Evening Post MONDAY, AUGUST 18, 1941. WAR STRATEGY: "WHERE AND WHEN?"

Evening Post, Volume CXXXII, Issue 42, 18 August 1941, Page 6

Evening Post MONDAY, AUGUST 18, 1941. WAR STRATEGY: "WHERE AND WHEN?"

The higher strategy of the war is very directly related to the message which Mr. Churchill and Mr, Roosevelt have sent to the Soviet Government. On the face of the message, the immediate question is "the apportionment of our joint resources," which are "immense," but at the same time are "limited." In using these words, the Prime Minister and the President mean that AngloAmerican and Russian war supplies are sufficient to win the war, if concentrated at the right time at decisive points; but these supplies are not sufficient to carry out a war policy aiming to do everything everywhere at once. In other words, Anglo-American resources and transport are not equal to a simultaneous speeding up on every front, or to a policy of mere adventure. The two Western leaders in their message to the Eastern leader state this obvious truth in the following precise terms:

The war goes on upon many fronts, and before it is over there may yet be further fighting on fronts that will be developed. Our resources, though immense, are limited, and it must become a question as to where and when those resources can best be used to further our common effort. This applies equally to manufactured war supplies and to raw materials.

The "where and when" of supplies and war materials is therefore the "where and when" of major blows against the Axis enemy. To say that is equivalent to saying that the higher strategy of the war is involved in the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic tryst, in the resultant joint message to Russia, and in the consequential conference which will bring eminent Western experts to Moscow. If the strategists decided to stage at once a big-scale landing in Western Europe, so as to make Germany fight not merely on two fronts but on two European landfronts, then the. "where and when" of Anglo-American "resources and supplies** would be radically different from what the "where and when" would be if the strategists decided to put all their effort into one landfront (Russia) in Europe in 1941. Nothing is clearer than that a British landing on the Continent of Europe this year would reduce the Anglo-American "resources and supplies" available to Russia on the Russian front. Both in manufacture j and in transport 4 big-scale British landing in Europe would involve profound calculations, and the same is true of big-scale supplies to Russia; ' if the two projects were attempted together, they would be competitive—and "our resources, though inimense, are limited." Therefore the first strategical question for what is left of the year 1941 is to decide whether Anglo-American help to Russia contemplates two landfronts in Europe, or whether it contemplates the Russian army as being the one spearhead on land, to which shall be rendered all possible supplies and help. There is reason to believe that Britain and America have found the answer to that question, and that the answer will be implemented by the experts going ito Moscow.

Significant phrasing used by the Prime Minister and thefPresident in j their message to the Soviet Govern-j ment is the promise of "the very maximum supplies" for Russia, "which you most urgently need." The reference to "a more long-term policy" implies the continuance of the war on the Russian front, and therefore the need of a plan for supplies and co-operative measures which is to be complementary to the immediate plan for urgently needed supplies. Both for short-term and for long-term measures, "speedy decisions" are needed, because manufacturing measures are in themselves long-term efforts; and the supplying of Arctic-bound and Hun-bound Russia from American and British arsenals is in itself a tremendous feat of transport. The onus of planning manufacture and transport is accepted by Britain and America in complete reliance that Russia is in the war to stay and to make the maximum use of what is sent to her:

We realise fully how vitally important to defeat Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of the Soviet Union, and we feel, therefore, that we must not in any circumstances fail to act quickly and immediately in this matter of planning the programme for the future allocation of our joint resources.

It will be seen that this remarkable message is more than a decision in higher strategy. It is an international confession of faith.

This alMmportant understanding with Russia concerning short-term and long-term military supplies may be linked with a new vast American appropriation under the Lease and Lend law. The Atlantic meeting gave rise to something else—an Eight Points declaration which binds Britain and America as to the kind of peace which they will be prepared ,to join in. If, as is reported un-

officially. Russia is to sign in London a supplementary declaration supporting the Eight Points, another step towards the political as well as the military alignment of the three Powers will be taken, showing that principles concerning which they are not in total agreement ai*e no bar to their joint war-making and to their joint peace-making. These events outweigh Hitler's strenuous struggles in Russia to save his blitzkrieg; and for Germany they constitute, in the words of "Pravda," a great political defeat.