PROBLEMS OF A PEACE IN EUROPE

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVII, Issue 149, 26 June 1944, Page 4

PROBLEMS OF A PEACE IN EUROPE

Tho apportionment of British indus-

trial and military power as between

the European war and the Asia-Pacific

war has been carried out since Pearl

Harbour on lines which seem to have

■been satisfactory to Britain and to the United States. This mutually satis-

factory Anglo-American arrangement was possible because both London and Washington agreed in December, 1941, on the No. 1 priority; that is, the priority of the European war over the

[Japanese war, a principle summed up in the slogan "beat Hitler first." Behind this leading and vital priority have been grouped a whole series of priorities, military, technical, and industrial. Both in Britain and in America numerous administrations, bent on war-winning, have given out orders to industries and to men. Administrators have said to this manufacturer "Do this" and he has done it;

they have said to that worker "Go there" and he has gone. That was the way to win the First World War when Churchill was Minister of Munitions; it is doubly the way to win the present total war. Britain and Britons have accepted the principle of priority in.all its many forms in order to overthrow Hitler and to remove Britain from his 'overhanging shadow. In this way Britain—who, be it ever remembered, stood practically alone in Europe from the fall of France in' May, 1940, till Hitler's invasion of Russia in June, 1941—has stood up to an unprecedented task. Now she is approaching the time when the cheerful sun in Europe and Britain will no longer be obscured by Hitler's shadow. But the distant shadow of Japan over the Pacific will remain.

The ; Pacific war will still demand from Britain, as from every other enemy of Japan, a system of priorities. But the circumstances will have been vastly changed by the fall of Hitler. The danger to Britain and Europe will then be farther off, being in the distant Pacific, and arising from Japan alone. The call of duty, of Empirepatriotism, will not be one whit less, but owing to all the many factors that distance introduces—owing to that somewhat comprehensive military concept called logistics—the principle of priorities will be expressed in a different way; the things that are to be done first, the things that are to be done second, and the, things that are to be left undone will be not the same as are listed for the European war. Geography in itself will account for. vast alterations. In addition to geographical and physical considerations, the fall of Hitler will introduce a new era because Europe—so far as one can see—will be building for peace while the Allies in the Pacific—not yet including Russia —will still be building for destruction, that is, for war. Britain will be industrially and economically the keystone of this new peace-building Europe. The priority question, for Britain and America, will ibe no longer as between the European war and the Pacific war; the priority question will have to cover what Britain and America must give to the continuing Pacific war and what they must give to the rebuilding of Europe. Numerous British and American relief agencies show how clearly Britain and America have foreseen this. And as part of the peace effort in rescued Europe, following Hitler's fall, will involve diversion of industries and man-power, the priority machinery will operate, after the European surrender, in new and very difficult circumstances.

The eyes of both employers and employees in Britain have been fixed primarily on the war in Europe. With the approaching fall of Hitler their eyes are shifting to the distant Japanese war, but cannot avoid falling on this urgent and near-at-hand problem of not only relieving but reconstructing Europe. As the Hitler grip releases, an immense vista of work to be done, right on the doorstep, opens up. But the priorities of war over peaceful reconstruction remain, even though the war belongs to another continent. If we interpret correctly the speech in the House of Commons of the Minister of Production, Captain Lyttelton, as somewhat cloudily reported, we believe his purpose to be to warn the employers, employees, and public ■of Britain— possibly,' also, some .^members of the British Parliament—that although, >for the geographical and logistical reasons referred to, it is physically and obviously impossible to employ against Japan all the forces Britain has mobilised, yet the release of manpower for non-war industrial work in Britain, .on the fall of Hitler, must not be exaggerated. Referring to such release, Lyttelton finds himself quite unable to estimate it, but he tells the House of Commons that "more of the resources will be required for the war against Japan than will be released." This. seems to mean that Germany's surrender must not be regarded as opening a flood-gate for the flow of released labour into factories or enterprises released from war production. On the one hand, the Minister states, "production for waging war against Japan" will have "absolute priority"; on the other hand, war production must "release factories for civilian production in places which will ease the Minister of Labour's task and in places which will give such production as the President of the Board of Trade wants." Thus Lyttelton links up the changed circumstances of the priority system with the economic exigencies of the Board of Trade, and with the'steps towards economic survival that "the world's largest debtor nation" must take.

The underlying hope of the situation is that the economic welfare of Britain —the only one of the Big Three who has been in the thick "of the war since 1939—wi1l be consistent with "absolute priority" of the Japanese war. This "absolute priority" depends on a whole host of detailed priorities. These can be worked out in their varying and delicate detail so that "absolute priority" and economic Britain shall both succeed. It seems that the Churchill Government is the Government best fitted for the complex postHitler task of working out the priorities for Britain. The Minister of Production admits that he does not know at present what they are. It is almost inconceivable that he could know. Each hurdle must be taken as it is reached, but the principle that Britain will hit Japan, as hard as physical difficulties permit, remains and will remain.