Evening Post TUESDAY, JULY 13, 1939. THE ISSUES IN CHINA

Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 15, 18 July 1939, Page 8

Evening Post TUESDAY, JULY 13, 1939. THE ISSUES IN CHINA

Underlying the many external and superficial manifestations of Japanese feeling against the British in China are fundamental issues which gravely affect the future relations of the two countries. Both are in China today, but ou different bases. Britain is there as a trading nation established iii the treaty ports of China nearly a hundred years with heavy accumulated investments in property of all kinds. Japan is there as an invader with tlie motive of acquiring a predominant influence over the destinies of China to the exclusion of Western nations. Japan's oft-repeated motto is "East I Asia for the East Asiatics," and her j ahu is to found "a new order inj the Far East." As late as July 6\ the Premier of Japan (Baron j Hiranuma), referring to the coming Anglo-Japanese talks over the blockade and other incidents in Tientsin and elsewhere, said that tlie talks would have "no meaning unless Britain clearly understood Japan's aim in building a new order in the Far East." Should Britain refuse to recognise Japan's main point and to accept her claim, he declared, there would be no course left to Japan but to break off the talks. Then.he added: Japan respects the rights and interests of third Powers in the foreign concessions, but if they obstruct the building of the new order in East Asia, she will resolutely reject such attempts. To this might be added tlie statement of the . Japanese Minister of War (General Itagaki) : Should the Chiang Kai-shek regime collapse tomorrow it would be necessary to crush the anti-Japanese policy of third Powers, which must be accomplished at any cost in order to free China from her semi-colonial conditions. In the face of such uncompromising utterances the indignities inflicted on British subjects, the blockade of the British concession at Tientsin, and occurrences at Swatow and elsewhere cannot be regarded as mere regrettable incidents due to the presence of third Powers in the theatre of an undeclared war between Japan and China. As such they could be discussed between national representatives of the offending and injured parties, and suitable apologies, reparation, and compensation arranged as often on similar occasions all over the world in the past. Instead the whole business assumes. the character of part and parcel of a set policy pursued by Japan with the intention of raising the major issues already set out by Japanese leaders. Similarly the violent anti-British agitation in Japan itself and in the areas of China under Japanese control where the British are present, is only another aspect of the design to press the issues to a decision one way or the other. It was to these issues that the British Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain) referred in his Cardiff speech of June 24 when he said that the Tientsin affair had been complicated by public statements oy local Japanese officials making the incident a pretext for quite inadmissible claims for an alteration of the policy which we and other Governments have hitherto followed hi these regions. ... No British Government could submit to dictation from another Power as to its foreign policy. Since then, after many delays, the British Ambassador at Tokio (Sir Robert Craigie) has managed to get the Japanese Foreign Minister (Mr. Arita) to agree to a preliminary discussion of the Tientsin affair. Unfortunately, the preliminaries have been conducted in an unpleasant atmosphere of strong anti-British agitation among the people of Japan, with demonstrations, including a delegation which is reported to have delivered a resolution at the British Embassy stating that tlie seven million citizens of Tokio are "determined to oyerthrow Britain as the enemy of humanity." All this is characteristic of similar agitations in Italy and Germany when European issues are raised, but they do not affect tlie issues themselves there or in China. So, in the House of Commons yesterday, replying to questions, Mr. Chamberlain preserved his usual calmness and declined to be side-tracked. He said that the discussion in Tokio between Sir Robert Craigie and Mr. Arita had been adjourned to give time for the further consideration of the issues raised. Mr. Chamberlain said lie would like to make it clear that Britain would not and could not so act as it had been stated Japan de-

sired her, to do in regard to her foreign policy at the demand of another Power, nor had Britain received any such demand from Japan. In Sir Robert Craigie's opinion, he added, the Japanese official attitude would more correctly be described as "a desire that Britain should endeavour to regard the Sino-Japancse hostilities with more understanding of the difficulties and of Japan's side of the case. Further, Britain shared the Ambassador's view thai to attribute to Japan intentions which might be found to have no basis in fact would only be calculated to prejudice the forthcoming negotiations." These negotiations, from the British point of view, concern Tientsin, and at Cardiff Mr. Chamberlain stated that up to the present no formal claims, of the wider character set up by local Japanese officials at Tientsin, had been put forward by the Japanese Government, and, he added, "if the issue is confined to the original subject of dispute it ought lo be possible to settle it by negotiation.'"'

Whether the Japanese point of viewhas been officially conveyed to the British Government or not, it has been publicly announced by the responsible Japanese leaders alreadyquoted. It is this that imperils the prospects of the negotiations, and ''The Times," in its latest comment, says: "There is little hope of any result but a deadlock if Japan persists in claiming British aid against China . . . the Japanese demand for such a concession cannot succeed if the Government of this country stands by its refusal to become passive accomplices of the Japanese militarists." This view may be taken as a fair presentation of public opinion throughout/the Empire.