WHAT HITLER KNOWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 29, 3 August 1939, Page 9

WHAT HITLER KNOWS

MENTAL PARALYSIS

A MASTER TECHNICIAN THE WEST AS HAMLET | PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY (By Dr. Hermann Rauschning.) (World Copyright by "Co-operation.") Danzig, still a "Free City," is in the foreground of international preoccupations. The f ollOAving article on this burning problem is by Dr. Hermann Rauschning, former National Socialist President of the Senate of Danzig, and thus the head of the Government of the Free City. Dr. Rauschning was formerly a close collaborator of Herr Hitler, and resigned from his high office of his own accord in November, 1934. He is the author of "The Revolution of Nihilism," intended by him as a description of his spiritual account with National Socialism. Dr. Rauschning has remained attached to the German nationalist cause, but is deeply preoccupied with the future of Danzig. •He is therefore very well qualified to deal with this problem. The hopelessness of the present crisis is due to the fact that Hitler has an extraordinary difficulty in realising the change that has taken place in the political mentality of Europe since last summer. How is it possible that this man, up to the present cool and realistic in his political initiatives, is now incapable of grasping the significance of the grandiose effort made by France and England, and persists in descriping them as "decadent nations," who have no other alternative than to recoil step by step? It is possible to answer that it is sufficiently clear since the last few months after the occupation of Prague, not only from speeches but also through acts, that further steps in the direction taken by the Third Reich Avill no longer be tolerated. Yes and no! Yes, in so far as the will to resistance is definitely reflected in the act. But no, in so far as the German Fuhrer, actuated by very different psychological presumptions, denies the possibility of resistance and has so ' far definitely adhered to this appreciation. TRAGIC POSSIBILITIES. The results of such a misunderstanding may be absolutely tragic. The Powers of peace make continued efforts to affirm their desire to co-oper-ate with a pacifically-minded Germany. They make their offers. Their proclamations, even their Avarnings, are to some extent affirmative. The impression conveyed is that they Avish to convince an unconvincible partner. But the receiver of these messages deduces the exact opposite. He regards them as a sign of Aveakness, as a symptom of inertia. I myself have on many occasions interrogated Hitler as to his policy, and he has explained that the risks apparently inherent do not exist in reality. He knows the Western Powers once and for all. That is his great achievement. ... He Tmows that the democracies are powerless to resist even if they wished to do so. Their time is at an end. The events work for the so-called dynamic Powers, for the future of the Avorld might of Germany. This is why Germany can dare anything, even if it - seems contrary to the nature of history. If this is still Hitler's idea —and it seems that this is the case—how is it possible to issue from the dilemma created by those well-meant words, which are intended to prevent war but merely serve to make war inevitable? To answer this question, it is necessary to penetrate further into the mentality of the National Socialist elite. "ENGINEER OF REVOLUTION." . The thorough knowledge of revolutionary literature concerning constitutional problems and civil Avars possessed by Hitler and his acolytes is not yet sufficiently realised. I cannot remember whether Hitler himself has perused Trotsky's doctrine of the coup d'etat. But he definitely assimilated the trains of thought contained in this and similar works. Why I emphasise this fact is as folloAvs:—All the ramifications of the Hitlerian policy are governed by the doctrines of revolution and civil war. People are well aware of Hitler's genius as propagandist, but not of his special talents as engineer of a revolution and of a coup d'etat. This revolutionary experience is the dominating factor, not only in .his pre-office tactics, not only in his home policy, but also in his foreign policy, which is nothing more than the transposition of the modern technique of the coup d'etat to international relations. Hitler exploits the old conservative classes to their own ruin. All political problems are appreciated by Hitler exclusively from a revolutionary standpoint. His strategical ideas, his conceptions of a Avar of nerves, his whole political instrumentation and his political tactics, his surprising and also his foreseen initiatives are the resultant of the experience and the doctrines of the coup d'etat and of the civil war. HITLER'S THREE MAXIMS. It is absolutely necessary to know this and to follow up this clue. The doctrine of the coup d'etat has provided Hitler with three maxims, and I believe that under certain conditions their validity can be relied upon. The first is that of the paralysis of the opponent through intimidation. In every revolutionary campaign, there is a period of "soundings," before the actual revolution takes place. These soundings make it possible to appreciate the existing or non-existing presumptions for the capitulation of the adversary. There are certain symptoms which permit of accurately estimating any given risk. During the preparatory period, such symptoms must be coldly and sharply watched— when the time is ripe, action must come like a thunderbolt. That is Hitler's second maxim. But the third is extremely curious. It is the disintegration of general action into seemingly unimportant diversions and into alternatives of threats and promises in order to create that atmosphere which Hitler regards as decisive, namely, the conflict in the opposite camp, conflict between the desire to maintain peace, and the instinct of national prestige. This leitmotiv of mental paralysis through inner conflict has earlier been emphasised by Hitler. Too few people have read "Mem Kampf," in particular that very important passage, which reads as follows: —"The clever victor will invariably inflict his demands successively and on separate sections of the vanquished and crushed peoples— and any people that does not see fit to resist is a people that is Avorthless from the point of view of character. He can then rely upon the fact that no section of the said people will

think it worth while to take up arms. The more pressure exercised, the less justified it appears to the vanquished to take up arms against each successive pressure, seemingly, on separate sections, but ever recurring—especially Avhen they have already endured so much misfortune in silence and resignation."

"UNCONSCIOUS ACCOMPLICES."

Mental paralysis through conflict of spirit, that is probably the secrqt of the success hitherto achieved by Hitler. But it is clear that such paralysis can only overtake an already Aveakened community. And here is a Avide field for the deliberate and unconscious accomplices of the party. A doubt expressed by a veritable patriot as to the continuity of a policy casts confusion in the masses. In the history of each revolution, one notes the complete under-estimation of the forces of order in comparison with the revolutionary factors. If a leading politician admits that the initiative is lacking for this or that. necessary but difficult enterprise; if one admits Oneself that one cannot keep pace with the demands of the age; if an elementary confidence of vocation fails—this inferiority complex with regard to one's own strength amounts to over-estimation of the adverse elements and is the preliminary stage of mental paralysis. The original hue of resolution is lacking—Hamlet is inevitably faced with the active Fortinbrass as heir to the kingdom.

The West is Hamlet; Hamlet is the dying bourgeoisie. This is Hitler's suggestion. The history of all successful riots and revolutions shoAvs that the fatal factor in the capitulation of the old regime Avas its repugnance to shedding blood. The will to yield rather than precipitate disaster by resistance is quite typical. The objection to taking a decision, to responsibility, the idea of redemption through submission rather than run the risk of an onerous resolution. All this is the characteristic attitude of a capitulating regime, as corroborated point for point in the psychological history of successful rebellions and revolutions. THE YIELDER WILL YIELD AGAIN. Hitler has largely utilised his experience. He has elaborated thereupon a political strategy and tactics Avhich he regards as infallible. Hence the slogans of the National Socialist propaganda: "Offensive—never defensive— never discussion!" He who agrees to argue is lost in advance. This preference for brutality, the trick of savagery and discourtesy, this deliberate incivility—all these minor and major tactics of a carefully-thought-out method prolonged into conversation are intended to paralyse the Avill of the opponent, to intimidate him, and to force him to yield. But the same object is pursued in all those promises of amendement, all those assurances that no more ground for conflict exists. It is thought that an opponent who yields once will always yield. To reassure the adverse party, the maxim not to Aviden the gulf, not to irritate thei enemy, the preoccupation to soap his path—all these tricks have been utilised by the master technicians of . mental paralysis to develop the symptoms of the opponent. The political development in the Third Reich and the succ^s of Hitler's initiatives up to now in the international field probably justify these methods of appreciation. Even quite lately, Avere there not signs of a-further success of these methods? Possibly falsely interpreted, but nonetheless fatal. WHAT MAY HAPPEN NEXT. When one is acquainted Avith the inner rules of the Hitlerian tactics, there is no difficulty in predicting what the Fuhrer will do next. What will happen? The increasing crisis due to the pressure of the Axis Powers is to lead to a psychological crisis in which the Western Powers, owing to ! their definite will to peace, will be absolutely compelled to make further concessions. A brutal attack upon Danzig and a seemingly limited objective in the form of the so-called corridor— apparently a justified action —will be followed by a general offer for a peace pact. All will be done to persuade the Western PoAvers to capitulate. Poland will be put in the wrong. The campaign against Poland Avill be limited to the occupation of Danzig and the guaranteeing of the German claims to Danzig and the corridor. With his offer of peace, Hitler will make proposals for disarmament —possibly the elimination of the heavy bombing machines and of raids upon unfortified towns. Hitler- will express his willingness to elucidate all pending problems at a general peace conference and to sign a collective treaty of peace providing for the restoration of more liberal trade relations. Andj he calculates, no one in the West will hesitate to accept, if the alternative lies in the complete occupation of Poland— according to the resistance offered on the west front — actions in the Mediterranean, on the west front itself, and in the north. Surely the will to resist must be paralysed by this demonstration. In particular, if the public in the Western States continue to ignore that Hitler only requires this further concession in order to embark upon a campaign for the domination of Europe. HITLER'S MISCALCULATION. The only thing in which Hitler makes a miscalculation is that an offer of peace on his part has no longer any value and that his Avord has no worth. But, reasons Hitler, why does the enemy persist in ignoring this fact, why does the enemy offer him peace, just as if he were a trustAVorthy partner? This, he concludes, is an admission of the Aveakness of the enemy positions. For anyone Avho is really strong, who has a good conscience, says his mind—no more treaties with a regime which has broken its promise like the National Socialists. If they were really sure of themselves, they would demand, but never offer. A mistaken interpretation, manifestations which are not sufficiently unambiguous—this is the misfortune which threatens to drive Europe into war almost inevitably. The psychological crisis into which Hitler threatens to plunge the Western Powers is looming on the horizon. But if the Western Powers resist nothAvithstanding Hitler's expectations—how then can peace be saved?

The system of mental paralysis must be applied by the adversaries of the Axis to the dynamic forces of that regime. They are also susceptible to this suggestion: an idea that is gradually emerging on the other side, and casts the match in the powder barrel of a finished regime. But, here again, the offensive is necessary. Political ideas are offensive weapons, but cannot be utilised for the defensive. And truth must be persuasive if it is to be acceptable. Propaganda is an unpleasant word and a more unpleasant fact. But truth is also difficult to convey. And if there is anything that can still prevail in and beyond the realm of T-Jational Socialism, in the field of spiritual conflict, it is that maxim of Hitler's: "Ahvays offensive, never defensive."