HOW A MODERN ARMY FIGHTS

Evening Post, Volume CXXIX, Issue 65, 16 March 1940, Page 20

HOW A MODERN

ARMY FIGHTS

SINCE the World War we have witnessed marked advances in the mechanical implements of war which will have striking influences on the conduct of battle, writes Major-General Hugh A. Drum, commander of the Sixth United States Corps, in the "Chicago -Tribune." I will enumerate in a general way only the important changes and improvements.

Aviation's spectacular advance, especially in reliability, range, speed, load, destructiveness, and service of information.

Armour-clad cross-coumry combat vehicles —mechanised forces.

Motorisation and expansive road systems for movement of large masses. Anti-aircraft artillery, with greatly improved accuracy and range and means of aeroplane detection.

An artillery with increased mobility, destructive power, range, and speed applied to all weapons from anti-tank guns to railway artilleryInfantry weapons with increased penetration, rapidity of fire, range, and accuracy. Chemicals with more efficient propellant instruments as well as more effective defence facilities.

Communications, covering a broad field, such as .radio with voice, facsimilie, and television transmission, and electrical reproduction instruments, keeping pace with the speed and range of other advances.

In our peace-time tneorising a healthy, rivalry exists as to the efficacy of these new developments and weapons. Some foresee a horseless battlefield and would abolish the foot soldier. Others claim supremacy for the power of aerial bombing and that it should replace ground artillery. While a different school looks to the charge of the tank and the movement of mechanised units to be more decisive then the '•boot-to-boot" crash of Napoleon's1 cavalry. Again, some chemical advocates would abolish all "shot and shell." Others visualise rapid movements of forces, mobility, as more decisive than the skilful application of fire power in combat. There is another school which claims that the inI creased fire power and protection afforded by the new weapons should reduce the man-power requirements and therefore losses. Although organisational statistics do not support his view, it is true that skilful employment in battle may secure an earlier decision and thereby avoid some losses, We. need such extremists in peacetime, because they stimulate our profession. . , We have seen some of these improvements undergoing tests in Ethiopia, Spain, and China. Views concerning them are still varied. We should formulate our conclusions concerning them before we crystallise.our ideas on their employment. All are essential to warfare of today and must be adequately provided for in modern military organisation. Our prime problem is to realise their capabilities and when and how to apply them— independently of or in conjunction with the older weapons. In general terms the solution is not necessarily one of supplanting the old by the new; rather of knitting them together in a powerful combat team. In the application of the foregoing viewpoint several salient broad factors should be considered as having vital influences on the organisation of our military forces and in,the conduct of operations and battle. The area of conflict, whther considered from the viewpoint of large operations or of battle.' will be immensely enlarged in the three dimensions of width, depth, and altitude. This will necessitate a broader visualisation and conception on the part of higher commanders as well as in the lower ranks. Constant and efficient observation, terrestrial and air, will be more important and call for special efforts. Mobility versus concentration of sustained fire power presents a mooted question to the military mind as a natural consequence of recent mechanical developments and the enlarged area of combat. The special characteristics of the new developments, such as the great speed, range, and destructiveness of aviation and the mechanised units and the ability to transport large bodies v of troops rapidly over long distances, leads to independent operations. A desire to secure surprise and to reduce losses' by avoidance of intensive fires prompts great dispersion—encircling or turning movements —even air and ground raids, far removed from the main forces. Many foresee operations of the future as a series of widely separated disjointed battles involving small units such as separate air operations, isolated divisional combats, and distant mechanised or horse cavalry fights. Such proposals have led to the concept of air without regard to the plan of the ground forces, and to the desirability of small, extremely mobile ground divisions and mechanised units designed for rapid movement and action far removed from the main forces of ah army. Here the qualities of great speed and range (mobility) are the guides^ in reaching conclusions.

On the other hand, increased potentialities of fire power and armoured protection turn our consideration to actual combat, the battlefield. The value of. speed, range,, and surprise is recognised as a preliminary step to the real objective—victory in battle—

which is secured by an effective fire power, air and ground, resulting from intense concentrations and sustained efforts. The main consideration is to secure as great fire power as possible, so organised in units as to permit their rapid concentration, and so adequately manned and supplied as to insure sustained action-until a decision is gained.

Decisive battle should be the primary objective of armies in any operations. The wisdom of this doctrine is enhanced by the power of modern weapons. The piecemeal employment of units, the dispersion of efforts by widely scattered forces, and independent disjointed operations are dangers the high command must guard against

Decision in battle is secured by the skilful employment of all available means to disorganise the enemy forces, not, as commonly conceived the killing of men. While unfortunately men have to be killed in securing this end, yet it is best accomplished and with less losses by skilful, powerful blows which destroy the means of command and supply. These are the vitals of battle organisation, and, if permanently severed, the means of direction, control, and sustenance fail. The power of cohesive resistance then disintegrates. Consequently the battle manoeuvre. and the co-or-dination ,of air- 1 and ground forces should seek such results. While some forces seek to hold the enemy in place, the main air and.ground efforts should be combined in-decisive blows directed at these, vitals of the battle system. ' ■ ■ ■■

Co-ordination of many separate efforts in order to secure a concentration of power for a given objective will be increasingly difficult. The air forces may inflict serious damage in broad areas, yet they cannot occupy effectively vital ground objectives. So also mechanised units may drive out a hostile body and seize important objectives, yet they lack the capabilities of holding for long and securing lasting major results. The combat team of infantry and artillery is essential to reap the full benefits from the action of these branches and to clinch a final decision.

Initiative ,or superior qualities on the part of leaders of all ranks will be required to gain the full value of the conditions just stated. Subordinates will more frequently be faced with combat situations where units are widely separated and decision must be made locally and at once. In such circumstances co-ordination can be expected only when subordinates are well trained and indoctrinated and appreciate the objectives of the high command. On the other hand, the high command must play its part by reaching early decisions, with definite objectives and comprehensive plans and insuring knowledge thereof by subordinates. Details yrill have to be left to subordinates and reliance *on their aggressive initiative to force the battle in accordance with the ; general plan indicated to them.

Speed of action as a corollary to our modern weapons: and transportation will involve mental processes as well as physical movements. The full value of these modern implements cannot be taken advantage o| unless our mental processes are stepped up in harmony therewith—our minds are flexible and supple. We: must develop the faculjties of. quickly sizing up a situation, grasping opportunities, making- quick decisions, and utilising the modern communications for transmitting them to the troops, in. brief, intelligent instructions. Associated with the foregoing is. the speed of transporting by air and ground of small and large bodies of. troops and supplies over great distances. In addition to surprise, these facilities will reduce materially the fatigue . and hardships of troops, resulting in the arrival of comparatively fresh forces in unexpected areas.

Surprise and night operations will become more . important. Both air and ground forces will endeavour to utilise darkness, fog, and inclement weather to launch surprise operations— to avoid detection and the severe losses incident to modern anti-aircraft and ground fires. Sleep by day and operate by night will be the common routine of the soldier of the future. The night attack should be recognised as an essential operation by all forces.

Air and anti-tank defence of the battlefield will become a serious concern of the high command. Normally our anti-aircraft defence plans are associated with back areas, installations, railroads,- bridges, etc. The future battle will find aviation joining the ground forces in the battle, supplementing the fire of the ground artils lery. Air and anti-aircraft defence will be essential to afford the ground units freedom to execute their battle plan. In like manner the flanks and rear of the fighting forces must be secured-against the approach of rapidmoving mechanised forces. Security of the infantry-artillery team in its ground operations against air attacks and mechanised flank and rear threats is now a vital feature of any battle plan.