NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 102, 2 May 1941, Page 7

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

HITLER'S NEXT MOVE

EAST OR WEST?

THE MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEM

Though it would be too much -to say that after the British evacuation of Greece all is over in the Balkans "bar the shouting," any further major opera- / tions in that theatre, apart from Turkey, are unlikely. Hitler will complete his occupation of continental Greece, and it is hard to see what can save in the long run the remnants of the Yugoslav army last reported as holding out in the mountains of old Serbia, but beyond the reach of any substantial assistance from the British in force. It will take some time for the invaders to repair the damage and dislocation wrought by the short, but fierce, Nazi campaign in the Balkans. From .the Danube, where two vital bridges were destroyed by the Yugoslavs, upsetting traffic across and up and down the river too, road and rail bridges and tunnels have been effectively wrecked all the way down to near Athens. The Germans have suffered heavy casualties, and everything goes to show that Hitler will have to pause awhile before taking the next step —if he takes it —in this area of hostilities. What will then be his next move? Axis Hold on Shores. So far as can be seen the position of the Axis Powers after the Balkan campaign is: They now hold two out of the thfree land areas of Europe which stretch southwards into the Mediterranean towards the shores of the African continent. These are the Italian and Greek peninsulas. The third great area is the Iberian peninsula, containing Spain and Portugal in the west. The fourth block that extends southwards, on, roughly, the same latitude as the other three i 3 Anatolia, or Turkey-in-Asia. Of the southern shore of the Mediterranean British Imperial forces have the use of Egypt, including the vital Suez Canal, and Palestine along the southeastern corner. On the European mainland they have only the fortress of Gibraltar, described in recent Notes. Vichy France controls Syria, between Palestine and Turkey, and a long sweep of the northern coast of Africa from Tunis to the borders of Spanish Morocco, which in turn extends through the Strait of Gibraltar to the Atlantic, with the enclave of the International Zone of Tangier, now under Spanish control. Limited Frontage. It will thus be seen that of the actual Continental shores of the Mediterranean Britain has the use of only a. comparatively short distance—and that almost wholly at the extremity most distant from the British Isles. But the British Navy exercises command of this great inland sea and its exits to the outer world at Suez and Gibraltar. But this command cannot be described as absolute and unchallenged, even though reinforced by the possession of the islands of Cyprus and Malta and the use of the Greek island of Crete, where the Greek Government has retired- The challenge comes from the air power of the Axis based on Sardinia, Italy, Sicily, and now Greece, together with the Greek islands occupied by the Germans and the Dodecanese still held by Italy. This air power has rendered untenable the use of Malta as a full naval base and may make the use of harbours in Crete somewhat awkward for the Navy. Certain units, also, of the much-battered Italian fleet survive, together with submarines, which have at least a nuisance value. Naval Difficulties. The British Mediterranean Fleet, unable to use Malta, is divided into two separate fleets, based on Gibraltar and Alexandria respectively. The western fleet is under Admiral Sommerville and the eastern under Ad^ miral Cunningham. Owing to the distance between these bases, nearly 2000 i miles, there is difficulty in exercising, ! with so many other pressing duties, control of the narrow strait in the cent tralv Mediterranean between Europe and Africa—the famous Sicilian Channel. It is across this, while the Navy 'was engaged in escorting the British Imperial Forces to Greece, that the Germans were able to send considerable forces into Italian North Africa and wrest from Britain the newly-con-quered territory of Cyrenaica. On top of these difficulties is the ambiguous attitude of Vichy France, which is suspected of at least conniving at the use of French North African territorial waters by the Axis, and possibly of even more active assistance. There is also the considerable French navy still in existence.

Hitler's Policy.

It is obviously Hitler's purpose to exploit all these difficulties. The occupation of Greece gives him useful air bases' for attacks on Egypt and the Suez, and the seizure of Greek islands in the Aegean certainly adds to the difficulty of British help to Turkey, should that be needed. Hitler's chief need at present is deemed to be oil, and oil can be obtained from the Irak, Iran, and Baku fields, between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Between him and the possession of these fields lie Turkey and Russia. -From the south Britain has moved a force into Irak, under the terms of the Anglo-Iraki Treaty, with a view to protecting communications with the Irak oilfields. Turkey has declared her in.tention to defend herself against any aggression, but to the south lies French Syria, the outlet to one of the pipelines from the Irak oilfield. this would be a convenient base for an attack on Suez also, but it could hardly be used without land access, and that could only come by consent of Turkey. It may therefore seem to Hitler that a blow at the west through Spain would be easier and more immediately profitable as a help in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of Britain, as well as in bottling up the western approach to the Mediterranean. The signs of Nazi intervention in Spain, such as the stale old pretext put forward of a reported British intention to invade the Peninsula, the influx of "tourists" and "technicians" into Spain, and <,he machinations of. the pro-Nazi Senor Suner all point this way. The announcement that tine Portuguese are reinforcing their frontier is additional evidence. Events in the next few weeks will decide which way Hitler will try to go npvt.