Evening Post FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1942. THE WAR AT SEA

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIV, Issue 105, 30 October 1942, Page 4

Evening Post FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1942. THE WAR AT SEA

Napoleon's dictum that, other things being equal, victory is on the side of the big battalions, is as true in the main today as it was in his time and before that. Otherwise, in war, as in most other enterprises, quality being equal, quantity will tell. The unknown factor which is apt to qualify all general rules is that of chance or luck. "The fortunes of war" is no meaningless phrase. In one brief moment, through some unforeseen movement, or even accident, the balance of strength may be upset and, with it, the outcome of battles, which are a trial of strength. Where there is an ample margin of superior strength, the side possessing' it may suffer losses without incurring decisive defeat. Where there is no such margin, the loss of strength by one side in an otherwise equal engagement may turn the scale of the struggle and result in; farreaching consequences. The Allies in this war started with an absolute inferiority on land and in the air and suffered defeat after defeat as a result until Britain, the sole survivor of the original alliance, came within an ace of disaster. Britain was saved by the qualitative superiority of her air force against the superior numbers of the enemy. On land the British Empire could not hope to equal the enemy's vast, well-equipped, and well-trained armies, and suffered more defeats until the German armies invaded Russia and met for the first time something like their equals in numbers and efficiency. This restored the balance more or less on land and gave the Allies, with the help of America, a chance and time to build up their strength. Thus on land and in the air nearly twelve months ago the prospects for the Allies were good. At sea the Allies- began the war with as great a superiority over their enemies as the Germans had over them on land and in the air. The collapse of France and the entry of Italy into the war was a double disaster to Britain as the surviving antagonist of the Axis. The powerful French fleet, which had helped Britain substantially to maintain command of the sea against Germany, was lost to Britain, and a new fleet, strong in numbers, if not in quality, challenged the British control of the Mediterranean. The task of the-Royal Navy became more than doubly difficult as the sphere of operations widened and the short route ;to the Middle East via the Mediterranean was rendered unsafe for general use and the longer voyage round the African Continent called on more shipping for transport and more naval craft for convoys. These difficulties were gradually being surmounted when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in/December last upset the balance once more. The Japanese fleet "was then the third most powerful in the world,, third only to the American and British Navies. Pearl Harbour itself and the loss of the British capital ships, Prince of Wales and Repulse, "off Malaya, for some months probably made the Axis Powers at least as strong as the Allied naval.forces with much simpler and easier tasks to perform in more confined waters. In a few months the Japanese took advantage of the opportunity to sweep the United Nations out of the western waters, of the Pacific from the Aleutians to the Solomons. In the meantime the Axis U-boats in the Western Atlantic were creating havoc among Allied shipping, principally American. To the United Nations command of the sea is vital to victory. After the first Japanese onrush had come to a halt inside a . wide fringe of Pacific islands and the eastern mainland of Southern Asia, the Allies, represented by America in the Pacific, began by a landing in the southern islands of the Solomons group to reassert their claim to the command of the East and South Pacific by removing a.threat to their communications with Australia and New Zealand. Such a challenge inevitably drew a response from Japan, and the battle now raging in the Melanesian Archipelago beyond the immediate scene of land operations is a trial of strength between the Allies and Japan. In the aggiegate, so far as the incomplete information from the battle area goes, the forces are more or less equal. It is almost certain that the Japanese are stronger in the land forces they have been able to disembark on the land theatre of the battle in the island of Guadalcanal. .At sea they are probably stronger also, otherwise it is doubtful whether they would have been able to transport and land considerable bodies of troops on Guadalcanal. In the air the Allies are qualitatively superior, if not in numbers, and it is this factor that is helping to correct the disparity in the other arms. But the | forces are so delicately balanced in the main, that neither side can afford heavy losses, and so there is a constant process of manoeuvre in the endeavour to gain advantage of position. In the vast archipelago of the Western Pacific the incalculable chances of war are greatly increased. Land-based aeroplanes on the islands are iii a position to inflict damage on surface craft, and the expanse of island-studded waters must be a happy hunting-ground for submarines. Such then is the position involving great issues for either side and deeply concerning this country and Australia. For the moment the outcome is uncertain, but the skill and resource shown by our American allies are a good augury for their success in what may prove a decisive struggle.