NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 116, 19 May 1941, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

FRANCE'S FORCES

STRATEGIC VALUE

EFFECT OF OPEN

CLASH

Things have not yet come to an open breach with France, or rather with the Vichy Govern- ; ment. While the French High Commissioner in Syria, M. Dentz, has called the British ' bombing of Syrian airports "flagrant acts of hostility," a statement issued by Vichy does not consider them "an act of aggression." This is interpreted in some quarters as "a move towards stemming the crisis with Britain." Vichy denies any intention' "to attack Britain.and still less the United States," but at the weekend the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, said that, from the latest information received, he was able to confirm that the recent Franco-German agreement was "definitely of a military character." President Roosevelt said that international relations were too serious for him to comment further. So there the matter stands for the moment. Value of French Navy. Should the worst come to the worst —and that may happen if the German use of Syrian airports continues —arid should Vichy throw in its lot with Hitler, it will be necessary to consider what forces the Vichy "collaborators" with Nazi Germany can muster againsj Britain and what is the strategic value to the enemy of the territory in France and overseas still nominally under Vichy control. The most important item is the French navy—or what remains of it. , When France collapsed in the middle of June, 1940, a number of units of the fleet were in British ports, either in Britain itself or in Alexandria. Steps were taken to prevent these and other units of the French fleet outside French ports falling into enemy hands. The names of these ships have not been announced, but Mr. Churchill, in his statement in the House of Commons on July 4, said: Early on the morning of July 3 we took the greater part of the French1 fleet under our control, or else called upon them with an adequate force to comply with , our requirements. But two battleships, two light cruisers, some submarines, eight destroyers, and approximately 200 smaller craft which lay for the most part at Portsmouth or Weymouth were boarded. Alexandria and Oran. Similar steps were taken at Alexandria, where, according to Mr.' Churchill, were lying "four French cruisers and a number of smaller ships, besides French battleships." These- were disarmed and have remained there since, with their crews. At Oran in Algeria the French Admiral Gensoul refused to comply with the rßritish Government's requests, and the so-called "Battle of Oran" took place between the French squadron, assisted by shore guns, at Oran, and Admiral Somerville's squadron. A battle-cruiser of the Strasbourg class was damaged and a battleship of the Bretagne class sunk. Another battle-cruiser got away to Toulon. Other vessels were set afire or otherwise damaged. On September 23, in an attempt by General de Gaulle, assisted by a British squadron, to take possession of the French West African port of Dakar, the most modern French battleship Richelieu was severely damaged. It is quite possible that in the intervening months the ships damaged at Oran and Dakar have been repaired, for both places are equipped for work of the kind. The other French battleship of the Richelieu class, the Jean Bart, has been mentioned in the news .as being at Casablanca in Morocco. Mustered to one spot the units of the French fleet still in control of Vichy would constitute a formidable addition to the enemy's naval forces, but, so far as is known, these units are still scattered and thus open to be dealt with in detail by the British Navy. On the other hand, as units they might do considerable damage to shipping before they were run down. Part of the original French navy has joined the Free French forces under Admiral Muselier, appointed by General .de Gaulle. It is possible that fresh accessions might come from the French ships under British control in Britain and at Alexandria. In any event, the best of the fleet could be recommissioned under British crews. Strategic Importance. On the balance, therefore, the adherence to the Axis of such ,part of the French navy as decided to follow Admiral Darlan would not be a serious challenge in itself to British command of the sea; the French Colonial Empire offers important strategic positions for the vise of the Axis. Even more important than Syria, which has no good naval harbours, is French North Africa—Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco—where the possession of Bizerta on the African side of the Sicilian Channel would make Mediterranean transport even more awkward for Britain than it is now. It would also facilitate the passage of reinforcements to the Axis armies in Libya. On the. Atlantic coast are the ports of Casablanca and Rabat, and, chief of all. Dakar, at the westernmost point of Africa, only 1715 miles away from the easternmost point of South America. It is Dakar the Americans fear most as a jumping-off point for the Axis in its designs on the Americas. There is ample evidence of Axis -infiltration with the usual "tourists," '"technicians," and "specialists" into French North and West Africa. They were already to be found at Dakar last September. Military Strength. French military forces in North Africa and in Syria are considerable. Genera- Weygand may be presumed to i have- under his command many divi---1 sions of French, Algerian, and SenegaI lese untouched by the collapse, and there has been ample time for training. The force in Syria has been estimated as at least 40,000, including Zouaver- and Spahis. While, the rank and file might be ill-disposed to "collaborate" with the Axis, it would be . unsafe to assume that General Catroux's appeal will be answered'by a formidable rising against their- use by the Axis against Britain.' There is also the prospect that the Germans, if Vichy joins the Axis, would release th. > bulk of the two million French prisoners of war they hold for return- to . France and, possibly, service on the Axis side. On the other hand, Vichy is obviously alarmed at the indignation aroused in America by its.closer "collaboration" with Germany. This may lead to further manoeuvres to evade, if possible, the consequences of such collaboration and prolong an unreal and delicate situation.