The Evening Post. WELLINGTON, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1944. HITLERISM'S EBB-TIDE

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVIII, Issue 56, 4 September 1944, Page 1

The Evening Post.

WELLINGTON, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1944.

HITLERISM'S EBB-TIDE

Without knowing what terms Russia will impose, the Government of Finland has asked Germany to withdraw her military forces from Finland. At time of writing, it is not known what reply (if any) Germany has made or what action (if any) Germany has taken. But the implication underlying the Finnish Government's decision is that the Finnish Government calculates that it will no longer profit Germany to maintain military forces in Finland; and that Germany's assumed loss of desire to maintain a military grip of Finland marks the proper moment, for Finland to ask Germany to get out, and, by getting out, to release for Finland's • information Moscow's withheld terms of armistice. The Finns have waited for this moment, as. a long-suffering family waits for the propitious opportunity to get rid,of a drunken lodger. One can picture the Finns looking down the passage to see if the lodger is going; something may stiH depend on whether iie is in the mood to go., Looking at Finland's situation _md at that of satellites generally—whether voluntary or forced satellites—the proceedings seem to bear an air of inevitability. The German expansion in Europe may be likened to a high tide, out of which rises the small top of a rock Called Finland, another called Rumania, and so on. The people of the rocks would like the tide to withdraw, but for a long time it refuses, and they cannot or dare not drive it back with King Canute's trident. As the tide ebbs, little by little, they can afford to be somewhat less polite concerning their desire for' its absence, but they still cannot openly approach its enemies for help. But a time comes eventually when the slow ebb of the unwelcome tide becomes a tide-rip; the tide must go out willy-nilly, leaving the rocks bare, and ready for a new master. Finland now thinks she ■has discerned that moment in the quickening ebb of the German tide. Finland now cannot see Germany stopping in the middle of her ebb and staging a come-back. Tides do not act in that way. Inevitably the German tide must fall further; and with the same inevitability Finland must formally request the inevitable continuation—perhaps acceleration—of the ebbing process^ in order that the Finns may hear what Moscow has to say. In so far as pragmatism represents a devotion to What is practical, the attitude of Finland seems to! be guided by pragmatism rather than by any other philosophy. Pragmatism has been defined as "a matter-of-fact treatment of things,"' and alternatively as "the doctrine that estimates any assertion solely by its practical bearing upbn human interests." Nothing could be more matter-of-fact ■-. than Finland's waiting for the ebb of the German tide to reach a specified low pd!nt. There was a time when Finland thought that Germany might give her a German peace which might be preferable to a Russian peace. When it became plain that to do so was beyond Germany's power, Finland decided in the most matter-of-fact way that her ultimate course must be to take a Russian peace which would be as favourable as the approval of the Western Allies could, make it. But between this Finnish decision and the departure of the Germans there had to be a time-lag—in fact, there may be still—and in the interim . the Finns quite pragmatically made tentative steps, in Russia, towards getting out of the war. To that purpose, peace, they are now nearer than ever before. At long last the clock seems to be reaching the hour at Which the Germans as well as the Finns feel that Germany should get out of Finland. Lodger and landlord near the point where their desires coincide. It will be remembered that more than one Finnish peace overture with Russia failed, because the German tide had not ebbed sufficiently.' Then a new fact - entered into ' this matter-of-fact issue: "After the Russian offensive in June/ to use the Finnish Prime Minister's words, "our forces had to be withdrawn." Germany too had to* swallow the same medicine, whereupon the situation caused by German and Finnish defeats was such that, in the Prime Minister's words, "it was not possible for Germany to give us sufficient help." As a result of a new Finnish approach to Russia on August 25, "the Russian envoy in Stockholm on August 28 handed the»Finhish envp^ the Russian reply with the comment that Russia and Britain had together agreed to this reply, which had also been communicated to the Americans for their approval. Russia demanded that Finland officially announce the breaking-off of relations with Germany, and demand from Germany the Withdrawal of her troops from Finnish territory within two weeks or by September 15 at the latest. Provided Finland conforms to these preliminary conditions, Russia is prepared to receive a Finnish delegation in Moscow ito negotiate an armistice or peace. I 1 know among our people there are ;• many who are not ready for the ; decision reached today, and many who '^build too great hopes on this decision." >" It Will be seen that the Finnish Prime ' Minister bases his case on a non I possumus which no \ matter-of-fact \ person can dispute, because a Finland that can no longer put its trust in j Germany must' put its trust in Russia s and the Allies. It needs no pragmatist ) to see that, on a basis of facts, Finland ■ has no option. In Germany also - pragmatic philosophy has been making progress, for the Finnish Prime Minister, tn the course of the evolution '' of Finnish policy to its present cross- ■ roads, noted Germany's requirement of a "all available forces" for home defence, '_ and that in Germany "many wellg informed persons no longer hoped for . victory, but were striving for a political (i decision." Naturally, Finland took the hint. And the ebb of the German tide, " now or later,' pragmatically settles the ' question.