MOTORIST'S DUTY

Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 12, 14 July 1939, Page 11

MOTORIST'S DUTY

4FTER AN ACCIDENT

RENDERING ASSISTANCE

Two convictions against William Alexander Tait, the driver of a vehicle causing the death of Neil Harris and Vera Thomson, who was charged at Dunedin on four counts, were quashed by the Court of Appeal today, a case having been stated by Mr. Justice Blair for the opinion of the Court. The two persons were killed outright, but Tait, besides being found guilty of negligent driving causing death, was found guilty on the third and | fourth counts —failing to render all! practicable assistance to the two persons injured, and failing to ascertain that he had injured Vera Thomson.

The Court consisted of the Chief Justice (Sir Michael Myers), Mr. Justice Blair, Mr. Justice Johnston, and Mr. Justice Northcroft.

The questions for the Court of Appeal were: Did the conduct of Tait in leaving Neil. Harris (the other person lolled) on seeing that he was dead andmaking no attempt to render assistance justify his conviction on the third count of the indictment; did his failure to ascertain the death of Vera Thomson justify his conviction under the third count: and did the fact that Vera Thomson was killed outright in the accident in any respect touch the correctness of the verdict ol guilty to the fourth count of the indictment?

Referring to the first question, the judgment of the Court (delivered by the Chief Justice) said: "But, in point of fact, Harris was dead at the time so that no 'practicable assistance' could be rendered. A motorist must, however, understand that, when an accident has happened and he goes away without having rendered any assistance by reason of ah assumption that the injured person is dead —which assumption turns out to be wrong—he does so at his peril." The second question was answered thus: "Seeing that she, too, was killed outright as the result of the accident, it seems immaterial so far as the third j count of the indictment is concerned j whether or not the prisoner knew that she had been injured. The fact is that she was dead, and no 'practical assistance' could be rendered."

"So far as the fourth count is concerned, the direction was correct as far as it went," continued the judgment. "But it did not go far enough. The prisoner, in fact, failed to ascertain that a second person had been injured, and it therefore became necessary for the jury to find whether on the evidence there was a reasonable excuse for such failure. The answer to that question would depend upon all the surrounding circumstances, such as the steps that the prisoner took, the nature and extent of the search made, the distance that the deceased had been thrown, probably the nature of the ground, and possibly the conditions regarding visibility. It is probable, or, at least, possible, that if they had been directed on this point, the jury might not have convicted. The conviction on the fourth count therefore cannot stand."

The conditions on the third and fourth counts were quashed. The prisoner has already been sentenced on the major charge of negligent driving causing death.