NOTES ON THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 117, 20 May 1941, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR

AOSTA YIELDS

SURRENDER AT AMBA ALAGI

OUTLINE OF CAMPAIGN

According to the news today, ! the Duke of Aosta, Italian Com-mander-in-Chief in Abyssinia, has surrendered, together with himself and his staff, the last big stronghold of Italy in Abyssinia, Amba Alagi. In two other areas, at Gondar, north of Lake Tsana, and at Jimma, in the Lakes region to the south-west of Addis Ababa, Italian forces are still holding out, but it is unlikely, after the surrender of the Commander-in-Chief, that their resistance will continue . much longer. The war in East Africa is practically over. Italy's Service to Axis. It is too soon to assess Italy's part in the war, but it would be entirely wrong to describe the Italian partner as a liability rather than an asset to the Axis. It is true that every campaign the Italians have conducted alone has failed, and that at sea the Italian navy has suffered great losses at the hands of the British Mediterranean Fleet, with little to its score on the credit side. It is true that Italy's only successes in the Balkans and in Libya have been won largely by the help of the Germans. . But it is also true that Italy's intervention in the war has done a service to Hitler which 'the Fuhrer has not been slow.to recog:nise. The Italian fleet immobilised, for other missions, large British, naval forces in tlhe Mediterranean, and rendered that sea difficult for Britain to use freely for any form of shipping for military or commercial purposes. Similarly, Italy's possessions in North and East Africa, with the large armies present in them, immobilised also considerable .British forces which might have been used elsewhere. Armies in Africa. When Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940, she had in Libya an army of some 200,000 or 250,000, and a simiJar force in Italian East AfricaEritrea, Ethiopia, and Somaliland; half a million men, in all, including, of course, many native levies. What the British forces in the Middle East were at that time has never been clearly stated, but it is known that the bulk . of the forces of the Allies in the Middle East were French, with General Weygand in command. The British Imperial Forces were probably outnumbered at least four to one by the Italians. If the Italians in Libya and Abyssinia' had then attacked with vigour from the west and the south, the defence of Egypt would have been extremely difficult. Luckily, the attack was delayed and, at the best, only half-hearted. The Italians from Libya reached Sidi Barrani and established themselves/but General Wavell, with reinforcements which had been arriving steadily via the Red Sea, attacked in December —just about six months after Italy's entry into the war—and in less than two months had driven the lalians entirely out of Cyrenaica, capturing a horde of,prisoners over four times the size of his own force of two divisions. The return of the Italians, with more than a stiffening of Germans ■—35,000 of them—is fresh in the mind. Free Hand in East Africa. In their East African Empire the Italians had at the outset almost a free hand. They could have invaded the Sudan in overwhelming force and driven out the tiny garrison of British and Sudanese troops. Fortunately, again they dissipated their energies and resources. They captured Kassala and Gallabat on the Sudanese frontier, but penetrated no further. In August they won a prestige victory by compelling the small garrison to evacuate British "Somaliland. They occupied the corner of Kenya between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. And there they; stopped for months, when time was the essence of the contract. < Lost Opportunity. The opportunity was lost. The Sudanese garrison was reinforced with British troops from Egypt and detachments of the Indian. Army. Skilful patrol work on the frontier pinned the Italians at Kassala and Gallabat. At ithe beginning of 1941 the British began to take the offensive in East Africa. The South African Army—numbers not stated, but certainly not more than two divisions—had assembled in Kenya, a splendid force fully equipped, and there were also numbers of. other native African troops, including the famous King's African Rifles. . The Boyal Air Force, including the South African Air Force and the Rhodesian squadrons, had by this time obtained practically complete command of the skies, and the way was prepared. Haile Selassie himself was waiting at Khartoum, and daring British officers had been waking the spirit of rebellion ■among the Abyssinian tribes. On January 18 the vital frontier post tof Kassala was retaken and the road ■was opened towards Eritrea. The advantage was quickly exploited. A second thrust came via Gallabat at Metemma, and a third, with the South Africans, from Kenya. These drives continued simultaneously. Another came down the Red Sea coast from Port Sudan towards Massawa. The Italians retreated along the motor road and railway into Eritrea, losing [Agordat and Barentu. Then they made a great stand in the natural fortress of Keren, which did not fall until March 27. With its fall Eritrea, with the capital Asmara and the port Massawa, fell into our hands —the latter on April 4. Advance Prom South. In the meantime the Imperial armies of the south, almost purely African, had carried out one of the most brilliant compaigns in military history. They captured Kismayu, the Italian port at the mouth of the Juba River, on February 15, and in a swift advance swept through Italian Somaliland and Jubaland, taking Mogadishu, the capital, on their way, and invaded Abyssinia along the route through the Ogaden taken by Marshal Graziani in 2935. By March 12 the South Africans were 300 miles inside Abyssinia. Berbera was recaptured ; on March 16, opening up a short cut to Harar, which was entered on March 26. In the meantime' British forces, had been pressing in from the;west and southwest and Addis Ababa, threatened on three sides, was entered by Imperial forces on April 5. Since then the Italians have made stands at Dessie, taken on April 27, and at Amba Alagi, now surrendered, and at Gondar and Jimma already mentioned. The whole campaign in Abyssinia and East Africa generally, a country naturally adapted for defence, has been a triumph of courage, endurance, skill, and organisation, for which the leader, General Cunningham, will share the credit with the rank and file. In Abyssinia the Italians, too, have fought well and made their best showing in the war. To prolong it into the rainy season in East Africa has undoubtedly served the Axis caus^ i