Evening Post MONDAY, JANUARY 13, 1941. HITLER-STALIN TRADE PACT

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 10, 13 January 1941, Page 6

Evening Post MONDAY, JANUARY 13, 1941. HITLER-STALIN TRADE PACT

Nothing has occurred to alter the impression—founded on strategic necessities—that, the chief aim of German diplomacy is to induce Russia to agree to a German advance in the Balkans. When the Soviet Prime Minister, Molotov, went to Berlin, the world wondered whether Hitler had at last bought Stalin's Balkan help, at the price (perhaps) of a free hand for Russia in Iran and Irak and further eastward. Ever since then observers have waited for the result of the Molotov talks. The greater gain for which Hitler might hope was a complete agreement with Stalin for a carving-up of Balkan, Near East, and Middle East spoils. The lesser (much lesser) gairi which might accrue to Germany from Molotov's visit to Berlin was a trading and goods-exchange pact on an enlarged scale. The latter, of course, could not solve Hitler's Balkan difficulties. A big "trade" with Russia in war-necessities for Germany ("greatest grain deal in history," etc.) could, no doubt, be exploited by Dr. Goebbels as a counter to the Roosevelt war-supplies policy and to the British Aid Bill. But, at its best, it could be only a very weak counter: As a means of war-winning, all that Russia can send Germany cannot compare with all that America can send the Allies. Now that results of the Molotov talks are to hand, in the form of the trade pact, reference to which is made in today's news, it is seen that Hitler has secured from Stalin only the lesser benefit, in which the Nazis have little enough to boast about. This last sentence is written subject to the reservation that the RussoGerman pact contains no more than is published; that there are no secret clauses covering a German-Russian agreement to occupy territories adjoining Russia; that there is nothing between the lines of the pact whereby Hitler is assured of a "new deal" with Stalin aimed at the Allies' command of the Eastern Mediterranean. On the face of the pact, as reported at time of writing, there is nothing that exceeds common expectations. Nobody has ever doubted Stalin's willingness to sell to Hitler for cash, just as Stalin—when they were in opposite camps—sold to Red Spain for cash. But to sell what Hitler will buy, at Russia's price, is a vitally different thing from joining Hitler in a Balkan deal which would unduly advantage Germany in the strategic region which geography and strategy have irrevocably made a bone of contention between German and Slav —the Turkish Straits. A trade pact, in itself, cannot attain what we have referred to as the chief aim of Nazi diplomacy—a Balkans pact with Russia and the entanglement of Stalin in a big tiger-riding experiment. That coup Ribbentrop has not yet effected, taking the pact as published. What it omits is incomparably more,, important than what it contains. In the recent past, Russian aid to Germany has been quoted to justify American aid to Britain, and American aid to Britain has been quoted to justify whatever supplying Russia has undertaken for Germany. The American formula is aid to Britain, short of war. We have not heard of any parallel formula in the matter j of Berlin-Moscow dealings, but so far Russia's aid to Germany has, as a matter of fact, fallen short of war; nor does the new pact, on its face, depart from that position. President Roosevelt has said that dollars shall not stand in the way of Britain's winning the war; but we have not heard Stalin say that roubles will not

stand in the way of Hitler's winning the war. President Roosevelt's appreciation of Mr. Churchill or Mr. Churchill's appreciation of President Roosevelt is not marred by any recorded observations of either of them, to the effect that the other is a thug and the scum of the earth—but such remarks about Moscow were pleasantries in Berlin until Ribbentrop went as broker to Moscow, and initiated a new standard of moral valuations. It will be agreed, therefore, that there are moral as well as material reasons why Russia cannot be represented as being Hitler's America. The absence from the pact reports of any sign of a new strategicpolitical agreement between Germany and Russia has not damped down the swelling chorus about a smouldering Balkans blaze, to be fanned by Berlin. From the maze of alarms and denials one important fact emerges—the impending AngloTurkish military-naval staff talks at Ankara.