FLICKERING FLAME IN ABYSSINIA

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 116, 19 May 1941, Page 6

FLICKERING FLAME IN ABYSSINIA

"Hitler's instructions to keep going as long; as possible in Abyssinia" have protracted the Duke of Aosta's defence, which has no motive except to somewhat smooth the military path of the Axis in Greece and Libya and (prospectively) in Syria and Irak. The enemy occupation of Greece is now, of course, complete, but the British defence of Egypt against the Germans and Italians is still handicapped by lack of the aeroplanes, tanks, and armament which the Duke of Aosta's persistence is detaining in Abyssinia. Although the British Empire forces have retaken Sollum and have gained ground at Tobruk, any general offensive they may have planned would certainly be helped by aeroplanes and armament that would be released by an Italian surrender in Abyssinia; but whether a British offensive against the enemy in the Western (Egyptian and Libyan) Desert is in actual need of more troops is another question, for, as Mr. Churchill has pointed out, the man-power usable in desert warfare is limited. By stringing out from Cyrenaica to Sidi Barrani a toonumerous Italian army, Graziani actually choked his retreat routes and achieved a glorious congestion that encompassed his own defeat. So the first need of r British offensive, in the Western Desert is aeroplanes, tanks, and armament rather than men.

If and when the Duke of Aosta surrenders, the South African Air Force will make itself felt in the northern region of its own African continent. The Indian troops, who. like the South Africans, are helping the Duke to make up his mind, may be released in time to participate in the opening stages of the Asiatic extension of the war, which is signposted by events in Syria and in Vichy, as well as by the Rashid Ali plot which went off in Irak at half-cock. Hitler's prestige boomed in Greece, only to recede when Hess, his twin soul, flew to Scotland. Goebbels has now promised that the Hess escapade—which is either something more than an escape or something less — will soon be forgotten in the shadow of greater events. In other words, Hitler wishes to do something big somewhere before the Italian flag flutters downward in Abyssinia— something which will remove from the mouth of the German people the bad taste of the Hess affair, and which will make the loss of Abyssinia appear to be a minor event. But can the Italians in Abyssinia "stick it" much longer? It seems that the Duke of Aosta's inquiry as to British terms of surrender of the Amba Alagi section of his army is without prejudice to the belligerency of his forces in the Gondar area and of his forces in the Lakes district. Will Britain entertain this qualified overture? Italian surrender in Abyssinia, though inevitable, cannot yet be dated.

Is the Axis offensive in the Western Desert destined to be a dying fire, tike the Italian resistance in Abyssinia? Or is the Axis offensive in the Western Desert destined to be a sustained enemy blow at Suez? Hitler has before him this North African route to the Middle East, and he has also the Syrian-Irak route, which he and Vichy are aerially testing. Which will he choose for his major drive to Bagdad? Or does his drive to Bagdad depend in actual fact on whether he can reduce Turkey to the status of Rumania and Bulgaria?