Evening Post. SATURDAY, JULY 10, 1943. PACIFIC AIR-POWER RESULTS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 9, 10 July 1943, Page 4

Evening Post. SATURDAY, JULY 10, 1943. PACIFIC AIR-POWER RESULTS

ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS. "Onl.v One Mother."—Please semi addrcs3 to tli to oftlirc. j ! 'iniweuicd."--Disclosure of personal Investments e:innot b:; di-mandi'ii.

The latest naval clash in the Pacific, whereby the Japanese cruisers and destroyers in Kula Gulf suffered much heavier losses than the Allies suffered, fits into the general pattern of the Pacific war against Japan. That general pattern has, as its main feature, the disproportion—as between the belligerents—of total losses, ships and aircraft. The persistence of heavy Japanese losses, far exceeding Allied losses, can no longer be attributed to coincidence or to bad luck. Such a run of misfortune, dating back to the Battle of the Coral Sea and to Midway, must have a consistent cause; and the causative factor must be that, in the type of amphibious warfare that has been carried on in island-studded waters, superiority in air power is more important than superiority in naval power. There have been times when Japan has placed within battle range of her enemy fleets superior to the Allied fleets, backed by heavy naval reinforcements that could have reached the battle in no very long time. But in every case the Japanese naval efforts have been defeated mainly by the Allies' aircraft, the destructive power of which has been so clearly proved that the Japanese navy has been afraid to throw into the battle its whole available and nearby naval force. From all this, a great tactical principle emerges, favourable to air war, but perhaps qualified by considerations of environment.

The facts speak for themselves. Anynaval superiority possessed by Japan —and at times it has been considerable—has failed to protect Japan from the sinking of 35 of her warships, and the damaging of an equal number, between August 8, 1942, and February 16, 1943. These are the checked-over enemy losses of that period, and to them must be added heavy losses of troop transports and personnel (well over 5000 men) and escort aircraft. Since then has occurred the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 5, 1943), where United Nations air forces sunk a whole convoy (12 transports and 10 cruisers and destroyers) and destroyed 55 escort aeroplanes; approximately 15,000 Japanese were drowned. The Allies' superiority in air power has thus neutralised any Japanese naval superiority; has tended to wipe out— by attrition—any Japanese naval margin of superior strength; and is tending to wipe out Japan's air strength in the combat ai-ea altogether. The Allies' advance in the New Georgia and Rendova area has compelled Japan to denude other areas in order to put <up the best air-fight possible against this particular thrust. But, in spite of her robbing of other parts of her front, Japan's air strength has not been sufficient to prevent the Allies' insular advances and the sinking of a large number of Japanese warships in Kula Gulf. Facts, we repeat, speak for themselves. Air inferiority in this type of warfare1 is an unpardonable sin; and Japan's sin has found her out.

It is therefore not surprising to hear that the war correspondent of the "New York Times" in the Southwest Pacific emphasises "the inadequacy of the Japanese air effort to counter the current offensive." His interpretation of the situation is that the enemy is "critically short" of aircraft of the combat type, and he adds: "The Japanese have been able to make only ineffectual stabs against the American advances, leaving dozens of profitable targets unattacked. Their major air effort lias been directed to halting the Americans in New Georgia. They have been able to spare only a smattering of aircraft for operations at the other end of the fighting line in the New Guinea area. Informed quarters blame lack of aircraft for the Japanese failure to bomb our landing parties on Trobriand and Woodlark Islands. Lieut.-General Kenney's relentless poundings of Japanese aerodromes at Rabaul throughout June, which were successful beyond expectations, greatly damaged parked aircraft. The over-all aviation situation in the Pacific is encouraging-" We hope that this correspondent is not overoptimistic when he suggests that, unless Japan soon sends aerial reinforcements, iher aeroplanes will be swept from the skies. More than that, the whole insular arc of Japanese Pacific defence must fall unless Japanese air power I can be maintained at adequacy. Air j power, the destroying factor, alone can keep stiff Japan's far-flung line; and herein lies perhaps the greatest of Japan's errors of strategy. The first evidence of such an error is heavy losses; the second evidence will be retreat to shorter lines. As recently as March, 1941, Chuko Ikesaki, a Japanese Minister, is reported to have said: "A careful survey of Pacific strategy reveals that if equally strong Powers fight each other, whichever starts the offensive will surely suffer defeat."