EVENING POST SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1942. RADICAL CHANGES IN CABINET

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 44, 21 February 1942, Page 6

EVENING POST SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1942. RADICAL CHANGES IN CABINET

Hitherto the attitude of Mr. [Winston Churchill to Cabinet change has been marked with a certain degree of inflexibility. It is true that, in the past, time has been gained against Cabinet critics by a certain amount of "reshuffling" of the Cabinet; but these, past "reshuffles" have been superficial, or at any rate have not been sufficiently radical to remove the impression that, in the matter of Cabinet personnel, the present Prime Minister has his own ideas and is somewhat im-

pervious to criticism. Now, however, that impression must be distinctly modified. The Cabinet alterations reported yesterday, though not sweeping, are radical. Their implications are as important as is their administrative meaning, and the Washington correspondent of the "New York Times," by a clever use of political reflections in the Washington mirror, brings some of these implications to light. The reflected light from Washington is even more penetrating than the direct searchlight of the London daily newspapers. Particularly challenging is the correspondent's picture of a certain division of opinion among the detached or semi-detached official onlookers in Washington, some of whom are sympathetic to Mr. Churchill's • first serious Cabine! changes, while others "feel some unhappiness in view of the fact that Sir Stafford Cripps [the new Leader of the House of Commons] has publicly advocated the granting to Russia of certain zones of influence in Europe after the war." This remark bells a rather timid political cat. On the eve of the war Hitler purchased Russia's neutrality at the price of certain territorial and other promises that Britain could not and would not have made. Hitler's perjury has destroyed that bargain, but has at the same time- raised rumours that Britain will again be faced with the question of what is due to Russia as the price of the resettlement of Europe after Hitler is defeated. In remarking that Sir Stafford Cripps in the past has publicly proposed - certain Russian post-war zones of influence, the correspondent reminds Britain that anything that is arranged between Moscow and London will profoundly interest Washington. But that very fact surely should be evidence that London will do nothing without consulting Washington. A distinction must be made between what the exAmbassador to Russia may have advocated in his personal capacity and what the new Leader of the House of Commons must in duty say and do, both in the House and in the War Cabinet itself. The Cripps policy in Russia and India and the policy of the new Leader of the House of Commons are separate things. This fact is sufficiently indicated by the recent statement of Sir Stafford Cripps that while he would like to be Secretary for India if he could carry out his own ideas of what is due, to India, he recognised that England had not yet made up her mind on that subject. If it is true that England has not yet made up her mind concerning the status of India, equally true it is that England and America have not yet made up their minds on the question of postwar zones of influence^in Europe and Russia's share in them.

That the appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps to lead the House, and to be a powerful personality in a smaller War Cabinet, is a gesture to Russia, is beyond doubt. Democracy and the British Empire already owe much to Russia, and they may owe more. If Hitlerism collapsed today, Russia would be primarily its destroyer, and would both exercise, and deserve, a commanding influence in the settlement of Eastern Europe. But as Hitlerism will not collapse either today or tomorrow, the maintenance of the Anglo-American-Russian front requires profound diplomacy, in the exercise of which Sir Stafford Cripps is no mean performer. This is by no means the first time that the eminent lawyer has been called on to argue within his brief. While his personality represents a gesture to Russia, his policy can be, and no doubt will be, dedicated to the Anglo-American-Russian co-operation. The value of his personality in the War Cabinet will lie in the fact not that he may have been Russophile or Indianophile, but that he has high intelligence, character, and decision, also a keen sense of reality—a sense that was so lacking in Malaya and Singapore. The man who prepared the way for the Anglo-Russian Alliance is not likely to be guilty of the preparational failures and lack of foresight that have so obstructed the course of our war. If Cripp? as Leader of the House produces a double reflection in the Washington mirror, Churchill as the inflexible exponent of one-man occupancy of the Prime Ministership and the Defence Ministership reflects back in the warm light of Washington approval. Red tape, wasteful _in peacetime, becomes a peril in time of war; and the Americans like to give great emergency powers to a Roosevelt or a Churchill. The correspondent therefore interprets Washington as approving the retention of both posts by a man of decision like Churchill; Washington regards him as in some degree a British counterpart to Roosevelt, and would not like to see his present authority circumscribed. Inflexible in his own immediate sphere, Mr. Churchill shows flexibility towards Australian

criticism, and his appointment of Mr. Attlee, British Labour Leader, as Dominions Secretary (in addition to his post as Deputy Prime Minister) is regarded as aiming at improved collaboration between the Dominions Office and the Labour Government of the Commonwealth. Lord Beaverbrook's business reputation need not rust if he applies himself to his new American of oiling the wheels of war production and distribution, including tfneasures "to step-up American output of aeroplanes, tanks, etc." If previous shallow changes in Cabinet gained time from the critics, these radical alterations should gain greater respite, for they have a meaning, and that meaning must be allowed a period within which to make itself plain by virtue of facts instead of (as now) mere speculations. As the above-quoted correspondent points out, America sees in the appointment of Cripps "the thwarting of any new political move" in the House of Commons, and the postponing of criticism of the Prime Minister's double load. Behind this flexibility, the old Churchillian inflexibility will march on to some more favourable turn in the fortunes of war.