Evening Post.

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 66, 15 September 1943, Page 4

Evening Post.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1943,

NAZI POLICY IN RUSSIA

For the moment the Germans seem to be singing a new theme song, the burden of which is retreat in Russia and advance in Italy. On the Eastern Front, huge areas are being given up by the Germans, but on the southern front ground is being fiercely fought for. Some commentators are impressed by Hitler's sudden reappearance at the microphone, and the reported fact that his broadcast laid much emphasis on Italy and almost none on Russia. They deduce that Hitler has decided on a first-class war in Italy—possibly without the German General Staff's concurrence-arid that he is influenced by a desire to protect his own prestige (which pairs with Mussolini's prestige) and to impress favourably his "satellite"' allies, particularly Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. Part of this argument sounds fairly good. It can be conceded that if Hitler makes a really great military effort to prevent Italy's slipping through his fingers, the "satellite" Governments will be less inclined to jump out of his hand. But will a desperate German effort to ""salvage Italy count as much with the Bulgars, the Rumanians, and the Hungarians as the menacing advance in their direction of the Red Army? Can a strong German hand in Italy blind the "satellites" to German weakness on the Russian front?

AND ITALY

If it is true that Hitler has turned the Italian war into "total unlimited battle," while continuing to give ground in Russia, the strategy is curious. It belongs, writes "Liberator" in the "Observer," not to "the precise calculations of the regenerated German General Staff," but to Hitler's own "unpredictable strategy" and his instincts concerning prestige. "Liberator" refers to Rommel, Kesselring, and other selected German leaders of the Italian and Balkan fronts as being "Nazi strong men," go-getters of the Hitler regime rather than of the General Staff, and trusted agents who will make Italy "a test case of the respective strengths in Europe of the Allies and the German Wehrmacht." But what about the "test case" in Russia? Is the German Wehrmacht content ito give ground in Russia and to rely on being rescued by General Winter or General Mud, or does Hitler plan an ultimate firm stand in Russia as well as in Italy, when the Russian front has been reduced in length? If Germany is to win the "test case," it seems that something more is wanted on both the Russian and the Italian fronts than the isolated case of the Salerno battle, where trie Germans are doing their best to destroy the Fifth Army—which appears to be mainly American, with British elements —before the Allied air forces can find their feet on Italian mainland soil. Whether the Germans succeed at Salerno or* fail, a "test case" must cover their reserve capacity as well as their present front line actions. Is Hitler's "unlimited" war in Italy commensurate with Germany's strength or will he (in "Liberator's" words) "once more destroy the central reserve which his generals [of the General Staff] laboriously sought to create"?