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NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

BURMA AND INDIA

THE JAPANESE THREAT

While Russia remains the strongest sector and the brightest spot in the world front of the United Nations, ihe position of the Allies in Burma seems in both respects to be in painful contrast. Only in the air are the Allies, represented here by the R.A.F. and the Ameri- < can Volunteer Air Force, more than holding their own. The Japanese with great superiority in numbers on land and with a virtual command of the sea are steadily pressing towards Rangoon and the Burma Road. Their ultimate objective may be India. It is unfortunate that the defence of India has been concentrated throughout the ages on its North-west Frontier, through the mountain passes by which all previous invasions recorded in history have been effected. Throughout the period of British rule in India, now not far from its bicentenary, military attention has always been concentrated on the Khyber and other passes into India from the northwest, and today they are strongly fortified. No' such precautions seem to have been taken against attack from the east. Here the natural defences of India are equally as strong as hi the north-west and along the whole northern frontier covered by the massive Himalayas. But Burma, up to 1937 a province of India, lies outside these mountain and river barriers, which indeed extend between India and Burma from the Bay of Bengal to. the offshoots of the Himalayas. A Recent Peril. So long as the only neighbours with coterminous frontiers were Tibet, China, Indo-China, and Siam, there was no danger to be feared, for Japan was far away by land and Britain commanded the seas. To meet possible contingencies of a naval attack by a superior Japanese fleet, Singapore was designed as a naval base, to serve a Pacific,and Asiatic fleet, not as a land fortress to guard Singapore from attack by land, which, twenty years ago, it might justly have been regarded as chimerical to anticipate. Siam was friendly, Indo-China was in the possession of the French, a former ally of the last war, America was in the Philippines, and the Dutch had the rest of the East Indies—all good neighbours. Apart from the Singapore naval base, which seemed to guarantee the security of the neighbourhood, little was done for the protection of this world's richest area. A Wasted Decade. At the beginning of the last decade the situation began, with the Japanese occupation,, of Manchuria and interference in China, to change for the worse. It was then that the now united nations—the ABDA Powersshould have begun to concert measures for the better defence of South-east Asia, or the South-west Pacific, as it is variously called. But though there were common interests to defend, which could only be defended adequately by a common policy—no one of the four Powers concerned toing strong enough in that region to face Japan alone —little was done. In the Philippines, as President Roosevelt pointed out, the Americans, fortunately for them and their wards, the Filipinos, had a plan, which, under the inspiring leadership of General Mac Arthur, has so far succeeded admirably. The Dutch did their best to put their immensely valuable' posses' sessions in a posture of defence —and they, too, are succeeding in a measure in Java. Britain neglected the whole i land approaches to Burma and Malaya from the east. Ever since 1937, when the Japanese invaded China in earnest, it would have been possible to do something. Since the collapse, of France and Japanese intervention in Indo-China and Thailand (ex-Siam), Britain has had her hands too full to do much, and the weaknesses of the land frontiers of Burma and Malaya were not corrected, with the results I now visible to the world. ■: Vulnerable Burma. The eastern frontier of Burma is particularly open to. attack, but so ! was Thailand, if forces had been avail- j able for a counter-offensive as soon J as the Japanese commenced their move ; south. Unfortunately, the best of the j Indian Native Army seems to have been disposed throughout the Middle East, and strong enough forces have never been available in time for the j defence either of Malaya or Burma. Apart, from Burma itself with its valuable output of oil, tin, teak, tungsten, and rice, there is the Burma Road, under imminent danger of attack and severance. The ', alternative route from India via Assam and the Brahmaputra 'Valley has many high mountain passes to surmount before it could reach the existing Burma Road in China, and it would take a long time to construct. Meanwhile, Rangoon and the Burma Road must be defended to the utmost in order that supplies stored en route may reach China. The future of communications with China by this route is therefore uncertain. There is no rail or road communication between India and Burma suitable for military supply, nor has Burma any other good port except Rangoon. The whole position therefore constitutes a very serious problem for the Allies.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19420227.2.30

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 49, 27 February 1942, Page 4

Word Count
836

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 49, 27 February 1942, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 49, 27 February 1942, Page 4