The Evening Post.

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVIII, Issue 147, 19 December 1944, Page 4

The Evening Post.

GERMANY, AT BAY, HITS OUT

When the German High Command decided to fight west of the River Rhine, instead of retiring behind the Rhine, it was a presupposition that the German High Command intended to make use, as opportunity occurred of the counter-offensive. Any other supposition would not have been complimentary to the German High Commane. To have placed a military pillow on the west side of the Rhine --a pillow to be punched; and not to hit back—would have been to fight a merely defensive war on the wrong side of the river. It is extremely unlikely that the German High Command ever entertained such a passive Policy, or that the Allied High Command ever suspected the German High Command of adopting such a limited purpose. The only question at issue was whether the Allied superiority in air power, by action on and behind the German front, would be equal to preventing the Germans from moving up to the Rhine, accoss it, and up to the fighting front a sufficiency of power to mount a big-scale counter-offensive. It is a reasonable" presupposition that when the Allied High Command instituted its military high-pressure policy in the west, Eisenhower hoped that by air power he might reduce the force of a German counter-offensive if he could not prevent it. Events now prove that he cannot prevent it, but |he yet may turn thfsjGerman counter- : offensive into an adventure too costly for Germany's strength, if not into a heavy defeat for the German army. Reduced 'to its simplest terms, the Allied purpose on the Western Front has been to make Germany fight a whiter war, involving the German army in the slow defeat of attrition if not in more rapid overthrow. Besides making Germany fight,, the Allied High Command hoped possibly to keep her on the defensive—that is, to deprive her of initiative—but could not have been blind to the possibility of .such a German counter-offensive, as has now happened. There is therefore no occasion to feel astonished at what has so far occurred. The German High Command has shown that Allied air power has failed to prevent the mounting of a formidable German push, but is still faced with the problem of how to conduct the German Operations in such a way that they can be broken off at a suitable time without draining Germany's strength to a degree that will shorten her resistance. The reserve forces of the Luftwaffe have made their expected appearance, and on land Goebbels now has something to show for his final comb-out of German man-power. Not only has Allied air .power failed to prevent this big-scale counter-offensive in the west. Pressure of the Red Army along the front from the Baltic to the Danube—culminating in furious Hungarian fighting—and Allied pressure in Italy have also failed to prevent Field-Marshal Rundstedt from emulating, on a small scale, in the winter of 1944 the tremendous efforts of Ludendorff in the summer of 1918. ' Ludendorff 's 1918 campaign was terrific—and exhausting. Far, from : being so terrific, Rundstedt's effort ! may prove equally exhausting, because Rundstedt has a Red Army to contend with, and Ludendorff had behind him a i passive Russia. In spite of this present German push, is not Rundstedt's position intrinsically much worse than that of Ludendorff, who saw possible victory pass to certain defeat in less than three months?

Rundstedt has defied, the superiority of the Allies, in armament and in the air to the extent of mounting a counter-offensive. Can he continue to. defy that superiority if lie is faced later with the necessity of retiring behind the Rhine and breaking o rt the west-of-Rhine battles to which he is now more than ever committed? The answer to this question, may depend on whether the German army's remarkable technical skill in 'disengaging at the right/moment is still 100 per cent, and whether the American position as regards supply and reinforcements is as bad' as some reports. suggest. General Bradley sees in the German counter-offensive 'a rebuke to optimism; possibly he implies also "that it is a rebuke to too rapid reconversion to civilian production- Rundstedt some weeks ago must have read with interest certain published reports of shell shortage—denied so far as Britain was concerned—but probably was himself in possession of more exact information On that vital point. The German army's activity is a i-ebuke to other things besides optimism and reduction of war effort. It is a rebuke to political disputation in Legislatures on both sides of the Atlantic, and to one or two recent transatlantic diplomatic ("rebuffs." As the tide of war ebbs from a country that is supposed to be at its last gasp new civil war develops; or a state of high tension, with strikes, (develops; or in some other way postwar frictions become drains upon the | war-energy of Great Powers. Distractions like these—violence in Greece, a Polish deadlock, an Italian complex— | are not inconsiderable trifles. They reduce war production, divert war effort, and undermine Big Three unity. While Russia and France, following the Russo-British treaty, come closer together, certain issues '■hat are electric in Europe, and more than latent in America, remain, unsettled-. These are more serious than the German counteroffensive, ' which may, however, profit by them. Germany' still ■hopes to disillusion America concerning Europe, and to divide the Allies.