NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIV, Issue 42, 18 August 1942, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

MOSCOW MEETING

CONCERTING ALLIED STRATEGY?

By far the most important news today is the announcement of Mr. Churchill's visit to Moscow, accompanied by Mr. Averell Harriman, representing President Roosevelt, and the leading military heads, and their four-day conversations with Premier Stalin, Mr. Moiotov, and the Russian military chief Marshal Voroshilov. It is stated that General Wavell was also present. On his way to Moscow Mr. „./ Churchill saw Field-Marshal Smuts in Cairo. He would thus be able to get a comprehensive picture of the whole military situation, ranging from Egypt, through Russia and the Middle East, to the Far East. What was the purpose of the Moscow meeting? The communique says: A 1 ■number of decisions were reached covering the field of the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe. This just war of liberation the Governments are determined to carry on with-all their power ana energy until the complete destruction of Hitlerism or any similar tyranny is achieved." It may be taken, therefore, that the "decisions" were mainly military arid concerned primarily the Axis in Europe, for Russia is not at war with; Japan—yet. The meeting coincided with the most:critical situation Russia has yet had to face, not even excluding the threat to Moscow in November last. Mr. Churchill will no doubt have been given much information about the exact military position. of Russia today; information not available to the rest of the world. The position may be better—or worse—than it seems. There would be no adyantage to Russia or the rest of the Allies in concealing the truth, whatever it is, from; Mr. Churchill. The British Prime Minister in turn could and would give Premier Stalin full information about the position of i the British Empire .m the various theatres of war in which the British are directly concerned. Similarly, Mr. Harriman could . speak t oy the' President and the United States. He said: "The will, agree to all. decisions taken by Mr. Churchill: Americans will stand hand toJiand together with the Russians." Thus, with the experts at call for consultation, there were all the necessary elements at Moscow for concerting a general war'plan for tlie Allies. A General £lan. The need for such a general, and global war strategy for the ■ . United Nations has long been evident. The lack of it has led to many disasters in. the past, the most serious being the loss of the East Indies, South-west Pacific and South-east' Asia areas to Japan. Hitler, with his one-man leadership, has succeededjso far with his preconcerted plan m Europe. The Japanese junta of naval and military heads have had a similar success with a strategy worked, out long ago .in detail. The Allies so far, apart from the much more difficult strategical job imposed on them by enemy successes have the further disadvantage, common to Allies fighting a common war, of having to consult one another in order to reach agreement on whatto do to beat the enemy. Hence the Churchill visits to.America arid now to Russia. The fruits may, not be visible immediately, but they should not be long in coming., Allied military policy in the whole Western theatre from the Caspian to the Atlantic should now be ruled by first-hand knowledge of the circumstances and conditions, and if "decisions" have been reached, it may be assumed that tney represent what is practical in warfare. ■ - The Final Determinant. It is especially; satisfactory that the United States was adequately represented at Moscow, because, as Hanson Baldwin pointed out in the "New York Times" recently, "the United States is, in the last analysis, the final determinant in this conflict; our strength is the only strength that can tip the •scales against the* Axis and- our influence is the major influence that can set the strategical pattern of this war." Where American influence is predominant, that is, in the Pacific theatre of war,, a definite strategic plan is emerging at more than: one point. The workmanlike way of American warfare has impressed the world with confidence in its capacity, to do the job. Right round the Pacific, with Britain coming in from India, and Australia and -New Zealand helping at this end, there will be more or less a unity of command. In the Western theatre, on the other hand, no such unity of strategy h* been apparent. The Russians, iri the main, have fought a lone hand against the Axis with all the help Britain and America could send in the way of materials, weapons, and munitions, but without any co-ordinated strategy to fit in with the campaign in Russia by means of operations elsewhere in Europe. In one sense, the R.A.F. air .blitz on Germany is such an operation, but may not have filled the bill in Russian eyes. No doubt these aspects of general strategy were frankly discussed at Moscow dnd the "decisions" reached should satisfy all the parties. On this point Hanson Baldwin is again worth quoting:

Sound decisions may be watered down in their actual application by the attrition of politics. For there can be no doubt that political considerations, ■ international and domestic, have influenced, and are influencing, military and strategical decisions. This has been tnue, of course, in all past wars; politics is an instrument of total war. But the war has now reached its decisive stage and the time for political considerations to take precedence over military considerations has gone. Otherwise our strategy may become the strategy of dispersion. There are many good ways to win the war. We must be careful that we do not try to take them all.