Evening Post. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1940. ITALIAN, GREEK, AND TURK

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 105, 30 October 1940, Page 6

Evening Post. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1940. ITALIAN, GREEK, AND TURK

When Hitler invaded -Norway, his excuses included fabricated pictures of British-Norwegian military understandings and of British penetration into Norway. The same pretence is used by Mussolini to cover i his three-hour ultimatum to Greece, [plus other pretences such as alleged Greek injustices to Albanians and alleged Greek violences on Italy's Albanian frontier. The Axis technique of invasion, so far as small countries are concerned, is now standardised, and rises above all scruples. The non-aggression assurances given by Italy to Greece are recalled to mind in a Rugby message, in further proof (if needed) of Mussolini's complete non-morality. It is remembered that in a Note to Greece in April of last year Mussolini promised to "protect Greece's integrity regarding both her land and sea frontiers." He now demands that this protection be conferred by Italian military occupation of strategic points in Greece, any Greek resistance to which leaves the Greek Government "responsible for the consequences." No wonder that General Metaxas calls this Italian communication by its true name —-"a declaration of war."

Rumours about events in the ItaloGreek war are hardly to be trusted because the war is still in its infancy, and because wireless commentators believe they see in certain current ; rumours another Norwegian parallel, for it is now known that Germany, when invading Norway, invented and circulated tendentious rumours for a j purpose, "raising hopes in order to take advantage of the subsequent reaction." Mussolini's first purpose is to bluff Greece into submission; his second purpose, if the first fails, is to repeat the Norwegian experience of a short war, with or without a Quisling. If, instead, he finds himself with a long Greek war on his hands, then his diplomacy can be credited with a major failure. The concurrence of the invasion of Greece with the meeting of the two dictators . makes the invasion definitely an Axis move; but the question of Stalin's relationship to it remains open. And [ with the problem of Stalin is interlocked the problem of Turkey.] Though delivered at the shortest j notice, Mussolini's blow at Greece was certainly not a surprise. When! the British Chiefs of Staff met in London, "it was chiefly to reviewj plans already made for giving Greece all the help in Britain's power. By . evening the first rapidly-moving! British units had taken up their sta- , tions to fulfil Britain's pledges." "The Times," which is responsible for this quoted statement, says that the Italo-Greek war is "part of a wider strategy, diplomatic and military, by means of which the Axis seeks to continue the Eastern pincer movement against British, positions and communications in the Middle East, and against British-controlled oil supplies in that regiou." Italy's action "is therefore as much a threat to Britain as to Greece." In fact, [ the Italo-Greek war is a move against a pawn, as part of a wider game of | war-chess. But Greece can make herself a very expensive pawn, if she so wills; and Turkey, if she wills, can be a more effective neighbour to Greece than Sweden was to Norway. I But Stalin, who pulled strings in Finland and Sweden, also pulls strings in Turkey. Which way he is pulling no one knows. There may be a good deal of significance in the remark of the Istanbul correspondent of the British United Press that "the Turks will aid the Greeks if General Metaxas (Greek Prime Minister) puts up Uie semblance of a fight."