most efficient and most just occupying force, and. their efforts will be judged by the world at long range and by the Germans themselves at short range. What the Germans will first look for will be lenient treatment. They may not receive it—and probably do not' deserve it—in any one of the occupied zones. But even if one of the three occupying Powers proved to be more lenient than the others, it does not follow that the Germans would award it first prize, because leniency is accompanied sometimes by easy-going muddlement; and the Germans are not the kind of people to value leniency with muddlement above severity with efficiency. And as the occupation of a zone in the Berlin of today is about as high a test of efficiency as any occupying Power could ever be subjected to, it is quite evident that the armies that won the Battle of the Rhine and the Battle of the Oder are now facing a test that is new to them and which is in the utmost degree hard and realistic. To create the right impression in occupied Germany and in the world at large is more than a military feat. It is a severe test of statesmanship. What is required of these several overlords of the Germans? What is required is (1) food, and feeding does not mean over-feeding; (2) discipline, concerning which it will be remembered that hundreds of thousands of Germans preferred surrendering to Britain and America to surrendering to Russia, thereby creating concerning the Russians an impression which later evidence does not seem to have confirmed; (3) a publicity policy which should fit into some re-education plan; (4) a differentiation between German and German, according to Nazi antecedents and political complexion; and (5) a general attitude towards the Germans which reflects the "tone" of the occupation, and which, in Britain's case, is confronted first of all with the problem of nonfraternisation. Taking these items seriatim, it is alleged in some reports that the formidable weapon of food is in the hands of the Russians because Russia controls rural districts wherefrom Berlin is fed, wherefore a comparatively foodless British military Government, four days after the arrival in Berlin of British troopsi, is unable to replace the Russians, in its own zone, as food supplier. Points 2 and s—discipline and attitude to the German ■ population—may be taken together. .To fraternise or not to fraternise—that is the question. The Russians. seem to have set themselves a clear and simple goal. They have a clean-cut idea of the people with whom they wish to fraternise, and of those whom they do not like. All accounts credit them with encouraging the .activity in Germany and Berlin of Leftism, which matches the outward colour of Russia herself. There is a certain practical simplicity in being able to choose heartily between Lefts and Rights. It is not nearly so easy for Britain and America to reject both Rights and Lefts and to discover some middle of the road body of Germans who would approximate *less to Leftism than to the Labour and Liberalism of Britain. But apparently the western occupying Powers must look for some middle of the road Germans in order to avoid extremes, and as this search involves both publicity and. differentiation (points 3 and 4) it now devolves on the British military men in Berlin to study the pen which is mightier than the sword, and to lay the foundations of a publicity (Press, radio, motion picture, platform), and a re-education plan (the curriculum of which puzzles Lord Vansittart) that will'bring back to life a Social-Democrat Germany, or a Liberal Germany, or whatever kind of Germany (not extremist) British policy aims at. An impartial and unbending habit of non-fraternisation is being subjected to the inevitable test of time. If any one of the occupying Powers in its own zone—aware of competition in other zones for the prizes of efficiency, justice, and political success in handling a temporarily defeated people—were to cramp its style by maintaining the glassy stare and withholding the glad hand from all and sundry, questions would soon be asked concerning the eternal: wisdom of the non-fraternisa-tion order. Already such questions are being asked in London. And if non-fraternisation is to be abandoned, then the longer t&e officials tight to maintain it, the more will the' Germans claim a victory wihen nonfraternisation ceases. If a Russian ogre (as pictured some time ago1, in some, quarters) were revenging itself daily, in Russian occupied Germany, for German outrages in Russ.ia, then by comparison the British and American rule, if it passed the food test, might be infinitely preferred by Germans, in their sense of realisation as in their earlier sense of anticipation. But the news contains no. ogre stories from Russian-occupied Germany. Russia is using such Germans as she considers to be usable. Over the rest of her policy no light is shed. In the eyes of the world, Berlin may become the principal testing ground ■of who can win the peace.

What is required of these several overlords of the Germans? What is required is (1) food, and feeding does not mean over-feeding; (2) discipline, concerning which it will be remembered that hundreds of thousands of Germans preferred surrendering to Britain and America to surrendering to Russia, thereby creating concerning the Russians an impression which later evidence does not seem to have confirmed; (3) a publicity policy which should fit into some re-education plan; (4) a differentiation between [German and German, according to Nazi antecedents and political complexion; and (5) a general attitude towards the Germans which reflects the "tone" of the occupation, and which, in Britain's case, is confronted first of all with the problem of nonfraternisation. Taking these items seriatim, it is alleged in some reports that the formidable weapon of food is in the hands of the Russians because Russia controls rural districts wherefrom Berlin is fed, wherefore a comparatively foodless British military Government, four days after the arrival in Berlin of British troopsi, is unable to replace the Russians, in its own zone, as food supplier. Points 2 and s—discipline and attitude to the German ■ population—may be taken together. .To fraternise or not to fraternise—that is the question. The Russians. seem to have set themselves a clear and simple goal. They have a clean-cut idea of the people with whom they wish to fx-aternise, and of those whom they do not like. All accounts credit them with encouraging the .activity in Germany and Berlin of Leftism, which matches the outward colour of Russia herself. There is a certain practical simplicity in being able to choose heartily between Lefts and Rights. It is not nearly so easy for Britain and America to reject .both Rights and Lefts and to discover some middle of the road body of Germans who would approximate *less to Leftism than to the Labour and Liberalism of Britain.