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STEPS TAKEN BY ITALY

ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

Rec. 10.50 a.m. RUGBY, Sept. 12. ■An authoritative account of the Italian armistice negotiations is given in London.

In the first week in August the British representatives in two neutral countries were approached by Italian diplomatists, acting on instructions from the Italian Government. Both explained that the Situation in Italy was desperate, and the second emissary said that he had been sent by Marshal Badoglio to discuss possible armistice negotiations. He was informed that the only terms the Allied Governments would accept would be unconditional surrender.

In the middle of August an Italian general travelling in Portugal, ostensibly on another mission, presented himself with credentials from Marshal Badoglio to the British Ambassador- in Madrid, and on the following day to the British Ambassador at Lisbon. The general said he had come with full authority from Marshal Badoglio to say that when the Allies landed in Italy the Italians were prepared to join them against Germany. This was reported to the British Government, which at once informed the American Government. General Eisenhower and the Soviet Government were, of course, also informed.

UP TO THE ITALIANS

The British and American Governments, considering that this was a serious approach, decided to inform the Italian Government through the Italian general of the conditions upon which they were prepared to cease hostilities against Italy. These were that Italy must surrender unconditionally and then accept such terms as the Allies determined to impose*. High officers from General Eisenhower's headquarters proceeded to Lisbon, and at a meeting over which the British Ambassador presided and which the American charge d'affaires attended they informed the Italian general of these conditions. The /general, Avho, ,of course, could make no answer wrtn r out consulting his Government, returned to Rome bearing the Allied conditions. These conditions were, confined to military terms, with a final clause stating that other conditions of a political, economic, and financial character, with which Italy would be bound to comply, would be communicated later. ~,.,, The emissary was told that it was for the Italians, by their behaviour, to influence the Allies in applying terms. Much would depend on how far the Italian Government and people _in fact aided the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. The Italian Government must undertake to proclaim an armistice immediately it was announced by General Eisenhower. This moment was to be chosen by General Eisenhower to coincide with landings in the Naples area which he had planned. SECOND EMISSARY. The Italian general left Lisbon, but owing to the extreme secrecy of his mission he took some time over the return journey. The Italian Government, evidently becoming anxious about his failure to reappear according to schedule, Sent a second general to Lisbon, where he arrived on the day of the first general's return to Rome. As evidence of the genuineness Of its intentions, the Italian Government sent with this second emissary General Carton de Wiart, whom they had released from captivity for the purpose. General de Wiart, who was placed under no obligation to return to Italy, was instructed by the British Government to proceed to England, where his arrival was kept a secret lest publication should lead Germany to guess that approaches to the Allies had been made.

The second Italian general, who corroborated the messages brought by his predecessor, was sent from Lisbon to headquarters at Algiers. Meanwhile, the first general, by arrangement, had arrived in Sicily with the answer of the Italian Government. He was met by General Eisenhower's representatives, whom the second Italian general accompanied. The answer was that the Italian Government, had it been a free agent, Would have been prepared to do what the Allies wished. It was, however, under the control of the Germans, and it was therefore impossible for it to announce an armistice before the main Allied landing in Italy. The envoy was told that the Allies were not prepared to vary the arrangements, and he returned to Rome to consult his Government. A final answer was demanded within 24 hours.

ITALY'S ACCEPTANCE.

On the following day a message was received at Allied headquarters by secret methods communicating that the Italian Government had accepted and that its representative would return to sign an armistice. The armistice, in fact, was signed in the presence of Generals Eisenhower and Alexander and by General Bedell Smith,' representing General Eisenhower and General Castellano, representing Marshal Badoglio. The date was September 3. Russia and, of course, the Dominions, were kept closely informed from day to day of the developments. While the contacts in . Lisbon between the British Ambassador and the accredited representative of the Italian Government were proceeding, Cotmt Grandi arrived at that capital. At no time has any Allied authority had any contact or communication with Count Grandi, whose joiirney to a neutral country, as far as is known, was made solely on his own initiative.—B.O.W.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19430913.2.35.1

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 64, 13 September 1943, Page 5

Word Count
818

STEPS TAKEN BY ITALY Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 64, 13 September 1943, Page 5

STEPS TAKEN BY ITALY Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 64, 13 September 1943, Page 5