NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXII, Issue 60, 8 September 1941, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

AID TO RUSSIA

MATERIAL OR MEN?

ALLIED STRATEGY

The gigantic struggle in Russia , still rages unabated and undecided. Both sides in the whole conflict, the - Axis and the Allies, must be fully '■ aware that this is the crux and crisis of the war, that on its dccl- , sion depend the duration of the •' struggle elsewhere and the chances of the ultimate issue.. The question before the Allies,. Including in the term America, is how can aid be most effectively given to Russia— by a counter-offensive in the West to swing the balance in the East, or by the dispatch of material, and ■ . ; possibly men, to the East. : . The situation, in Russia at the open- ■ ing of the twelfth week of .the German | onslaught does riot seem to be materi- . ally changed by events at the.^weekend. Leningrad, how for ten days subject to gradually increasing press- ■ ure, is fighting back with some measure of success, but it seems clear that only \ one outlet remains open, that to the east. Whether the Germans- are ; actually astride of the Moscowienin-' ; grad railway and road is not certain, but this main outlet is at least pro- ' bably under artillery fire, for its direction is almost due south-east from Leningrad, and Schlusselburg, reported to have been shelled by long-range guns, is some distance to the north,. where the River Neva issues^ from Lake Ladoga on its course towards Leningrad and the Gulf of Finland. Further north the Finns claim to have reached the River. Svir, part of the Stalin Canal, connecting, Lakes "Onega and Ladoga. Leningrad, therefore, can be fairly said to be in the front- line. In the central sector the fighting is still hard to follow, but the references to Kiev show that the German advance from the south has come near the city Odessa holds out well in the extreme south, while the-Dnieper remains aii effective barrier between the opposing armies, attempts at large-scale crossings by both sides having so lar failed. Men, Material, Morale. The struggle in Russia has passed out of the early phase of a campaign of manouvre with advantage to',the Germans from possession of the iniative and a plan. It is now a sheer dour battle between men, material, and morale, a test of endurance in. which each factor will count Napoleon used to • say that morale counted ten times as much as material, and the Russians have the advantage in morale. But material counts far more in modern war than it did in Napoleon's time. In men the forces in conflict have so far been more or less equal, with-the initial advantage of the Germans tending to pass, to the Russians, whose vast country and comparatively poor communiciations. retard mobilisation. The factor of material, remains. It is here" that the situation may be more, critical for Jhe Russians than "appears, in the news. Both sides must have, suffered tremendous losses in material—aircraft, tanks, guns, vehicles, and equipment.' Which side can replace, its losses the more readily? Almost certainly the Axis, which has not only Germany, ._ but the rest of occupied Europe to draw from, including,the arsenals of France, Belgium, Holland, . and Czecho-Slovakia, and the engineering output of Scandinavia. These are all working for .the Axis, and can hardly all be crippled by the bombing onslaughts of the R.A.F. Replacing Russia's Losses. On the other hand, Russia has lost a part of her munition-producing.areas in the Western Ukraine, particularly the Krivoi-Rpg oilfields and the Dnieper hydro-electric station. Similarly the Leningrad area will be affected and the region east of. the Middle Dnieper' from Gomel to Smolensk. These losses can hardly be replaced from the areas more recently developed towards and beyond the Urals. Consequently, the Allies—Britain and . America—will be called on to make good the losses, as far as possible, from their own resources and output. Hence the great importance that must be attached to the Rugby message today stating, on the authority of an agency report from Washington, that "the United States and Britain are likely to arrange substantial assistance to; Russia ... at .the. expense of their own armament requirements." Then the message adds: This is no doubt due to the belief that assistance to Russia is the best way of defeating the enemy, the Red-.army's "strong., resistance and the heavy German losses — estimated in. Washington at 1,500,000 -^having encouraged the expectation that the Russians can hold •' out through the winter. Landings Hazardous. This view is not inconsistent with the London "Daily Herald's" statement, cabled on Saturday,"that a."vast extension of the British Army is contemn plated," and that "this move js the first indication of vital, new decisions which were taken recently by the Government, arising out of developments in Russia." It was in Saturday's notes that this might mean intervention on the Continent on a large scale. So it probably does, but not necessarily this year. Landings from the sea in hostile territory are recognised in all studies of warfare as among the most dangerous and hazardous military operations that can be undertaken. For their success preparations must be meticulous, co-ordination perfect, and timing and conditions most favourable. Moreover, such operations have to be "underwritten" by the readiness of large reserves to follow up the initial venture and cover losses that may occur. There should be absolute local air mastery and ample transport; protected by warships. It does not need any inner knowledge to presume that Britain could hardly contemplate such a perilous move, with all the. consequences of failure in loss of prestige, until and unless there was ample guarantee of effective support from the Western Hemisphere. The time may not be ripe for that —yet.' Opening Up Murmansk. Meanwhile, there is the sending of urgently-needed material aid to Russia. There are* three possible routes—via Murmansk, via Vladivostok, and, via - the.Persian Gulf and Iran. By far the most convenient, not only.tip Britain but also to all the eastern seaboard of North America, would be via Murmansk, which is less than a thousand miles from Iceland on the Atlantic Arctic convoy route from America. Unfortunately, Hitler may have foreseen this contingency in his initial occupation of Norway, which prevents the use of Murmansk in this war as the safe line of communication with Russia it was in the las^. Hence the importance today of Norway from Narvik to the Varanger Fiord beyond the North Cape to Kirkenes and Petsamo. This area is difficult for the Germans to- reach and reinforce except by sea. AngloRussian combined operations hapf might well pay a divider'