Evening Post WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1943. TURKEY VISIT REFLECTS NEW STRATEGY

Evening Post, Volume CXXXV, Issue 28, 3 February 1943, Page 4

Evening Post WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1943. TURKEY VISIT REFLECTS NEW STRATEGY

Mr. Churchill's visit to Turkey and Cyprus is a symptom of what the Americans would call the new Mediterranean line-up. That is to say, the visit marks a new phase of strategy and is a significant mile-post in the progress of the war. The NovemberDecember developments in North Africa were a rude shock to Hitler's conception of a war confined mainly to east and west. Hitler suddenly found himself compelled to click his heels and make a half-turn, facing south; and he saw before him the long and in parts narrow expanse of the Mediterranean Sea, with a neutral country at either end of it. One of these countries, Spain, 'has a Government which sympathises with Fascism but which has maintained its neutrality. The other country, Turkey, at the other (east) end of the Mediterranean, co-operates with Britain and America, but within the framework of neutrality and the special treaty with Britain. When Hitler turned on his heel to face the new threat in the south he looked again at Spain and Turkey. Often he had looked at them before, but the new strategic situation—the Allied threat to "the soft under-belly of Europe," stretching between Spain and Turkey—compelled Hitler to take a renewed and special interest in these two side doors of the Mediterranean, which are also side doors to the Continental battlefield.

To Hitler, holding Central Europe, Spain and Turkey appear as two pincer arms. He would like to close them tight on the Mediterranean, and close it at each end to British sea power. But, to Britain and America, Turkey and Spain are, as stated, side entrances to Hitler's Continental citadel. Of the two Turkey is, at the moment, vastly the more important to Britain and America, for various reasons, and ; especially for the geographical reason which inspired Churchill's devotion in the last war to Dardanelles strategy— namely, geography has placed Russia ! and the Black Sea on the other side of Turkey. The Turkish Straits and Turkey's position between the two Iseas —the Middle Sea and the Black— ! are a permanent fact of vast strategic meaning. In 1914-18, owing to what Churchill now calls the "tragical" breach of "the ancient British-Turkish j friendship" and of the Crimean War tradition, Britain and Russia had no opportunity to join hands through the Turkish Straits except by forcing the Dardanelles, which our Gallipoli army and the fleet failed to do. But today Britain and Russia are again allies; Turkey is no longer an enemy; and once more, as in 1914-18, the Turkish Straits beckon, Moscow approves, and the Balkan countries are again a possible avenue of Allied advance into Europe. A glance into the history of 1914-17 will greatly stimulate the imagination of anyone who wishes to interpret the position today—dissimilar and yet similar—and to find the meaning of the Churchill visit to 1 Turkey. It has been stated, rightly or wrongly, that Hitler's chance of marching from France into Spain for the purpose of closing the Mediterranean Sea at its western end has been discounted by an intimation by the Spanish Government that, if either belligerent invades Spain, the other belligerent will be invited to come to Spain's help. Such an intimation, if it were made, would be within the province of a neutral, and would be one of the most effective diplomatic weapons for the protection of neutrality. In any case, Hitler keeps out of Spain. Equally, he will expect his enemies to keep out of Turkey. But there is no geographical phenomenon in Spain at all like the Turkish Straits with their immense strategical importance, and connecting (or disconnecting) a mighty military Power like Russia with its two Great Power allies or co-operators, Britain and America. Also, Spain does not lie cheek-by-jowl with a possible battleground and military line-of-route like the Balkans. These facts in themselves are sufficient to explain the present concentration of the spotlight on the more easterly of the two neutrals.

While Allied interests would not be served —and might be disserved —by speculating too deeply on either Turkish or Spanish neutralities t and private sympathies, it is reasonable to point out that a political event like the British Prime Minister's visit to Turkey reflects accurately the point the war has lately attained. It is an event which draws some of its colour from its immediate surroundings and from the military portents inherent in those surroundings. A few months ago, when Hitler was driving through Russia to the farther Black Sea and towards the Caspian Sea, a visit by Mr. Churchill to Turkey would have assumed a defensive complexionwould have looked like a diplomatic move to keep defied to Hitler the Turkish road to Asia. But in those few months the war situation has been transformed by events in Russia and North Africa. Africa, then a German spearhead pointed at Egypt and Asia, is now an Allied spearhead pointing at Europe. It is fair to assume, then, that what Mr. Churchill said in Turkey has offensive as well as defensive connotations. Turkey now is relieved from the fear of becoming involved through the advance of one arm of the German Mediterranean pincers, and Turkey appears to be cast for quite another role in the affairs of Europe and Asia. Needless to add, Moscow and Washington as well as London were listeners to the Turkish talks, which may well have a leading page in a new chapter of history now being written.