SATURDAY. JUNE 26, 1943.

Evening Post, Volume CXXXV, Issue 150, 26 June 1943, Page 4

SATURDAY. JUNE 26, 1943.

AIR COMBAT DEEPENS

Those bombers that take out a return ticket from Britain to Africa have introduced into the air war a new factor. This extension of the air blitz programme is too recent to be adjudged as having passed the testing stage; in fact, the whole ambitious programme of the British and the American air forces in Europe must be regarded in the light of a legitimate military adventure, full of promise but not yet proved 'to demonstration. Lately an outstanding feature of the air war has been the disparity between Italian anti-aeroplane measures and those of Germany. The Africa-based air attack on Italy has met with less dangerous opposition than the Britainbased attack on Germany; and it seems that this disparity is likely to continue, for Hitler may be expected to concentrate all his available air force to defend Germany rather than find any surplus to send to Italy's general defence. Token support of Italy by Germany, in the matter of air power, there may be. But the indications are that Hitler is making a supreme effort to inflict the greatest possible damage on Ruhr-raiding aircraft; that the Ruhr is more important to him than are the manufacturing towns of Italy; and that even the Russian front and the Mediterranean fighting line will not get any ,more than minimum requirements of German air power, so long as Hitler retains a hope of breaking the air blitz on the Ruhr by countermeasures. It is pointed out by the "Daily Telegraph" that a British-based bomber that takes out a return ticket to the Ruhr only is likely to meet with intercepting enemy fighters both going and coming. But the African return ticket enables the Ruhr-raiding bombers to continue southward after their bombs have been dropped, avoiding an immediate return over well-armed Germany, and enjoying the comparative quiet of the southward trip, because "Northern Italy's defences are notoriously weak." Indeed, the Italian night-fighter strength is described as negligible, and this authority adds: "Thus, after the bombing [of Germany] the Lancasters had more or less an armchair flight to North .Africa, with a smaller risk of losses. The Italian defences would not have expected the Allied bombers to jcome their way after unloading their bombs on Friedrichshafen. The element of surprise must have been equally effective on the return flight from Africa. The German defences 'face" Britain; the German radio-loca-tion detection systems are presumably organised to pick up raiders coming in from the west or north; but the bombers, flying in a general northerly direction from Spezia (Italy) towards Germany, came in behind the German defences without having to go out from Britain, and thus raise the alarm1 in Germany. By flying to North Africa the Lancasters were able to strike much further into Axis territory than would normally have been possible at midsummer." For the present, therefore, the so-called shuttle bombing gives safer flying over parts of the new Britain-Africa route. It must involve,, however, considerable ground organisation at the southern end, and there is "at present no indication as to whether the organisation and resources of the British and American air forces are equal to making a shuttle service frequent, and, if so, how frequent. All that can be said is that it offers at present a degree of safety from losses which German anti-aircraft measures are raising to a considerable figure. All these considerations are contributory to the long-standing discussion concerning to what degree the downfall of Germany can be brought nearer by air action, and whether air action can expedite a decision within this year. The German anti-aircraft services that were "on their toes" waiting for the immediate return of Friedrichshafen's attackers (who did not come) were fooled, but it will be hardly possible to fool them so completely again. That the whole anti-aircraft personnel of Germany is on its toes, spurred on by Hitler to make a mighty effort in a supreme crisis, can hardly be doubted. Radio news to hand today states: "The Germans last night put everything they had into the defences guarding the Ruhr. They pushed the outer ring of defences to the coast, and our pilots met a heavy barrage over Belgium. The barrage intensified as the bombers hurtled into the Ruhr. Huge belts of searchlights tried to stop our bombers. The Dusseldorf and Cologne defences were in action, and every searchlight in Elberfeld was in service. Many night-fighters were up, too, and there were duels from the Ruhr back to the English coast. The night's operations, which included other attacks in the Ruhr and minelaying, cost us 33 bombers, eight of them Canadian." The other side of this picture is that "Elberfeld's war industries were heavily blitzed. One pilot said the fires merged until they covered a large area, and this pilot was one of the earliest in the raid. The Air Ministry says the weight of our attack was nearly as heavy as one attack recently when more than a] thousand acres of Ruhr factories were damaged." To see the picture in perspective, it has to be realised that Hitler is fighting back against the Allies' air-stranglehold' just as the Allies fought back against Hitler's Üboat stranglehold. Hitler is trying to shoot his way out of a very tight place on land, as we shot our way out of a tight place at sea. The combat deepens. It is far from being over. Of the| result we have no doubt whatever. But this amany-sided war still has to be won.