Evening Post TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1942. "DELICATE BALANCE" IN PACIFIC

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIV, Issue 73, 22 September 1942, Page 4

Evening Post TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1942. "DELICATE BALANCE" IN PACIFIC

Concerning the strategic value of Australia and of the South-west Pacific as an offensive area, Hanson Baldwin was formerly a doubting Thomas. In his military contributions to the "New York Times" he did not appear to regard Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji as the best route to Tokio. Now, however, he i* writing from "somewhere in Ihe Pacific," and evidently sees things from other angles than were accessible to him when he wrote in New York. It would not be true to say that critics, like some birds and animals, take their colour from their surrotindings, but certainly environment has a great influence on outlook, especially when the environment has been added to by. such colourful exploits as those of the Americans in the Solomons —an enterprise that was only incubating when Hanson Baldwin wrote his earlier impressions of South-west Pacific strategy. The American mind has got farther and farther away from the disillusionment of Pearl Harbour and nearer and nearer to the stimulating influences of Guadalcanaland the Solomons seizures. Also, nearer and nearer to naval parity in the Pacific, which is a step towards American naval supremacy. The restrained enthusiasm of the following sentence in Baldwin's dispatch explains a good deal: "The forces in the Pacific Ocean are delicately balanced, which is a great improvement since Pearl Harbour, when the American were clearly inferior." This delicate balance is affected by climatic as well as armamental factors, for the white man fights tropic conditions as well as Japanese. Military Thomases often are well entitled to their doubts. If, last March, there were doubts about the South-west Pacific road to Japan, there were double doubts about the invasion of Europe. As the months went on, the doubt about the wisdom of a big-scale landing on the French coast did not diminish, but the Pacific doubts distinctly grew less. The Solomon Islands landing—although not yet insured against a Japanese major counter-blow—has been more convincing than the brief landing at Dieppe, at any rate, so far as public impressions are concerned. One result is a tendency to devote more effort to securing in the Pacific results that do not seem to be attainable in. Europe; in other words, to exploit Japanese vulnerability if Germanoccupied Europe is to be adjudged, in 1942, invulnerable. From "somewhere, in the Pacific" Baldwin notes this change in the tide. In the belief that "hopes of a second front in Europe in 1942 have disappeared," American intentions, writes Baldwin, "are tending to focus increasingly on the Pacific." This tendency is now so strong that nothing can subdue it save perhaps a successful Japanese offensive on a big scale. Dare the Japanese navy attempt it in the Solomons? The First Lord of the Admiralty's figures concerning British naval construction are read in Tokio. Tokio also knows where American naval reconstruction has already got to. Japanese naval and shipping wastage has become a prime factor. The first phase of Japan's war ended when she occupied all the territories which were rapidly occupiable. Tojo at that time stated that "the real war" had not begun. But the latter half of 1942 sees it very definitely begun. The Pacific commitments on both sides are so heavy that neither side can give way on any Pacific front without loss of prestige. Elsewhere than in the Pacific, Japan is also now facing "real war"; she faces it in the Indian Ocean, possibly on the Indian front also unless her fifth-column efforts among the Indian multi-millions yield treacherous fruit to-the-Allies' disadvantage. Also, as for years past, Japan faces China; and rumour attaches to her the prospect of a new fighting front in Russian Asia. If, by Japan's own choice, she thus becomes ringed with enemies, she will be essaying a task which appears to be beyond her strength. Bui: her lack of capacity to bear an unprecedented burden is not something to be assumed. It has to be proved. Can Japan so utilise the resources of the rich economic empire which she has lately seized as to construct a new and impregnable zone of defence? Vast economic and military resources are present to her hand, but their organisation requires a vital factor —time. It is time that should be denied to her. United States strategy early glimpsed that fact, and therefore struck early in Lhe Pacific, not waiting for numerical supremacy. That'policy'has paid. We hope it will continue to pay. and that Mr. Baldwin will rejoice in iU.