ITALY GRIPPED-TOE, HEEL, ANKLE

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 65, 14 September 1943, Page 4

ITALY GRIPPED-TOE, HEEL, ANKLE

So much is heard now* about the toe and heel* of Italy that it will be not out of ordfir to speak of the ankle and leg. For purposes of description in popular language, the ankle may be regarded as the part of Italy extending from Salerno Bay on the west (Mediterranean) side .to Bari on the east side (Adriatic). Two kinds of blood have been circulating in the Italian leg—ltalian and German. Owing to the armistice, the Italian blood-flow has tended to stagnate, and the German blood has been required to make a sudden and desperate effort to reinvigorate the whole limb. It is natural that the German blood in Italy should be weakest at the lower extremities; therefore it is natural that the toe and heel should fall to Allied invasion quicker than the ankle and the leg. Approaching the ankle, the flow of German blood force necessarily is stronger than at the toe, and the flow of- Allied air force necessarily is weaker, until such time as captured Italian airfields shall bring the battlefields of the ankle (notably the Salerno-Naples battlefield) more within range of Allied air fighters. After the Salerno landing, the rising German tide, as yet unchecked by the rising tide of Allied air-fighting, delayed the inland and northward march of the American invaders. That the Germans can make this stand in the SalernoNaples area is a feat which they will seek to magnify in the eyes of wavering units of the stagnating Italian

armies. But the del-ay the Germans are imposing on the Allies is a small matter compared with the setback which the Allies would have suffered had the Germans forced the Americans out af Salerno and back to the sea. It is admitted that the Germans moved quickly, but not quickly enough to score such a major success.

The problem of Eisenhower and Alexander, when they started to capitalise the armistice, must have been: "How far north?". A successful landing could be expected if the landing were made not far enough north to meet Germany's full northern strength. It would also be important to locate the landing place • within range of Allied fighters as based at the moment. In line with these principles, Eisenhower selected Salerno for the most, northerly assault On Italy's west coast, knowing that it was extreme air-fighter range from Sicily. According to one correspondent, Sicily-based fighters have so far to come and go that they can spend only a brief period over the Salerno-Naples battle area. A Lightning, it is stated, carries enough fuel to spend about an hour there, but a Spitfire can be over the battlefield only about twenty minutes. And yet, the correspondent declares, fighters from the nearest bases in Sicily have been employed in such numbers that, even at this extreme range, they have "kept an air umbrella over our forces day and night." So much for the fighters. The bombers, ranging farther afield, have smitten German communications in many parts of Italy; and it is quite clear that the Allied landing forces at Salerno have enjoyed an air umbrella which they could not have enjoyed farther north, besides being further protected by the disruption of German supplies through air bombing. So air power counts for very much in Eisenhower's grip on the Italian ankle. Meanwhile the Allied armies of the toe and heel—especially, it seems, the latter—are coming to the ankle's rescue; and nearer Italian airfields are being converted rapidly to Allied use.

When this concerted strategy is complete, the problem of the leg of Italy will remain. That Germany could prolong the Italy war is, fairly evident; but how many Germans still believe in the lebensraum dream? And, in the absence of a loot motive, how long will jGermans • continue a losing struggle?