AIRLINER'S CRASH

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIV, Issue 9, 10 July 1942, Page 4

AIRLINER'S CRASH

INQUIRY CONCLUDED

DECISION RESERVED

The inquiry into the circumstances of the Union Airways liner's crash at Mount Richmond, on, May 7 was concluded yesterday and the board of inquiry reserved its decision and will report to the Minister. The board consisted od! < Mr. W., F. Stilwell, S.M. (chairman), Squadron Leader G. B. Bolt, and Captain ©.Garden. Dr. N. A. Foden appeared for the Department of Civil Aviation,' Mr. D. W. Virtue for Union Airways, Ltd., and Mr. H. Mitchell for Mrs. Johnston, widow of one of the pilots. Continuing his evidence, Flight Lieutenant J. M. Buckeridge, Acting Controller of Civil Aviation, produced a\ statement 'showing details of the company's air operations. Questioned by Dr. Foden, witness said that in later years a conservative policy in regard to trip cancellation was adopted. For instance, in 1936, 300 trips were cancelled; in 1941 the. trips cancelled totalled 21. The majority of cancellations were due to weather, and the reduced number indicated that the aircraft were flying irt worse weather. This was the first passenger accident since the regular schedule started seven years ago. The total passenger miles flown was about 33,000,000.' The number of passenger fatalities .to the miles flown was one in 11,000,000 miles, which compared more than favourably with the .figures for countries like Great.Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia. Cross-examined by Mr. Virtue, witness said that the experienced cornparty pilots were better qualified to evolve a practical method of approach than the Department. ' Mr. Virtue: When you threw - those stations open for general use, - was it not desirable that the Department should say how any particular station should be approached?— That, in effect, is what is intended, but we have asked the companies, in the light of their experience, to evolved procedure that is practicable. Witness said that compared with 1936, the company was flying about 1000 fewer schedule trips a year.. In reply to a further question, witness said that with the cloud at 10-10 and the ceiling at 300 ft in the .Nelson area, the pilot would.not be justified, in view of the weather report, in leaving to make a flight on dead reckoning. He agreed that the pilot in those circumstances would be entitled to ask for bearings. Francis Maurice Clarke, general manager of Union Airways, said that the company's regulations required their pilots to give their positions every 20 minutes. .Dr. Foden: Then Commander Johnston committed a breach of the company's regulations?—lt would appear so. •Witness said that the pilot made the decision as to whether he should make a flight or not. COUNSEL'S ADDRESSES. In his concluding comment, Mr. Virtue said that no one could say that Commander Johnston's judgment was at fault in undertaking the flight with the evidence available.about the weather. Several unsatisfactory features, however, had been disclosed about the operation of the direction-finding stations. More co-ordination of control between the Air -Department and the Post and Telegraph Department might be desirable. Junior. operators were apparently left in charge at vital times when two men were really required to cope with the work. There seemed to be no uniformity in the classification of bearings. As to the navigation of the plane, it appeared likely that Commander Johnston was working by dead reckoning and using bearings only as a check. The Nelson log recorded that at 8.13 a.m. a bearing of 278 degrees was sent out. Palmerston North recorded Nelson as sending out a bearing of 248 degrees at the same time. It was possible that when the operator recorded having sent out 278 it. was his honest but incorrect reconstruction of what he had done. NO NEGLIGENCE PROVED. Mr. Mitchell said nothing in the evidence in any way tended to establish that Commander Johnston had been negligent. He was a first-class pilot and not in the habit of taking risks. From the facts now known it seemed that the plane was not in the position that Commander Johnston thought it was, for three main reasons: there was a higher wind than he beUeved or could have reasonably expected from the forecast; because of the wind he was not. making the ground speed he could reasonably .expect; he received inaccurate bearings. On the last count he associated himself with Mr. Virtue's. submissions. Dr. Foden said the cause of the accident appeared to. be the unknown and unpredictable velocity of the upper winds, coupled with, lack of visual contacts. The pilot seemed to have assumed that he could never be carried more than 10 miles or so off his course on this route, which was borne out by his recommendation that 5000 feet was a satisfactory height, though the event seemed to have shown that a greater height was desirable. The pilot also did not seem to have allowed himself enough- time to give full consideration to the weather before the flight. It would "be better if more time were given to this in future. There also seemed room for improvement in the system under which each pilot was a virtual law unto himself in deciding whether a flight should be undertaken and .the flying methods to be adopted under difficult conditions. It was frankly admitted that the Nelson log was defective, but it was perhaps too much to ask that it should be completely accurate when the operator was busy with his primary work of giving, bearings.