A BATTLE FLEET

Evening Post, Volume CXXVII, Issue 131, 6 June 1939, Page 11

A BATTLE FLEET

TO PROTECT DOMINION

BRITISH ACTION CERTAIN

STRATEGIC POSITION

(By "Autolycus.")

To those who. recall the significant declaration of Sir Samuel Hoare, when he was First Lord- of the Admiralty, that Britain would have to establish her battle fleet on a two-hemisphere basis there will be nothing surprising in the recent London cablegrams forecasting such a move. What may be news is the linking of it,with the recent conference held at Wellington on Pacific defence.

However,' it will be readily understood that the question of naval power in the Pacific was very fully discussed at this conference. The Australians have revealed themselves anxious to have a battle fleet stationed at Singapore at the earliest possible moment, and are willing to accept even one or two battleships if they are unable to obtain any more, as it is pointed out that there were only two capital ships oh the China Station in 1914. Also there is a sharp realisation, both in the Commonwealth. and in this country, that our first line of defence is far overseas; that, iri fact, with the threat of a strong fleet based on Singapore on the flank, the (somewhat doubtful) attraction of a move to the southward in force is likely to appear less compelling to the Far Eastern member of the Anti-Communist Pact. It must be obvious that the great base which Britain has built at Singapore, and to which Australia and New Zealand have contributed, will not remain without strong forces, assigned to it, and it is possible that if British interests in China wane still further those forces will be stronger even than appears likely today. BEFORE THE WORLD WAR. For despite the fact that there,has been a very marked change in the ■ political situation in the Pacific, the fleet which Britain maintained on .the China Station in 1914 was more powerful, if today. The China Station is much the greatest in extent of the six stations of the Brtish fleet; it extends from the Arctic to below the Equator, and from east to west it is about one-quarter of the circumference of the globe. To police it in 1914 Britain had stationed there two batleships, .four cruisers, eight destroyers, four torpedo-boats, three submarines, and sixteen sloops and river, gunboats. The strength of the fleet on the China Station today is five cruisersj eight destroyers, one aircraft carrier, five escort vessels, fifteen submarines, six motor torpedo-boats, •and seventeen river gunboats which are employed on the Yangtze and West Rivers. In 1914, also, we enjoyed the advantage of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had been in existence since 1902 and which gave gave us the support of the Japanese fleet; a fleet which proved itself capable of undertaking the work of providing naval defence throughout the Far East. In 1919 this alliance was terminated and today Japan's links are with the Fascist Powers. Iri 1914," also, there was a useful Australian fleet consisting of one battle-cruiser, four light criusers, three destroyers,' ~and two submarines. Today there is no capital ship* on the Australian Station, though Australia is anxious for one, is even considering providing a dock in Sydney Harbour capable of taking one, and is raising her cruiser strength to six. So it will be seen that, in a strategical situation which has vastly altered, the strength of the British Navy in, the Far East and in- the Pacific has not been raised in any way commensurate with the loss of strength resulting from1 the end of the Anglo-Japanese Pact. REINFORCEMENT CERTAIN. In these circumstances, and with the fears which have arisen in Australia in the last.two years, it is inevitable that Britain should reinforce the Pacific Fleet. The commonly-expected move on her part will be the dispatch of the five Royal Sovereign class- battleships to' Singapore as soon as her new building programme is sufficiently advanced for this to be done., But in addition the new cruisers of the Southampton class (of 10,000 tons and mount- 5 ing 12 6in guns) arfe already being ordered abroad for service. Some -. them are now on the East Indian station- as new ships are built the sisterships will be sent to the Far East. The Edinburgh and the Belfast are expected to serve their maiden commissions in the Pacific. The D class destroyers which are now on the-China station will be replaced by more modern ships as the J and X classes become available: for use with the home and Mediterranean Fleets. Today the main fleets.of Britain are almost evenly divided between those two latter stations. The home fleet consists of five battleships, five cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty-four destroyers, and five submarines. The Mediterranean Fleet has a strength of five battleships, one aircraft carrier, six cruisers, twenty-four destroyers, eight submarines, and six -motor torpedoboats. THE ROLE OF THE FRENCH. A primary aim is to maintain the status of those two fleets and to strengthen the other stations, which are engaged in the essential work of safeguarding Empire lines of communication, without altering the relationship now borne by the home and Mediterranean fleets to neighbouring Powers. But it must be realised that in any conflict Britain would almost certainly have the assistance of the French Navy, which would vastly strengthen her position in European waters- as far as capital ships and cruisers are concerned. In fact, apart from the shortage of the smaller ships to carry out the work of commerce protection, the position of Britair. supported by France, against a possible German-Italian coalition would be very.strong and would give a preponderance in ,capital ships of 21 to 9 even if Germany's three vessels of the Deutschland class, which are officially rated as "armoured ships" be included. That' being the position it is not as difficult for Britain to contemplate the establishment of a two-hemisphere fleet as may be thought. It is true that today, after a. long period of naval restriction, she lacks the Second Fleet of fourteen battleships and two cruiser squadrons and the Third (Reserve) • Fleet of fourteen battle ships and five cruiser squadrons which she possessed 25 years "ago. But the resulting position is not one which can be improved by regretting this fact. Nor, it must be emphasised, did .Britain lose as much as is commonly supposed by the policy' of naval limitation which the Powers adopted at Washington. She was faced with the loss of her naval supremacy to the. United States anyhow, and at Washington she merely accepted'this situation, on the best terms" for - herself, avoiding a costly- and- useless naval race, the 'building- of many ships which would have been absolete today in

any case,, (some of them were obsolete while still on the stocks), and the alienation of the United States by lack of good sense. Nor, in the light f the development of air pow°r, is it clear just how useful a large number of old ships would have been in a new war. RESERVOIRS OF STRENGTH. And in addition it must be realised that the Mediterranean and home fleets are regarded as-reservoirs from which strength may be tapped to supply any threatened area in any ocean. Put in another way, a glance at the list of stations of the British Fleet will show that while it is part of naval pojjfy to maintain a cruiser squadron, for The protection of commerce, in every ocean, the battle fleet is in conception,' and in fact, a highly mobile force able to go anywhere at a few hours' notice, and, provided that bases are available, may serve in an area for months on end. In practice the stations of these battle fleets are dictated by the presence of foreign fleets, and any threat of an unfriendly battle fleet in the Far East would naturally bring battleships towards the Pacific. And in posting such a force at Singapore there is the additional advantage of closing the route to the Indian Ocean, .where about one-quarter of Britain's merchant marine is to be found every day of the year.