Evening Post SATURDAY, AUGUST 15, 1942. A MARINE "HEDGEHOG"

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIV, Issue 40, 15 August 1942, Page 4

Evening Post SATURDAY, AUGUST 15, 1942. A MARINE "HEDGEHOG"

A good deal has been written about " "hedgehogs." When the*Wves of the Russian counter-offensive last winter " (Northern winter) closed round German strong-points, a new 5 defensive term was evolved. A sur* c rounded or semi-surrounded strong' point was likened to the little garden animal which, when in defence, rolls - itself up into a ball, prickly and passive; and though the parallel is f far from being complete, modern - defence being anj'thing but passive, b the term "hedgehog" has found some f degree of acceptance as being applic- \ able to surrounded points that can f be neither rushed nor reduced by ) siege. But to say that the island of I Malta has proved a "hedgehog" hi 5 the aircraft-infested waters of the central Mediterranean is. to underf state Malta's insular glory. The soul of Malta has been its power not only ' to defend but to strike. Although ■ almost entirely dependent on outside t supplies, Malta has for years been !. receiving "these supplies, by sea and : air, in sufficient degree to enable the 5 island garrison to sally forth by air \ to intercept attackers, to prey on ; enemy shipping in "transit, and even to attack the enemy in his coastal < lairs and havens. Malta is not only - an obstinate rock which the Axis v cannot blast away. Malta is also a nucleus of the British war on Axis \ communications and sea power. | Mussolini regards the British flag on • Malta as both insult and injury. j Two outstanding facts *in the Mediterranean naval war are the failure of s Britain's predatory campaign (sea and air) to prevent the Axis from i reinforcing Rommel,' though it has , made reinforcement more hazardous, j and the failure of the enemy's war on j convoys to prevent the supplying of Malta. Some day books will be written on such enterprises as the ' supplying of Rommel's Libyan army t by the Axis, the supplying of Malta, • and the attempt to supply the , beleaguered American forces in the Philippines. Such supply enterprises as these are valued according to (1) the importance of the force to be , supplied, (2) the degree of its vital :. need, and (3) the loss rate involved jin maintaining supply. Already it i has been published that the attempt 8 t6 supply the Philippine garrison ■ was abandoned as hopeless because two cargoes out of three (or even a s higher proportion) were sunk or j seteed by the enemy's predatory craft. ' But the fact that the Axis persists in i supplying Rommel, and that Britain • persists in-supplying Malta, is prima : facie evidence that the loss rate in • these two rival enterprises has not j reached a crippling point, and alsd . has not reached a point at which ' either of the enterprises can be conr sidered unprofitable. The import- \ ance placed by the Axis on Rommel's _ Libya-Egypt push ;s evidently not seriously discounted by the shipping ; toll the Axis pays to British ships and • aircraft. In like manner, the importf' arice of Malta to Britain, and that island's dependence on supplies fldwn or conveyed from outside, • make a high loss rate acceptable to ' Britain—a rate so high, perhaps, thatJt would not be acceptable on • any other supply route in the world. ; Judged by its strategic and tactical importance, and its dependence on outside supplies, Malta is worth : the heroic labours of its garrison and ■ of those great sea and air forces that i rim the gauntlet of the. Mediterranean - in order that Malta shall eat and s fight. Both the merchant ships and 1 their escorts, Malta-bound from Gibraltar, have to run the gauntlet of Axis torpedo-carrying and dive- ; bombing aircraft, submarines, Ec boats, and mines. The predatory j. pack might hav.e been added to when I Italian Cruisers (eight-inch and six- - inch gun types), moved southward as if to attack our latest convoy, but 4 our'aircraft turned them back. A b result of this kind o( supplying is '• that Britain rtiust risk her larger - units, but the enemy may or may not ■do so. On this occasion the supplies ', and reinforcements (including fighter ; aircraft) got through to Malta, but . with expected heavy losses, which mii eluded the aircraft-carrier Eagle and - the cruiser Manchester. The escort included at least one other aircraft- ; carrier, also battleships, so the '" Admiralty is not afraid to risk heavy r-. ships in backing its faith in the - Malta garrison. At least it can be $&id that convoys to Malta attain 5 more results than the famous nine convoys that were hurried to Singa- '• pore after December 7. The 3tory fl of the Gibraltar-Malta convoy is ' incomplete, and the' same may be said of enemy losses. In different 8 parts of the Mediterranean Italy's cruiser strength has been further - reduced by aerial and submarine r attack, and the day when Italy will "- accept a main fleet action seems to ir be no nearer. 3 . If France were still our fighting '' ally, the whole history of the Medina terranean naval war' would have been ,' different. Mussolini, greatly profits', ing through the armistice, hopes to s> profit still more when Laval presents I him with the French fleet, which II Laval would gladly do. And so long y as the political hazards of Mussolini 1 and Laval maintain their present _ precarious balance, so long will ';. British heavy ships be compelled to 2 take risks that Italian heavy ships - avoid, and so long will British con- - voys run the gauntlet, that being part of the price of maintaining on heroic i Malta the Union Jack, defiant in its I "hedgehog'Msplation* ... ,