NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 137, 12 June 1942, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

LIBYAN BATTLE

LOSS OF BIR HACHEIM

t There are two important pieces s of news today,' one, good and. one bad. The good news I* the maki ing and signing of a treaty ,bcs tween Britain and Rassia .. that covers not only the war itself. be» also the period after the war. The t United States has not gone so fir $ yet, but an'effective understanding • oh similar lines was- reached by the Soviet envoy to both Britain 3 and America, M. Molotov, ' with » . President Roosevelt. vTherurider- ". standing covers the qttestldn* of a 1 "second front in Europe' in. 1942." j The bad news is.the* IolB^of; Bir Hacheim, the southern cornerstone ; of the Allied defence .system .: in I Libya. It is stated that the gftrrlr son was successfully evacuated bei fore Bir Hacheim was occupied.. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty appears to " be mainly political, and- as -such ; is 1 more suitable for treatment elsewhere > than here. Both parties Will continue : to give each other the utmost-assist-ance in their power;for the, conduct of the war. This means all possible supply of munitions to Russia, a xnpre difficult proposition, via " tiie/ shorter Arctic route in .'the height'of shimmer, with the midnight sun,*, than in the long Arctic nfght.'.The Persian route r has, however, been, greatly improved , by various means of late, ,and should : be able to undertake a larger* share of > the burden of transport. It may be . taken that Russia will not g6 short of I' Allied help in these critical months The reference ol an "understanding" on the "creation of a sfecond front m Europe in 1942" does Jno.l carry the question much further than it is now, except that it contains ah' that the question was thoroughly discussed with M. Molotov, ' who will know now how much'is possible and how much not. It ma"y v be accepted that he thoroughly uriderstands* the position of Britain aridtAmerfca in this respect and is satisfied .with, assurances given. In one sense,, the passive blows of. the Royal Air Force, on German centres of industry may be; said to constitute a "second^ front." , O'n'the increasing scale promised they should go far to weaken Germany in' the -East as well as in the West, and prepare the way for a real invasion .of, the Continent by the Allies this" year'or next. This war, like the, last, [ is -becoming a war of attrition,';■ wliere ,the application of force in, anjr direction is useful if it wears down, the. strength of the enemy and'tends to. hasten a collapse. Significance of Haeheitn. ' ' It is impossible without' *a fairly large-scale military map and'a ."fuller knowledge of enemy, and Allied dispositions to assess the precise significance of the loss of Bir Hacheim. This desert post must have been of "great* if not vital, importance to the defence of the general Allied line, or 'it would not have been attacked so ferociously and defended so stoutly, for' so long. It was evidently a thorn in the side of Rommel's arms', 'which hnd- to. be' removed before any general advance was possible. Quite literally, it must have been a cornerstone' of >th* Allied defence, a desert stronghold with a,well (bir) and therefore capable of defence. It probably, as the description implies, rose* above the general level of the plateau. Its strategic'lmportance was that it stands on the inland road, frinf ing the absolute desert, from'the famous Mekili cross-roads, to Si'di Omat on the Egyptian .frontier.1 \t wa&'alonj this road that the Bth Army.1 advanced westward in its offensive of NpverhberDecember last. pome' miles'. east of Bir Hacheim on the'road to Egypt is the important road junction of Bir el Gobi, often mentioned v iti accdunt^of the earlier campaign/ From^ErGobi a road runs east and no^th to Tobruk, via El Adem through which' passes the Trigh-Capuzzo Road near- the former battlefield of Sidi Rezegh. Possible Effects. . l- ■ ■ '" It may be that the loss "of'Bir'Hacheim will compel a general withdrawal of the Bth Army to'the 'Bir el GobiTo'bruk line with minor losses'of men and equipment almost' inevitable, in such cases. The -Bir * Haclieini-Sidi Omar road certainiy' outflanks.' the British positions in the Tpbruk-Sollurn area, and mobile columns 'ban 'cover much ground. The conditions!, of desert warfare are unique in this; respect: sufficient forces cannot' be maintained with food and water«-particularly water —and other munitions to hold trench lines or a close chain of connected fortified posts,'as in France in the last war and in Russia in this. The result is that the fall of'd single post may expose the rest of the "defences to dangerous outflanking manoeuvres. Both sides have had ample experience of this side of desert warfare in the previous campaigns in • Libya. ' "Both sides have to maintain long lines of communication With' their bases,' and these themselves are" subject-to repeated attac^ from the air. ' Benghcsi and Tobruk The Axis base is -Benghazi and- the advanced Allied base Tobruk'. - Both have water, and th& front line has often to be supplied with water' carried a long way. The local wells are>'seldom sufficient for more than .a handful of troops. Benghazi is superior to 'Tobruk in the fact that its local sources of supply of both water'and1 food are more abundant. It "is also 'probable that the Axis forces in 'Libya have been raised by supplies of vail kinds, men and material, to a point at which they are stronger, than the Bth -Army. The masking of Malta by constant air bombardment has helped the-Axis in this task of reinforcement and the demands of the Far East, both naval and military, may have weakened, to some extent, the position of the Bth Army in Libya. At all,, events it has had to remain generally on, the f defensive against Rommel and to husband resources of all kinds so thai; the defence may. be continued, even if minor withdrawals are necessary.. Artillery Comes Back. , - ■ The methods of attacking Jboth Bir Hacheim, on a small scale, and Sebastopol on a much ■ larger; show .that heavy artillery is coming back to its own in the reduction of stubborn resistance in fortified, areas.: Hfeavy artillery has been found far, mone effective than air bombing in $ilch cases. Other examples are those .of Batan and^Corregidor in the Philippines.., -)ltwas«not until heavy guns -we're brought to bear that Batan fell,' and not until j these guns could be. posted .on'the"high ridges commanding Correg'idor'that, the island fortress succumbed. Similarly, heavy mobile guns have been ."used With great effect by, the Russians when tanks and aeroplanes failed: - *