MANY REASONS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 42, 19 February 1942, Page 7

MANY REASONS

CALAMITY IN MALAYA

LEADERSHIP ABSENT

(By Telegraph—Press Association —Copyright.) LONDON. February 17. "Why did Singapore fall?" asks the Singapore correspondent of "The Times" in a dispatch from Batavia. He says: "The following is an attempt to explain—but not to explain away—what happened. "First, Singapore was never a fortress, but was a potential naval base. Its whole significance depended on certain unfulfilled, or partially-fulfilled, conditions, the i chief of which was the Allies' ability to produce enough ships and aeroplanes to operate from the base and keep the Japanese several hundred miles away. "The 'fortress' concept arose from loose thinking when our propagandists were trying to keep the Japanese from war by making them think we were stronger than we were. "Secondly, the majority of our troops had participated in a long, exhausting, and thoroughly dispiriting withdrawal for over 500 miles. Many of our best units suffered heavily in the fighting on the mainland. The single battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders engaged lost 80 per cent, of its men, and the Gurkha casualties were even heavier. "Remnants of the East Surreys and Leicesters, who took the brunt of the attack at Kedah, were early amalgamated into a so-called British battalion. Two Australian battalions were badly cut up at Muar, and the Australians also lost heavily in other sectors. TROOPS NOT FIT. "Thirdly, many of the white troops —the Australians were conspicuous exceptions—never seemed physically up to the mark. Some had been too long in the tropical climate and had gone soft, and others were unaccustomed to the climate or the terrain. "One brigade plunged straight into the jungle fighting in Johore three days after landing after an eleven weeks' sea voyage. "Fourthly, the troops whose duty it was to repel the Japanese in the sector where they landed on the island were subjected after three days to a crescendo of shelling, the bombardment reaching its climax on the evening of February 8, when, for four hours, Japanese light, medium, and heavy guns fired at machine-gun tempo. The Japanese also had the advantage of continuous aerial observation. "Fifthly, the enemy's complete aerial ascendancy had a big effect on the fighting and a bigger effect on morale, especially that of the Indians. "Only one thing could have transformed this state of affairs—dynamic, able leadership. The general showing the greatest qualities of leadership was Major-General Bennett. "Though hard, bitter, sarcastic, and difficult, he was a fighter through and through, imbued like his men with an aggressive, offensive, and unconventional spirit. The other generals lacked this vital spark. LACK OF LEADERS FELT. "The absence of forceful leadership at the top made itself felt from the top downwards. The morale of the men was potentially good. Something was lacking to crystallise and coordinate it, to infuse them with fire and confidence. The same lack of dynamism characterised the upper ranks of the civilian administration.

"Except for certain sections of the Chinese community—some inspired by Free China's struggle, others by Soviet precept and example—the bulk of the Asiatic population remained spectators from start to finish. Their inclination was to get as far as possible from the hostilities in Singapore.

"This caused acute labour difficulties. Bomb craters in airfields were not filled because no Asiatic and not enough Europeans were available for the work of the labour force. Twelve thousand Asiatics were employed at the naval base early in the war but only 800 were now reporting for duty. "There was no native labour at the docks, and soldiers had to be taken from their military duties for loading and unloading ships. Many small ships which could have evacuated many thousands from Singapore were immobilised in the harbour because the native crews had deserted and there were not enough Europeans to man them. REGIME LACKED ROOTS. "After nearly 70 years of British rule, the vast majority of Asiatics were insufficiently interested to take steps to ensure its continuance. The few thousand British officials resident in Malaya were completely out of touch with the people. The British and Asiatics lived their lives apart. The British rule and culture and the small British community formed no more than a brittle veneer. "Against this structure there was suddenly launched the explosive force of a nation impelled by both fanaticism and frustration of economic repression. "The Japanese in Malaya revealed themselves to be able, disciplined, and resourceful. The soldiers were well equipped and well supported from the air. The normal Japanese elan was hightened by continuous and unexpected victory.

"The Japanese also enjoyed certain natural advantages, such as their Asiatic appearance and the ability to live off the country. Above all, they possessed a capacity for co-ordinated effort with, every man and every

weapon, thus achieving a maximum effect.

"This capacity was conspicuously lacking on the British side. One good push sent the structure crashing to the ground.

"What is the answer?

"Till more aeroplanes are available to the Allies in the Pacific it will be difficult to hold the Japanese at sea and on the ground. It is not that the Japanese are strong in the air. It is that the Allies are weak.

"Secondly, till the British exercise to the full those qualities of vigour and ruthlessness which made them great in the past, they cannot expect greatness in the present."