NOTES M THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 82, 7 April 1941, Page 8

NOTES M THE WAR NEWS

BALKAN THEATRE

AXIS ATTACK BEGINS

YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE

With the not unexpected declaration of war by Germatly, followed by Italy, on Yugoslavia and Greece, and actual hostilities on the frontiers at the weekend the land war in Europe reopens for 1941 at almost exactly the same date in April as Germany's push into Scandinavia last year. Once more Germany, with Italy this time somewhat reluctantly slinking in the background, is the aggressor.

The alleged German motives are just the same as last year. The pretext for the attack on Grece and Yugoslavia is what it was for the sudden onslaught on Norway last April and on Holland and Belgian in May: that Britain had planned to make these countries bases for further operations and Germany had to get in first for her own protection. Such excuses deceived few people last year, and deceive nobody now. In both instances Germany's motives are purely military. The seizure of Denmark and Norway, and (afterwards of Holland and Belgium, Iwas essential to her plans of conquest, particularly against Britain. Once more Britain is the enemy. Salonika the Aim. The difference between 1940 and 1941 is that Britain is actually present in the Balkans, ready to help Greece and Yugoslavia. The lesson of Norway has been well learnt. Germany's plan in the Balkans, to which control of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria was obviously a series of steps, was to secure a base in the Mediterranean, in the first place at the Aegean port of Salonika. The subservience of Bulgaria was a gain, for it gave the German army positions on the Bulgarian frontier from which to threaten Greece on the west and Turkey on the east. Between Bulgaria and Greece (or that part of Greece known as Thrace) the frontier runs along the Rhodope mountain range, but between Bulgaria and Turkey the border lies in much easier country. Between the Rhodope Range and the Aegean Sea Thrace runs as a more or less narrow coastal strip of plain ending at the Greco-Turkish frontier on the Maritsa River, On account of its length and narrowness Thrace will not. be easily defensible despite its mountain barrier, unless the Tui-ks enter the war quickly on the Greek side. The prospect at the moment is not quite certain.

; Natural Defences. On the other hand, the western sec- | tion of Thrace from where the Struma River enters the" Aegean is well suited by nature for defence. It was because of the natural difficulties in the way of an advance on Salonika that Germany tried to secure the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Axis Pact, for Yugoslavia commands the only easy access to Salonika, that down the Vardar Valley. Fortunately. Yugoslavia woke up in time, and Germany will have to | fight for the possession of what is ' known as "the Balkan furrow," the natural highway from Belgrade, the Yugoslavian capital, on the Danube, up the Morava River and down the Vardar. to Salonika. This region of '■ southern Yugoslavia, with its roads and railways, communicating with Istanbul from Nish through Sofia and with Salonika and Greece by the other main railway line, is likely to be the theatre of the heaviest fighting in the next few days, as the Germans will endeavour to strike through to meet the Italians in Northern Albania, cut the Serbian armies in two, and isolate Greece from Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Stronghold It is doubtful whether the Yugoslav High Command in view of this German threat will attempt seriously to defend the easier country of northern Yugoslavia along the Danube Valley and along its tributary the Save. But westward of these rivers is a vast mountainous region falling steeply to the Adriatic, a natural stronghold impenetrable to mechanised warfare, and j the true homeland of the Yugoslavs. It was on this country that the Serbian armies retired in the Great War when Bulgaria stabbed Serbia in the back. The Yugoslav proclamation of Belgrade. Zagreb, and Lyubljana as "open towns" on the eve of hostilities seems to indicate an intention not to defend this vulnerable frontier area of the lowlands too seriously. Into the vital south-central region of Yugoslavia there are two easier ways from Bulgaria through the mountains. To the north there is the line of the main raili way—the Orient Express route—from {Sofia to Nish. and further south there is a belt of lower ground leading to the Vardar Valley via Strumnitsa and Shtip. These access lines are likely to be heavily defended by the Yugoslavs. From Durazzo on the Adriatic there is also the route of the old Roman road, the Via Egnatia. which, via Lake Ochrida. connects with the Aegean at Salonika. It might be added that if the Yugoslavs are able to i hold the Germans away from vital j J points, they might be able to spare 1 a force to deal with the Italians in Northern Albania. The elimination of the Italians from Albania would greatly assist the Allied cause by opening up the Adriatic to the British Navy, with tremendous possibilities of dealing directly with Italy proper as well as of supplying the Yugoslavs from the sea. Abyssinia and Libya. General Wavell's campaign in East Africa goes from success to success, and seems to be nearing its end. One of the most significant incidents about this | theatre of war is the American conclusion that the Red Sea is no longer a combatant zone and is thus accessible, under the neutrality law, to American shipping. This is indicated by President Roosevelt, and is enlarged upon by a statement, by Mr. R. G. Swing, who regards the transport of American supplies via the Red Sea to the Sue 2 Canal as "likely to be one of the big factors of the war." This suggests that the cleaning up of the Italians in Eritrea has been even more complete than the reports so far have indicated, ! and that their hold on Massawa, which they have refused to surrender, is a paper one, liable to collapse when the British forces cover the few miles that remain.

One of the swiftest moves of the whole of the Abyssinian campaign i£ reported today, the capture of Addis Ababa. Only a few days ago it was expected that the South African troops moving along the railway from the east would be held up at the Awash River, about 90 miles away. The river runs in a gorge, about 200

feet deep, and the 400 ft railway bridge across it had been blown up. The South Africans, however, scrambled down into the gorge, overcame the machine-gunners who were trying to stop them, and crossed the river. Right on the heels of the news of thi3 passage came the announcement that the Imperial forces had taken the capital.

j Three hundred miles north of Addis Ababa, and just inside the Abyssinian border, is Adowa—a place of unhappymemory for Italy—and this has also been taken, after a swift advance from Asmara. There is every evidence that the whole Italian military structure in East Africa has been wrecked and that the operations amount now only to "mopping up," combined with the task, which may prove a difficult one. of protecting Italian residents from the vengeance of the natives. The Benghazi Affair. As a set-off to the successes in Eritrea and Abyssinia must be put the I enemy's advance in Cyrenaica, resulting in the capture of Benghazi and some further progress. Very little news has been given about the strengthening of the enemy forces in this region. When the Army of the Nile seized Benghazi and set up a new local government, it seemed that something like permanency had : been achieved, with the British forces established in comfort and the beaten Italians a long way off to the west. But. German forces were carried over the Mediterranean from Sicily (the sea crossing is only about 70 miles) and with these as stiffening a new offensive was begun. There is no indication that it was a powerful attack, for the British forces left in Benghazi were probably reduced to the minimum possible, and the enemy are reported to have been held. It cannot be assumed that the enemy action was a surprise, in spite of the lack of prior indications. There has been much air activity over the North African coastal area, and no important enemy mov#« iments could have been made un» 'observed.