Evening Post FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1942. TO TALK LESS AND HIT MORE!

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 43, 20 February 1942, Page 4

Evening Post FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1942. TO TALK LESS AND HIT MORE!

The road of the transgressor is hard; and the road of the unprepared, when war arrives, is both hard and long. But that: does not mean that retaliation by the smitten Allies must be always a matter for tomorrow. The enemies of democracy are implying that democrats are growing tired of hard knocks, tired of waiting for a tomorrow * which never arrives, tired of matching their future victories against their present defeats. But the victorious tomorrow is not so far distant after all. As the United States Secretary for War (Mr. Stimson) sees the position, defensive strategy is not the preoccupation of the Allies, or, at any rate, is certainly not the preoccupation of the United States. American striking forces will carry out "vigorous offensive activities" on a tomorrow-that is not far distant. The United States High Command does not sit and wait, but is devoted to offensive strategy. The day of the French army's defensive policy (it can hardly be termed strategy) is gone for ever. The imbecilic phases of Pearl Harbour and Malaya incidents belong to the past. "The United States will seize every opportunity for offensive action," says Mr. Stimson. Leaders.who bring their countries into contempt by promising a safety which is based on shadow and. not substance have been weeded out. No more will persons in high commands attempt to defeat the enemy with their mouths alone. Not for very much longer will enemy propagandists be able to heap ridicule on Britain by emphasising the gap between British commanders' promises and their performances. Hitler has probably learned that it is unwise to promise to be in London on a given date; and the confident predictions made, on the British side, about Singapore are, after all, less absurd than Hitler's London and Moscow pretences. There may still be a few over-confident talkers, on the air or elsewhere, whose equipment should include a silencer; but, generally speaking, the Allied effort is passing from talk to action, and the northern summer will reveal that the Allies are capitalising not only on the future but on the present also. There is one precaution, however, that even now may be overlooked. When the next Allied offensive starts, is it to be compromised, as in the past, by absurdly exaggerated anticipative victories, widely publicised? If the Allied Governments can stop this spate of spoken or written humbug, a weapon will be taken from the hands of enemy propagandists, who well know how to compromise British prestige by comparing promise with performance. The loss to the Allies' prestige, particularly in Asia, by the absurdly optimistic speculations of responsible and irresponsible persons is already immense. And it is entirely unnecessary. When the Allies strike their next big blow, as they assuredly will, the best course to be followed by people who know nothing is to say nothing. If this rule is adopted, embarrassing 'utterances based on false optimism will disappear, and the Japanese satirist who grills on the air the blundering forecasts of our blind prophets will go out of business through lack of material.