DEFENCE OF MALAYA

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 7, 9 January 1942, Page 4

DEFENCE OF MALAYA

i With the military position in Malaya still favourable to the Japanese invaders, who in a month have advanced from the Thailand frontier down the peninsula halfway to Singapore, their main objective, it is -natural that there should be some criticism in the House of Commons about the conduct of the war in the Far East, and, particularly, the failure, in the opinion of the critics, to make suitable provision for the defence of Singapore. In the main the criticism had been met in advance by the Deputy Leader of the House, Mr. Attlee, in his preliminary review of the war, which opened the debate. This was on the line Mr. Churchill had already taken in his address to the United States Congress on December 26, 1941, when he said that if people asked in England, as they had a right to ask, why it was that the Empire had not more modern equipment in Malaya and the East Indies, he could only point to the victory that General Auchinleck had gained in the Libyan campaign. Had the gradually growing resources in Libya been dispersed in Libya and Malaya, the Allies would have been found wanting in both places. Mr. Attlee amplified this by the argument that the necessities of sending war supplies to Russia and elsewhere meant that our territories in the Far East were less strongly garrisoned and equipped than we could have wished. It was impossible, he said, and beyond our resources to be strong everywhere at the same time. This short sentence embodies the bedrock truth of the whole situation as it stands at present. For that situation, as Mr. Attlee pointed out, it would not be fair to blame the commanders on the spot for the lack of sufficient strength to hold the enemy on the frontier or thereabouts. The United States faces similar difficulties in the Philippines for similar reasons. In such emergencies Governments, unable to be strong everywhere, must decide on the priorities of certain places and certain measures

before others. In the defence of the British Empire all must agree that Britain comes first, and the defence of Britain has entailed the maintenance of'large forces, land, sea, and air, in that zone of war. About the [ relative priority of Libya and Malaya, the Middle East and the Far East, there may be some question. Australia has definitely taken up the attitude that, to her at least, the Far East is the more important. It is doubtful whether, in the light of the grand strategy of the war as a whole, such a view is correct. The defence of the Mediterranean and the Middle East involves not only the short Suez route to the Far East, but also the maintenance of solidarity with Russia, the support of Turkey, the preservation of vital oil fields in Irak and Iran, and the defence of India. Mr. Attlee emphasised also the additional strain which the extension of the war to the Far East had imposed on the Navy with its responsibilities for keeping open the seaways, particularly in the Atlantic. 'In replying to the debate Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, maintained that the claims of Malaya arid Singapore had not been forgotten in the dispatch of reinforcements to the Middle East. The decision was taken deliberately and not based on neglect. In any event it should be added that at Washington concerted measures were taken for.the defence of the Far East by the Powers concerned. It may be a little time before their effect can be seen, but both President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill have expressed confidence in the outcome, and on their confidence, based on knowledge of the facts, the peoples most closely concerned in this quarter of the, world may sately rely. ■