Evening post THURSDAY, MAY 22, 1941.
THE BATTLE FOR CRETE
Hitler has begun his second great battle for a large island, the island of Crete. The Battle for Crete is a minor echo of the Battle for Britain, which Hitler lost; but if Crete should be won, then perhaps he would use a Cretan success as an omen warranting a renewed attack on the islandfortress of Britain. Nazi propaganda leans towards symbolism, and would place the highest emphasis on the symbolic value of a successful German invasion of one of the greatest and most historic of Mediterranean islands. The combined effort of the German air, sea, and land forces to conquer Crete must be regarded therefore as having a bearing on the problem of the British Isle itself, as well as a high strategic value in the war for the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The conquest of Crete would be placarded by Dr. Goebbels as a fulldress rehearsal of a coming Second Battle for Britain, besides representing Germany's seizure of an islandkey to Africa and Asia. Cyprus then might be starred by the Nazis as a second island-key and a second rehearsal. For the capture of the one island would pave the way for invasion of the other.
I There may.be a symbolism in the Battle for Crete, but there can be no parallel with the Battle for Britain. The first fact and a decisive fact about the Battle for Britain was the German failure to achieve airmastery; but the world is still in the dark as to whether the German capacity to concentrate aerial armament in Greece exceeds the British capacity to do likewise in Egypt— and exceeds it by such a margin as will give the German invader airmastery in Crete. And in all other respects British power in Crete, and indeed in Cyprus and elsewhere in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, is but a fraction of British power in Britain—a sea-borne fraction transported for many thousands of miles and only lately reinforced by American Red Sea transport. So any serious comparison of Britain's poAver to defend Mediterranean islands, and her power to defend herself, is out of the question, and the public need not be perturbed on that score by anything that the Nazis may say. But in Middle East strategy the importance of Crete cannot be minimised. Seeing that Hitler has commitments in Libya and now in the Syria-Irak area, one might well have hesitated to believe that he would have launched out so quickly on an invasion of Crete by sea and by air—on a full-scale battle, instead of a feint—but the messages to hand seem to indicate that the Germans are now heavily committed in Crete to a challenge not only to its garrison but to our whole power in the Eastern Mediterranean, including not only our air power but also our sea power. Concerning the full extent and persistence of the German blow at Crete reservations still have to be made, and the situation is too susceptible to rapid changes to warrant any assumptions as to the issue. That sea and weather conditions may not be hostile to invasion seems to be indicated by the fact that, in a.leaky rowing boat and with one pair of oars, a voyage of 140 miles from Greece to Crete has just been made by fugitive soldiers—Maoris and New Zealand rnounteds. By no means the least important aspect of the Battle for Crete is the prestige values involved, and the repercussive effects on Vichy France, on Turkey, and on Russia. Hitler is telling Turkey that, by way of Crete, Cyprus, and Syria, he is determined to get round Turkey to Irak; wherefore (he implies) Turkey might as well allow him to go through Turkey as watch him outflank and encii-cle her. As to Vichy, Admiral Darlan knows the power of the British Navy, and has just been drafting orders to French merchant captains that scuttling of their ships is preferable to British capture. To this hesitating Vichy Government, Hitler aspires to say: "Don't fear the British Navy. I will capture their island bases. Watch me, as an example, take Crete! I am nearing Syria, and you Frenchmen might as well give me right of way there; for otherwise I shall take it." Something similar is being said to Russia; and the "Daily Express" suggests that Russia as well as Vichy will join Hitler's military plan for looting Asia. Many evil consequences, therefore, might hinge on the fall of Crete. Let us hope that, with the help of Providence, Crete will not fall; that the French garrison in Syria will side with Free France; and that the Russian rumour will prove to be a myth.
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Bibliographic details
Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 119, 22 May 1941, Page 8
Word Count
790Evening post THURSDAY, MAY 22, 1941. Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 119, 22 May 1941, Page 8
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