THE OIL SUPPLY

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 150, 21 December 1940, Page 6

THE OIL SUPPLY

GERMAN TROUBLES

VULNERABLE STORAGE

TANKS

TRANSPORT PROBLEM

Germany's main source for the importation of finished oil products is Rumania, which In 1938 produced over 6,000,000 tons of oil, writes Harold Moore in the "Manchester Guardian." There are indications that production has fallen since that date, and-a considerable proportion of the oil will undoubtedly be required in Rumania itself, but v/ith the country under Nazi domination we may expect that this will be the main source of petroleum products at the present time. Rumania possesses sufficient refining capacity to treat the whole of its own crude, but the problem of transport to Germany must present many difficulties. Poland is to some extent in a similar position and produced about 500,000 tons before the war. Austria produces 100,000 tons per "annum and Albania produces about 200,000 tons per annum of very low grade crude, which will be available for Italian use. Probably the Albanian production has been increased. -. ■ ■ .

Indications are that if the peacetime production of Rumania was available to Germany, together with her own crude, she would have approximately sufficient oil to keep going indefinitely, provided that she virtually stops the consumption of petroleum products in occupied territories and that nothing interferes with the transport and distribution of this oil. SYNTHETIC PLANTS. Germany developed large plants, for the production of synthetic oil from lignite and coal. It is generally estimated that if these plants had not been interfered with they would be producing between 2,000,GQ0 and 2,500,000 tons per annum at the present time, and the bulk of the production would be petrol. The German coal-tar industry provides 500,000 tons of benzole per annum, part of which may be used for aviation purposes, but a considerable quantity will be required, for chemical work. The alcohol production is hot sufficient to play any-con-siderable role as a wartime fuel.

If there had been no interference with transport of oil from Rumania,no falling off in Rumanian production, no interference with the production and refining of home-produced crude, - and if the synthetic plants had been left intact there is every reason to suppose that Germany would have adequate oil to carry on the war, provided she starves all the occupied territories, which are almost all dependent on imported products. Italy, though with great /refining capacity, has no appreciable crude production, the refineries -having worked on oil imported from-Irak' and the United States until Italy entered the conflict. RUSSIAN PRODUCTION. Russia's production Is in the neighbourhood of 30,000;000 tone, all of which is' requited at home. If Russia definitely decided-, to ..restrict her own consumption - drastically '% arid - hand over the surplus to Germany; provided transport facilities were available, she could '■ undoubtedly keep Germany amply, supplied. The writer is assuming, however, that Russia is not prepared to do this and that the transport facilities are not available. There is lio doubt that large quantities of oil'have been lost by Germany as a. result of air raids. The stocks held in the country before the. war were partly, in normal commercial storages —that is to say, overground "tanks which had been built for peacetime use-r-and part was undoubtedly in secret reserve underground tariks built by the Government for wartime use. It is probable that in such underground tanks the loss from air raids is comparatively small. The overground tankage is, however, very liable to air attack. It consists of large cylindrical tanks containing from SQOQ to 10,000 tons each, and these tanks are separated into different compounds, isolated from each other by bunds or walls. Before the 7 war the German authorities were giving great attention to the bunding and separation of tanks so as to give them the maximum immunity from air attack, but'they would still be extremely sensitive to intensive bombing. . THE OILFIELDS AND BOMBS. The actual oilfields are not very sensitive to air attack—that is to say, the wells themselves are not likely to be affectedr—but the storage tanks situated at the wells are,- of course, liable to be fired, -and the transport from wells to the refineries may be affected. The refineries are very sensitive; both storage and equipment may easily be destroyed. This might necessitate moving crude to uninjured refineries, as the total refining capacity of the country exceeds requirements owing to the cessation of crude imports. • .

The synthetic oil plants are .extremely sensitive to air attack. The synthesis process involves the use of a great deal of power and most elaborate equipment for a comparatively small production. More than that, tho.ugh the installations are very large, each part is dependent upon the satsifactory operation of other parts,, so that injury to one part of the plant will stop the entire production until the injured part is repaired. As the majority of the synthetic oil plants in Germany have been raided several times, it is highly probable that the production from these plants has been reduced very seriously indeed. They are undoubtedly much more sensitive than a petroleum refinery. The oil imported in the form of finished products is the least vulnerable; its import can be restricted by interference with railway or barge transport. As Rumania is the main scource- for the importation of finished products, it is probable that the most important target of the E.A.F. at the present time is the organisation of transport of these prcJucts; ITALIAN PROBLEMS. Italy has been almost entirely dependent on importation of crude and finished products. She has considerable refining capacity, most of it modern arid in fairly good condition. This, however, is no use without the crude. The small amount of low-quality crude available from Albania' would not be of great help. Italy would require to import crude from Rumania, which presents many transport difficulties "nd the supply of .the Italian forces in |jNorthern Africa must . present even ig'sater difficulty.

! It is difficult to arrive at any. definite 'figures as to Germany's probable oil situation, but in the writer's opinion there would undoubtedly be a shortjage were it not for the importation of '(Rumanian finished products. The transport system from Rumania is, of course, weak; in the summer it depends largely upon barge transport up the Danube and in the winter on railway transport, which is not capable of handling the large amount of oil required. How far the Germans can imi prove this and how far we could inter* I fere with it it is difficult to estimate.