AIR DOMINATION

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 72, 22 September 1943, Page 5

AIR DOMINATION

INCREASING PROSPECT

LULL IN ATLANTIC WAR

(U.P.A. and 8.0. W.) Rec. 11 a.m. LONDON, Sept. 21. Loud and prolonged cheers greeted Mr. Churchill as he entered the House of Commons. . He said that: the new front in the Mediterranean had always been intended as an essential preliminary to the main attack against Germany and her satellites. The decision for going beyond the occupation of North Africa was taken eighteen months ago, but almost immediately came the Tobruk disaster and the German advance in Russia. Following Alamein, almost a year ago, we and our Allies had had almost unbroken successes on land and sea and in the air.

"Last May," he said, "President Roosevelt and myself set ourselves the principal objective of knocking Italy completely out of the war this year. Nobody could have expected that that task would be so rapidly achieved."

The weight of bombs discharged over Germany by the R.A.F. in the last "three months was half as great again as in the preceding three months, and the percentage of losses were lower this.year than last. The enemy had been forced to make an enormous diversion of energy from the war fronts.

The increase in aircraft available now exceeded the corresponding German supply by more than four to one. This opened the possibility of saturating the German defences, ground, and air, and complete strategic air domination of Germany by the pritish and Americans was not necessarily beyond our reach even in 1944.

The Russian air force was already at many points superior to the strength the Germans had been able to assemble.

"We must not let this favourable tendency lead us to suppose that the war is coming to an end," he said. "On the contrary, we must expect that the

Mussolini over before, the landing, _as that would have disclosed the Allies' intention to the enemy. The Italians were in possession and still had to appear as allies of Germany| The Badoglio Government took carefully conceived measures to hold Mussolini, but did not provide against a heavy parachute descent. "We would have done more, if we could, to help this unhappy Government, which, beset on all sides, had kept its word with courage and good faith." The Soviet, after studying the terms of the armistice, authorised General Eisenhower to sign their name to it. The suggestion that 40 days of preJ cious time was lost in negotiating was as ill-founded as it was wounding to those who were bereaved. The wnole operation was planned as a result of decisions taken on the fall of Mussolini, and would have taken place, whatever had happened in Italy, at the earliest possible moment. The surrender of Italy was a windfall, but had nothing to do with the date for harvesting the orchard. The Italians had already suffered terribly, and now; they \yere to be pillaged and terrorised in Hitler's fury of revenge. In due course they would be rescued from servitude and degradation and enabled to regain their rightful place among the free democracies of the modern world. WAR AGAINST TYRANNY. If he was asked whether he would, apply this argument to the Germans, said Mr. Churchill, he would say that the case was different. We did not war with, races as such, but against tyranny and to preserve ourselves from destruction. Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism must be rooted out if the world was to be spared still more frightful conflict. Until this was done there was no sacrifice we would not make and no lengths in violence to which we would not go. "Having at the end of my life acquired some influence upon affairs, I wish to make it clear th^at I would not prolong: the war needlessly for a single day," said Mr. Churchill, "and if is my hope, if and when the British people are called by victory to share in the august responsibility of shaping the future, we shall show the same poise and temper as we did in the hour of. mortal peril."