NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 150, 21 December 1940, Page 12

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

GERMANS IN ITAL^

TROOP MOVEMENTS

MEANING OF TRANSFER

The reported passage of Ger* man troops to Italy by way pfj the Brenner Pass and unoccu-.. pied France is an interesting' " development of the war which; may be fraught with unexpected , consequences for the Nazis and Fascists alike. • "*■£>»

What is the purpose of these troopy transfers? Several explanations' are; possible. In - the first pla.ce the units' sent may be purely technical ones and their numbers may have been magnified in the telling. It is highly likely that the troops include the personnel of anti-aircraft batteries, for it was plain that Italy entered the war quite inadequately prepared to defend her vital points .against air raids. ~ Even though the defences needed have been limited because of the practical difficulties of making the long flight from Britain to Italy, and. the fact that much of the country was at the extreme bombing range at the best of times, the R.A.F... met -. with singularly little resistance in itf earlier attacks. _ -\ .'.;,..,^L_ .j ■■■ ■ ■ ■ ■^•■■'•■^'"&'"('3C:f"' His-.Two Errors...... 'T^'^A^Pi Equipment of a country with afk^j quate anti-aircraft defence is a lon* business and the first result of Musso-> lini's gamble on a quick victory being; won by the Nazis was to expose Nortbt Italy to British bombs. Since then the position has become worse. • The second error of the founder of Fascism was the ill-prepared attack on Greece. This has given the R.A.Fi what it most wanted, land bases froni; which to attack eastern and southern Italy. Also the blow to the Italian fleet at Taranto has left the Mediter-' ranean almost an open sea to;- tha Royal Navy, and consequently has. increased Italy's risk of attack by planes of the Fleet Air Arm and even of naval bombardment. Again, of course, limiting factors have come into play. The principal ones have been the facts that th^ British Air Force in the Mediterranean, has been needed for military purposes in Egypt and Albania, and that the planes spared for attacks on Italy hava been mainly directed against objectives having a direct bearing on the campaigns. But -the progress- of th« British and Greek,offensives threatens to release a sizeable number of machines to attack the-vulnerable spots-of southern and eastern -Italy. : ..,,•; Other Units Sent. / r However, the reports refer to a-much larger number of troops than would, be needed to stiffen the Italian /defences against air attack,, and there is. some confirmation of them in the largenumber of train cancellations reported from Italy'in the-last day or. two. Consequently some other explanation must also be sought, for if anti-aircraft regiments have been sent1 (and the recent turning over Of the. iamous Skoda" works to the production of anti-aircraft: guns, reported by the Czech foreign, news service, indicates that Germany is making big strides in this direction), other units have also gone.along. _ ' The next possibility is that the Germans are sending troops to stiffen the Italian armies in Albania and Libya,i especially in Albania. It is not : probable, though possible, that Germany would send regiments to fight under the command of Italian-generals who have shown themselves unable to conduct a campaign with any success.

Men Before Planes. r It is also possible that the Nazis would take this step in preference to sending the air aid which might be expected. The curiously varied rhythm of the German air attacks on Britain in recent weeks has suggested that the Luftwaffe is not as strong as Goering would desire it to be, and therefore the German General Staff may be reluctant to release planes to get. Mussolini out of the mess into which he has got himself. The point about these troop transfers, however, is that they come so.late. .The Nazis are not in the habit of delaying their decisions, and it has been obvious: for many days that the Italians were in danger in Albania'and'in absolute peril in Libya. Moreover, despite reverses, Italy is still militarily equipped to fight her own battle, if she is inclined to do so. It is not so long since we heard almost daily boasts -from Gayda and others of the huge number of trained reservists of the Italian army, its marvellous modern equipment, its corps of officers which rt: would take Britain five years to equal in riumbers, and which, according to Ansaldo, Britain could never hope to equal in quality. . ' Lowered War Potential. From the point of view of ability to put an army in the field and give it modern arms, then, Italy is far from defeated. But many things count in. war besides the ability to mobilise millions, as the examples of France and Poland proved* It may be doubted today whether-the mobilised millions of Italy will want to fight, whether, they all can be got to face the overseas voyage, to leave their bones bleaching abroad, and whether the rickety Italian State, feeling the lack of raw materials and its own poverty, can keep the new forces supplied with the munitions of war. . . :. .^ This, then, raises the really significant point. Are the Germans going to Italy, not to support Italy but to bolster Fascism? Left to themselves the Italians may crack; already they showsigns of being unable to stand the strain of a real war. In fact, their behaviour lends point to the joke made by a Briton after the Italian, entry .to the conflict: "Well, we had to. have them in the last war; it is only fair that the Germans should have them.in this one." '..";. A Critical Position. '::', Such wails as Gayda's statement that Italy was standing alone, the. resolutions passed by Fascists urging support to Mussolini, the resignations of leading generals; these on top of the very real poverty reported to exist in Italy and the bleak outlook of a nation which should align itself with the strong at sea and chose to link herself with: the strong on land, all point to." a difficult position in Mussolini's State. If the crisis is already at hand, it. may arise with swiftness. Consequently the Nazis may be acting with some, promptitude to control the situation. This means, of course, that Mussolini has sold out his people to the Nazigangsters, as British sources pointed out at the time of his entry of the war. It means that his supreme gamble went wrong, and that whatever the outcome he can be remembered only as a hired assassin is remembered, and as the man who wrecked the Italian Stats.