Evening Post TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1940. WIDE ECHOES OF ITALY'S FAILURE

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 128, 26 November 1940, Page 6

Evening Post TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1940. WIDE ECHOES OF ITALY'S FAILURE

Confronted in the Greek war with events utterly unexpected, the Italians are beginning to ask themselves questions. Even Fascist discipline has not prevented some Italian newspapers from attacking the army, although the army, more than anything else, is the visible expression of Mussolini himself. Among the unexpected things are the still continuing retreat of the; Italian divisions which General Soddu is trying to stiffen up; and although impartial and authoritative reports dd not yet describe that retreat as a complete rout, the persistence of Greek and neutral statements implying Italian disorder and heavy losses is encouraging the impression that Mussolini has really been smitten much harder than caution has allowed us to hope. While the ultimate GermanItalian military reaction to the Italian defeat is still unpredictable, and may possibly be drastic, this fact at any rate emerges from the confusion: the prestige of Mussolini, whose torn portraits now pave Koritza streets, has received a terrible setback.

In ordinary circumstances, neutral opinion on a battle that is still continuing—and to which Hitler may still make a formidable contribution of air force;—would be reserved. But the Italian retreat in Greece and Albania is naturally surveyed against the extraordinary background of assurance with which Mussolini created this war at three hours' notice. Proclamations printed in Greek which the Italian army carried with it to serve on the to-be-conquered Greeks, the total absence of plans for an Italian defensive in the event of a forced retreat, and other pieces of evidence show that Mussolini expected a walk-over —he ! regarded Greece as another Denmark or at least as another Norway. Against this background of prideful assurance, his prestige has received, by contrast j>f his promise and his performance, a stunning blow. The Italian retreat —even if it becomes no worse —is a Mussolini disaster. And that fact is proved by its re-( sounding echoes through the Balkans and through Europe. Everywhere the moral blow to the arrogant, Hitlerimitating Mussolini is recognised as exceeding the military damage that the Greeks so far have inflicted. The damage" to the Fascist morale steadies Bulgaria, hardens Turkey, and may have given Moscow a new bias, besides, of course, spurring on the Greek army to greater deeds against the retreating foe.

One effect of the Greek dash, in which cavalry units have been successfully employed, is seen in news coming to hand as we write. The 8.8.C. interprets "latest messages" as indicating that "in some sectors" the Italian retreat is "assuming the proportions of a rout," and that the rear positions on which the Italians hoped to stand may now prove untenable. From another source it is stated: "Something has happened quite recently to make Berlin and Rome believe that they cannot get Bulgaria into the Axis at present. It may be the growing realisation of Italian weakness" That is to say, although Mussolini's Greece-Albania battle is not finished, and though it may have a sequel, nevertheless the Fascist Dictator has already succeeded in making Bulgaria listen a little more to Moscow and a little less to Berlin and Rome. Taking the same text of Italian weakness—the Mussolini frog that blew itself vp —General de Gaulle reminds his countrymen that "Italy in her present state would make the French people realise how important a -part the French air force and fleet could have played in Africa and Syria had they not been betrayed by the Armistice. France now realised the nature of the so-called new order in Europe." Who, before the French downfall a few months ago, would have predicted that France in the year 1940 should have a military example set for her by the Greece whom she "guaranteed"?

The view is expressed in "diplomatic circles" that Hitler, in response to Mussolini's insistent demand for Italian expansion in the Balkans, replied at their Brenner meeting with words equivalent to "take it if you can." Now, however, that Italy is retreating before her much smaller enemy, "Hitler is forced to contemplate assisting his ally just at the moment when, that ally's failure has made it much harder to help him owing to the stiffening attitude of

the Balkan peoples. Italy's defeat has had an effect far beyond the Balkans and has faced Germany's plans in the Middle East with rapidly growing opposition." This moralpolitical hardening-up of the Balkans and of Mediterranean countries against Axis aggression is an even more serious matter for Hitler than is the possible loss of several Italian divisions in the Greece-Albania campaign. And as an enemy who is on the rim should be kept on the run by all possible means, it is not surprising to hear of new British units in Greece and Crete, striking not only for Greek freedom but for an open Mediterranean, and for the final destruction of Mussolini's theory that an Empire highway should be converted into "an Italian lake."