Evening Post. FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 1944. HITLER'S BID TO GET FIGHTERS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVII, Issue 5, 7 January 1944, Page 4

Evening Post. FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 1944. HITLER'S BID TO GET FIGHTERS

Diminishing German air power on the Russian and Italian fighting fronts, and its probable corollary—conservation of air power for the defence of Germany against western invasion— were among the subjects touched on yesterday in reviewing the apologia of the Berlin military commentator Dietmar. Since then, a commentator of the R.A.F. has reviewed more minutely the balance of air power, and he dates the German policy of airpower conservation as far back as 1942. In that year—the year following Hitler's second and fatal blunder, the invasion of Russia—the German High Command had already foreseen Germany's loss of the, initiative and her forced acceptance of what Dietmar now calls "our lot of defence." Airpower conservation—"part of the Germans' policy of conservation which began in 1942, when they went over to a defensive strategy"—took the immediate form of concentrating on the construction of air fighters for defence, with resultant lessening of the proportion of German output of the offensive arm, the bomber. This change of German air policy became known to the Allies. Their reply was to use their bombers to hinder Germany's manufacture of the bomber's enemy, the fighter. Their bombing of German factories had a marked result. Indeed, according to the R.A.F. commentator, the Allies' bombing efforts over Germany "cost the Germans a great part of their intended production" of fighters.

Nevertheless, the German special effort to build fighters for defence, if it was not so fruitful as it might have been, was distinctly,productive. It was productive to a point which has become of both strategic and tactical importance in the problem of the Anglo-American invasion of western Europe. The R.A.F. commentator concedes that it is "a very remarkable achievement" that has enabled Germany to enter the year 1944 with "one thousand more fighters in the front line than in 1942." Relatively to I aircraft construction by the Allies, Germany has fallen behind, but it is a very serious fact that "the actual size of the Luftwaffe increased in the year just closed, 1943." The call of the German, soldier, in Russia or in Italy, for air protection will not deviate the Nazis from their conservation course. But when Germany herself is subjected to large-scale bombing attacks, "ferocious opposition of German fighters" is, the commentator points out, always met with. Allied bomber blows on the fighting (land) fronts and even on northern France may be but slightly parried, but "the Germans are as determined as ever to protect Germany itself.". According to the same authority, "German inaction against recent fierce onslaughts on northern France" is due partly to the German, endeavour "to build up a reserve for prolonged battles on the second [west Europe] front" and partly to the fact that the Germans hesitate to use their precious fighters against the north France attacks, but may do so when the Allies attempt "deeper penetrations against more vital targets."

Germany necessarily has paid a bomber price for a fighter gain. The price of destroying, by defensive fighter action, as,many as possible of the Allied attacking bombers, is a heavy reduction •in Germany's power to hit back with bombers at Britain. Hitler, therefore, has been forced into this quandary by his loss of the initiative and by his forced concentration on fighters: he can no longer hope to revive German civilian morale by counter-bombing Britain on anything like the scale on which the British and Americans are bombing Germany. He has not sufficient bombers to exact a bomber-revenge. On that vital point the R.A.F. commentator is quite definite. Although Germany still has "a sufficient force of bombers available to give Britain a nasty knock any night," Germany "has not enough bombers to make a sustained offensive." Lacking the bombers, Hitler substitutes a war of nerves, promising the British people a dreadful revenge by means of some secret weapon. On this, the following pertinent comment is made by a Swiss explosives expert: "Rocket guns and secret weapons are nothing but a nerve war to scare credulous laymen. Secret weapons are only effective if the public believes in their existence. ... No rocket gun could possibly fire 120 miles to London from France, nor use a 12-ton shell. The rocket shells used by the Germans against Allied bombers weigh 221b, with a range of only about a mile and a quarter. . . . The most terrific explosive known is called Tetranitro-methan-benzol, of which all army headquarters know." But after making allowance for all that portion of the terror that is only imaginary, let New Zealanders reflect on the lot of the British people, who live within range of a Germany who still has enough bombers "to give Britain a nasty knock," even if only for one night, or two, or three. And let New Zealand's population reflect on its extraordinary luck in knowing so little of real bombing war.

British strategists can at least claim that, by bombing, they have dictated German air strategy. Hitler concentrates on fighters, because he must. Thereby he pays the highest military and moral tribute to Allied air power and the Bomber Command.