NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXIX, Issue 96, 23 April 1940, Page 10

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

THE MEDITERRANEAN

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS!

ITALY'S AMBITIONS

While on the face of it then would appear to be no" great conflict of interests in the Scandinavian and other countries round the Baltic and North Sea, apart from the necessity -, for opposing Germany's sheer,lust of conquest, it is far different in the Mediterranean, where Italy's attitude is again causing concern.

The Baltic" is an inland Sea giving access to Sweden, Finland, Northern Russia, Estonia, Latvia, ' Lithuania, Poland (when it existed as an iride« pendent State), and the eastern.portions of Germany and Denmark. Thera is no through-communication eastward via the Baltic to any -other part of the world. The Mediterranean, on the other hand, is not brily the sole source of sea access to the numerous and important countries ■' that border its shores, including the Black Sea,:but it carries the main line of sea traffic in normal times, via the- Suez Canal, between Europe and the East.

It is therefore of the utmost importance to Britain and France, with . their large possessions in the East and I the Far East, that this sea route should be maintained in peace free from the i threats of any Power seeking to estab-* ilish a domination over the Mediterranean. Italy is - the strongest I purely Mediterranean Power,, lying j geographically in a position centrally i adapted for exerting influence in every direction over this great inland sea. i Chequered History. Italy's ambition to become a colonial Power took shape not long after her emergence as an independent na-. tion occupying the whole of the Italian peninsula and Sicily in 1870. Northern Africa was the first most obvious, field, and Tunis, then in the late seventies virtually unclaimed, was the nearest territory—across the "Waist" of the Mediterranean ■ from Sicily— ready for occupation. " Had , Italy, seized Tunis then, it would have given, her a grip of the narrowest portion of the Mediterranean through which, international sea-traffic to the East would have- to pass. France, however, got in first in Tunis in 1881, to Italy's lasting indignation. The next year the British occupied Egypt. Between Tunis and Egypt was Tripoli, . still under Turkish rule, but Italy at that time dared not intervene for fear of . France. Therefore, to strengthen hen position she joined in 1882 with Germany and Austria in forming ' ;the Triple Alliance. That was the originof the first conception of the RomeBerlin "Axis." When the Triple Alliance was renewed in 1887 Italy got Germany to give .a guarantee against, a French occupation of Tripoli, but Germany would not encourage Italy to , take Tripoli for herself. Italian, col-, -■ onial ambition was thereby, diverted1 to the Red Sea littoral at-Eritrea, and! subsequently in the nineties to designs on Abyssinia which led to the disaster of Adowa in. 1896. After that, im«, perialism declined in Italy",, for'seven ;'• ral years, owing to the popular distaste for overseas adventures. ■ Imperialism Revives. * Early in the twentieth century thera was a revival of imperialism,. and. an. arrangement was reached with France by which France was to have a free hand in Morocco in return for a free hand for Italy in Tripoli. British paramount influence in Egypt was also recognised. Italy : was thus associated with both the Triple Entente and .tha Triple Alliance at the same time in the furtherance of her ambitions. It. was at this stage that the Russian Am. bassador in Paris, M. Isvolski, wrote to his Minister in St. Petersburg,.a dictum on-Italian policy which after events went far to justify. He said that "in case .of war Italy' will .begin.by adopting a waiting attitude and will then join on the side to whicft victory is inclining." In the Great War Italy, though nominally still a member of the Triple Alliancei witfc Austria and Germany, showed her,, prescience of victory by going to war, in May, 1915, on the side of the Allies. A similar waiting attitude is detected by some observers now. The London, correspondent of the "Sydney Morning Herald" noted recently, for in-, stance, that "there is a belief in diplomatic circles in Rome that Italy s attitude will be decided by the outcome of the struggle in. Scandinavia. . Signor Ansaldo, director of the newspaper "II Telegrafo," according to a message yesterday, said in a speech,. ™he Smed forces of Italy are ready for action at any moment. . . . Italy can be among the victors only if sh» is really strong." | Paving the Way. Italy's policy therefore is thoroughly 1 realistic. It was so in 1909 when she _ entered into the Racconigi Agreement" with Russia by which, in return for a . •'benevolent regard" for Russia's ambition to secure a passago through the Dardanelles for her warships to the Mediterranean, she- was given a free hand in Tripoli. Ti-e "free hand" was. used in 1911, when Tripoli was occupied without much difficulty, and the Dodecanese ' Islands off the coast oj Asia Minor as well. By the treaty of Lausanne, 1912, Italy undertook ,t»evacuate the Dodecanese, but events occurred one after the other which left Italy finally in possession after tha Great War. The whole story of the intrigues of the Powers, great and small, in the Eastern Mediterranean in all these years from the beginning |of the century to the outbreak of the i present troubles, makes an interesting 1 study too long to detail here. The upshot is that the power of Italy in the' Mediterranean has grown considerably. The island of Leros in the Dodecanese has been fortified as a naval and air base threatening the Asiatic coast of Turkey, the Aegean Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. The seizure of Albania last year haa given Italy command of both sides of the entrance to the Adriatic. Pantelleria, a small island, in the fairway between Sicily and: Tunis in North Africa, has. also been fortified. ' Italian influence ' is reported to be strong in Spain after the substantial help given by Italy to General Franco to enable him to securevictory in the Spanish Civil "War. Tripoli on the North African coast it' well garrisoned.

On the other hand, there is the grave military weakness of the presence of large Italian forces in Eritrea and. Abyssinia capable of being cut off from relief or withdrawal by the closing of the Suez Canal. The Allied' Navies are also well able to spare enough ships to reinforce their Mediterranean fleets sufficiently to meet any chal« lenge. There is also the close AngloBritish alliance with Turkey and th« friendship of Greece, coupled with lh» presence of the large Allied army of manoeuvre under. Generals Weygani and Wavell in Egypt and Syria. Thesa factors should be enough to make Italy, hesitate before committing herself tp any rash adventure.