LUFTWAFFE'S STRENGTH

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVII, Issue 5, 7 January 1944, Page 5

LUFTWAFFE'S STRENGTH

RECENT QUIET EXPLAINED

RUGBY, January 5. The German inaction against the recent fierce onslaughts on northern France was due to two reasons, said a K.A.F. commentator tonight. The first was that the Germans were conserving their fighter strength to deal with deeper Allied penetrations on more vital targets, and the second was because they were endeavouring to build up a reserve for prolonged battles on the second front. But they were as determined as ever to protect Germany itself. This was shown by the ferocious opposition of the fighters to our large-scale bombing attacks. It was still further emphasised, the commentator said, by the fact that Germany now had 1000 more fighters in the front line than in 1942—"a very remarkable acheivement." This was part of their policy of conservation which began in 1942 when they went over to a ,defensive strategy and started to build up fighter strength. The Germans were hampered in this by the R.A.F. raids on their factories, which cost them a great part of their intended production. Nevertheless, the actual size of the Luftwaffe increased in 1943, showing the extent of the German efforts.

But in building up their fighter force "the Germans had weakened their bomber strength, which had been on the down-grade for some time. In addition, the Germans had used Juss's and other heavy aircraft for transport work in Russia, Tunisia, and Sicily, and had lost a considerable number thereby. Also, the crews of these aircraft could have been used for the specific purpose of training bomber crews generally, and their absence had had a considerable effect on their pre-sent-day bomber personnel, who were below the 1941 standard. These causes had crippled the fighting strength of their bomber force. Furthermore, 1943 was not a fruitful year for bomber production. „

Germany, nevertheless, had a sufficient force of bombers available to give Britain a nasty knock any night, but not enough to make a sustained offensive.

The enemy were now beginning to turn out four-engined heavy bombers, which they never previously possessed, but their Heinkel 177 was still not a satisfactory aircraft. On the other hand, the R.A.F. in 1943 dropped 136,000 tons of bombs on Germany compared with the total of 65,000 tons which the Luftwaffe had dropped on Britain since the war began. The Coastal Command also made 40,000 sorties in 1943 against 30,000 in 1942. Aircraft casualties in Coastal Command were less in 1943 than before, and though confronted with new weapons, new tactics, and stronger Üboat armament, it sank more submarines in 1943 than in the three previous years combined. The Fighter Command also increased its attacks on shipping in 1943, and in attacking three times as many ships as ever before it sank three times as many. Fighter Command in 1943 made 160,000 sorties, of which 90,000 were offensive.

In the Mediterranean the Air Command in 1943 dropped 110,000 tons of bombs, made 350,000 sorties at a casualty rate of less than 1 per cent., destroyed between 3500 and 4000 aircraft, and attacked 1000 ships, of which 250 were destroyed—B.O.W-