Evening Post. MONDAY, JANUARY 10, 1944. "AFRAID TO FIGHT"

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVII, Issue 7, 10 January 1944, Page 4

Evening Post. MONDAY, JANUARY 10, 1944. "AFRAID TO FIGHT"

To assume that the Japanese fleet is "afraid to fight" is foolish, says Colonel Knox. His point may b<& conceded readily. As a rule, the control of navies is, in the last resort, political. During the years that a fleet is both ready and willing to fight, it may happen that the political heads decide to conserve it; and their policy of conservation, based on political-strategic considerations, may persist until "the fleet, by sheer inaction in defended harbours, becomes' rusty, demoralised, and of reduced tactical or fighting value. That process was demonstrated in the First World War. Germany j then had what she has never had since —a big and fully-proportioned battle fleet. After the Battle of Jutland it rusted—although Germany declared Jutland a victory—and it ended ingloriously at Scapa Flow. Much more recent evidence is provided by official statements concerning the sinking of the Scharnhorst; the Scharnhorst and her men were not "afraid to fight,'/ but some of the men had lost their sealegs to such an extent that the captured survivors were seasick en route to Britain —a fact attributed to the crew's prolonged stays in port or ashore. Thus the German High Sea fleet in 1916-18 and the Scharnhorst in recent years show how the seaman can deteriorate in an inactivity dictated by political policy. Italy's case was both similar and different. It was similar in that Mussolini the politician tried to conserve the Italian battle fleet; but there came a time in Italy's war when most of the fleet fell into the hands of the Italians who pushed Mussolini off his perch, and the new surrendering Italian Government (Badoglio's) could not fail to be conscious of the fact that to send the fleet to the Allies, as intact as possible, might be accounted unto Italy for a virtue, and for a set-off against punishment in the final settlement. Whether such an anticipation will be realised, time will tell. But when the whole story comes to be told, it is possible that an acute historian will adjudge Italy's fleet. as having been a more important asset in the peace than in the war. In any case, it is not to be assumed that the Italian fleet was "afraid to fight." Probably there was a period—before resting and rusting had done their worst—when Mussolini could have sent the fleet to battle had he so willed. As to Japan's fleet, it is certainly not to be assumed that the fleet is "afraid to fight" or that ihe political heads in Tokio are built on the Mussolini model. Colonel Knox assumes that Japan's fleet, its commanders, and their political directors are waiting for opportunity, or till time suits their purpose. Tokio must know all about the post-Jutland naval history of the First World War, and about Mussolini and Badogiio and the Italian fleet that carried an olive branch to Malta; also about the Scharnhorst's seasick sailors. "While Japan's fleet remains cooped up," says Colonel Knox, "our numbers in ships, men, and planes are growing." Is the phrase "cooped up" to be taken literally? Is the Japanese fleet "cooped up" to the extent that the Scharnhorst was "cooped up" in Norwegian fiords? Or does the" Japanese fleet possess ample cruising space, within limits that enable it to avoid battle? If it is merely avoiding battle, without being "cooped up," then Japan is under the disadvantage of conceding precious time to the .Allied fleets, whereby they are progressively, outbuilding Japan's navy, and thus increasing the favourable margin the Allies derived from the 'Italian naval surrender, which reduced to a fractional point the naval and maritime risks of the reopened Mediterranean Sea route. But .if Japan's fleet is "cooped up" as well as avoiding battle, then the deterioration evidenced by the Scharnhorst's crew, and by the German High Sea fleet a generation ago, must be setting in. Knox also suggests that Japan's fleet may be "waiting till the odds are in its favour," by which he seems to mean that a belligerent who is in a position of naval inferiority may achieve a local and temporary superiority by manoeuvring for such a transient opportunity, and may thus snatch a naval victory. To gain a success of that kind, Japanese naval and political bosses must lay their heads together, not as two bulls do, but in the co-operative manner of Churchill and his military chiefs. And that is not always possible.